Joaquin Hernandez-Vasquez appeals the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States after deportation. The sentence was within a properly calculated advisory guidelines range that was increased by a prior conviction for a crime of violence (COV).

Hexmandez-Vasquez contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court did not give a sufficient explanation for the sentence. Because Hernandez-Vasquez did not object to the explanation at sentencing, we review this contention for plain eiror. See United States v. Lopez-V elasquez, 526 F.3d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 2008). The district court explained that the sentence was based on the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), independently and as embodied in the Guidelines; additional elaboration was unnecessary. See id.; see also Rita v. United States, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2463-65, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007); United States v. Hernandez, 457 F.3d 416, 424 (5th Cir. 2006). There was no clear or obvious error that affected Vasquez’s substantial rights or rendered the sentence procedurally unreasonable. See United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 339-40 (5th Cir. 2008).

Hernandez-Vasquez also contends that Gall v. United States, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), and Kimbrough v. United States, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), which issued after his sentencing, abrogated the rationale of previous Fifth Circuit decisions by broadening the distiiet *941 court’s discretion to impose a nonguide-lines sentence. He argues, therefore, that the sentencing court labored under a misconception that it could not sentence Vasquez below the Guidelines in the absence of “extraordinary circumstances” or based on the court’s disagreement with guidelines policy or based on disfavored guidelines factors such as hardship to Vasquez’s children.

Because this theory was not argued in the district court, we review for plain error. See Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d at 339-40; United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2959, — L.Ed.2d — (2008). Nothing in the record suggests that the district court was constrained by this court’s precedent from considering all of Hernandez-Vasquez’s arguments for a nonguidelines sentence. Accordingly, there was no plain error. See Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d at 339-40.

Hernandez-Vasquez also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because there is no empirical support for U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, the Guideline mandating the COV increase. He did not challenge the empirical grounds for § 2L1.2 in the district court, so his contention is reviewed for plain error. See Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d at 339-40. Nothing in the record suggests that the district court believed that it was precluded by circuit precedent from imposing a lesser sentence in the face of § 2L1.2. Moreover, pre-Gall precedent did not prevent a district court from giving a lower sentence than advised by § 2L1.2. See id.; United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 557 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2008).

Hernandez-Vasquez shows no plain error. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.