Luis Antonio Garces-Soto (Garees) petitions this court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision dismissing his appeal from a final order of removal. Garees asserts that the BIA erred when it denied him a waiver of inadmissibility under former § 212(c) (8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1996)) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and a suspension of deportation.

Garees argues that he is eligible for a § 212(c) waiver of inadmissibility on a nunc pro tunc basis and that the BIA erred as a matter of law in holding that it lacked the authority to grant such a waiver. Garees is not entitled to nunc pro tunc relief. See Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2007).

Garees also argues that he is eligible for a § 212(c) waiver because there is a comparable ground of inadmissibility in § 212(a), namely a crime involving moral turpitude, for his conviction of sexual abuse of a minor. Garces’s arguments are foreclosed by this court’s precedent. See Avilez-Granados v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 869, 871-72 (5th Cir. 2007).

Garees further argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he was not eligible for a suspension of deportation under former 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2). Garees also contends that because the BIA failed to specifically adopt the reasoning and set forth its own reasons for finding Garees ineligible for a suspension of deportation, the matter should be remanded to the BIA for further consideration. Garees cannot satisfy the go.od moral character requirement of former § 1254(b) because he was convicted of an aggravated felony (sexual abuse of a minor) in 1993. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8).

Accordingly, Garce's’s petition for review is DENIED, and Garces’s motion to stay is DENIED AS MOOT.