Mexican citizen Mirna Lizeth Rodriguez petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an order of removal entered by the Immigration Judge (IJ). Rodriguez contends that the BIA and IJ erred by refusing to afford her the benefit of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(I), which excludes time spent in the United States by a minor from the calculation of a period of unlawful presence.

The plain language of § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(I) limits its application to § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i). Cf. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (looking first to plain language in interpreting statute). Rodriguez was deemed inadmissible under another provision, § 1182(a)(9)(C), which sets forth more culpable conduct than does subsection (a)(9)(B). See Mortera-Cruz v. Gonzales, *307 409 F.3d 246, 255-56 (5th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing subsections). Further, § 1182(a)(9)(C) has its own exception and waiver provisions, which do not include any exception for minors. See § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) & (iii). The inclusion of some waivers implies the exclusion of others. See Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489, 499 (5th Cir. 2003).

In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that, although “unlawful presence” has the same general meaning in subsections (a)(9)(B) and (a)(9)(C), there is no presumption “that the waiver provisions are also incorporated, particularly where they are contained in separate provisions and not within the definition itself.” Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that “hardship” waiver of § 1182(a)(9)(B) was not incorporated into § 1182(a)(9)(C)).

Rodriguez was properly held to be removable under § 1182(a)(9)(C). Her petition for review is DENIED.