Appellant Bonnie Figuero appeals the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law, which nullified a $112,626.99 jury verdict in Figuero’s favor. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

Figuero was a distributor for Appellee Pepperidge Farm, Inc. (“Pepperidge Farm”) in Mississippi. On August 9, 2003, Pepperidge Farm terminated Figue-ro’s distributorship agreement (the *508 “Agreement”). Figuero sued Pepperidge Farm, and a jury trial was conducted from May 22-24, 2006. The jury found that: (1) Pepperidge Farm terminated the Agreement “with cause” and (2) Pepper-idge Farm did not act in bad faith. These two findings are not contested on appeal. The jury was instructed — pursuant to language in the Agreement — that if it found a termination with cause, then Figuero was entitled to receive compensation “in accordance with the established business practices of [Pepperidge Farm], and each party’s right to receive any favorable balances and obligation to pay any adverse balances.” The jury awarded Figuero $121,000, less $8,373.01 previously tendered by Pepperidge Farm, for a total award of $112,626.99.

On June 13, 2006, Pepperidge Farm filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for amendment of the judgment and remitti-tur. Pepperidge Farm argued that, pursuant to its “established business practices,” a reasonable jury could not award $121,000 to Figuero. On July 25, 2006, the district court granted Pepperidge Farm’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.

We review a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. See Ford v. Cimairon Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 828, 830 (5th Cir. 2000). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for that party -with respect to that issue.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Doug Kolojack, Pepperidge Farm’s Director of Operations, provided the only evidence at trial concerning Pepperidge Farm’s established business practices regarding terminations with cause. Mr. Ko-lojack testified that if “a distributorship agreement is terminated for cause, it is Pepperidge Farm’s established business practice to sell that distributorship for whatever price the market will bear and to pay the proceeds of that sale, less any balances owed by the distributor, directly to the distributor upon receipt of the sale proceeds.” Figuero v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., No. 3:04CV929LN, 2006 WL 2088280, at *1 (S.D.Miss. July 25, 2006). Mr. Kolo-jack further testified that, immediately following the Agreement’s termination, Fi-guero’s route was put up for sale. A small portion of the route was sold for $1,000, and Pepperidge Farm retained this entire amount to offset part of Figuero’s indebtedness. In 2006, approximately half of the territory was sold for $10,000. 1 A portion of this amount was applied to Figuero’s remaining balance of $1,626.99, and the rest, $8,373.01, was tendered to Figuero. 2 We find the district court properly concluded that, pursuant to Pepperidge Farm’s established business practices, Fi-guero was only entitled to receive $8,373.01 — the amount that the route sold for and which had already been tendered by Pepperidge Farm.

The jury’s award of $121,000 was based upon Pepperidge Farm’s asking price for the entire territory, based upon the “optimum” value of the distributorship. However, this amount was never offered by any buyer — in fact, no offers were made at *509 all in the first two years the distributorship was up for sale. The district court properly concluded that the contractual language at issue only entitles Figuero to funds pursuant to Pepperidge Farm’s established business practices — i.e., the value that the distributorship actually sold for, less any indebtedness. This is exactly what Pepperidge Farm tendered to Figue-ro, and the district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to Pepperidge Farm.

AFFIRMED.