James Curbow, Texas prisoner # 900052, moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) following the district court’s order denying IFP status and certi *829 fying that his appeal is not taken in good faith. The district court dismissed Cur-bow’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit as frivolous.

Curbow argues that the defendants failed to protect him and were deliberately indifferent to his safety when they called for outdoor recreation after being warned that a prison riot would occur. Curbow was stabbed and beaten during the riot. Curbow argues that the defendants obviously knew that the riot would ensue because they had been told by a prison instructor who heard about the planed riot from an inmate and because they were prepared with gas grenades.

Curbow’s “appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Curbow’s motion for leave to proceed IFP is therefore granted. This court may, however, address the merits of Curbow’s claims at this time and may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998); Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).

Even if Curbow has alleged sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding that the defendants were “subjectively aware of a risk to inmate health or safety,” see Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2003), “[n]o liability exists, ... if an official reasonably responded to a known substantial risk, ‘even if the harm was ultimately not averted.’ ” Longoria v. Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 593 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). Curbow has alleged that prison supervisors repositioned security officers, equipped them with full riot gear, and placed them in the recreation yards. Cur-bow admits that prison officials were positioned and ready to respond prior to recreation being called. The district court’s conclusion that the defendants reasonably responded to a potentially substantial risk was not an abuse of discretion. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 345-48, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986); Stanley v. Foster, 464 F.3d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 2006).

Curbow also argues that his due process rights were violated because he was found guilty in a prison disciplinary proceeding of fighting in the riot. Curbow argues that the determination of his guilt was based solely on Hinkle’s false testimony. Curbow lost good-time credits in the proceeding, along with other privileges.

Curbow’s due process claim is not cognizable in his § 1983 suit because a judgment in his favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of his prison disciplinary proceeding. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481-82, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); see also Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

IFP GRANTED; AFFIRMED.