Moisés Ramirez-Jamaica (Ramirez) appeals his conviction and 46-month sentence for illegal reentry after deportation.

Ramirez first argues that the district court failed to clearly apply the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and failed to explain its reasons for the sentence imposed. Because Ramirez failed to object on this basis below, we review for plain error. See United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2959, 171 L.Ed.2d 892 (2008). Both the Supreme Court and this court have held that, if a sentence is within a properly calculated guidelines range, little explanation is required. See Rita v. United States, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468-69, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005). If the sentence is within a properly calculated guidelines range, it also can be presumed that the sentencing court considered the § 3553 factors. See Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2463-65. In the instant case, the district court’s oral statements at sentencing and its written statement of reasons set out the applicable guideline calculations and adopted the presentence investigation report without change; we have held that the requirement that the district court explain the reasons for the sentence imposed “is satisfied when the district court indicates the applicable guideline range and how it is chosen.” United States v. Hernandez, 457 F.3d 416, 424 (5th Cir. 2006). Therefore, Ramirez has not shown that the district court committed plain error.

Ramirez also seeks to preserve for further review an argument that this court’s precedent effectively reinstated a mandatory Guidelines scheme. Because Ramirez did not raise this argument below, review is for plain error. See United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 339-40 (5th Cir. 2008). As we did in Campos-Maldonado, we conclude that this argument does not rise to the level of “reversible plain error.” Id. Furthermore, Ramirez’s sentence, at the bottom of the correctly determined guidelines range, is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness that Ramirez has not overcome. See United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006).

Finally, in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), Ramirez challenges the constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of the offense that must be found by a jury. This argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). United States v. Pineda-Arrellano, 492 F.3d 624, 625 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 872, 169 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008).

AFFIRMED.