Alfonso Pacheco Parra appeals the 121-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Parra argues that the district court erred by applying U.S.S.G. § 2Sl.l(a)(l) rather than § 2Sl.l(a)(2) because the offense level for the underlying offense cannot be determined. Parra contends that the offense level cannot be determined because the drug types and drug amounts involved in the underlying offense are unknown.

Ordinarily, the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 594, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). “Neither Gall, Rita v. United States, [551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) ], nor Kimbrough v. United States, [552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007) ] purport to alter [this court’s] review of the district court’s construction of the Guidelines or findings of fact.” United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008). This court reviews the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Charon, 442 F.3d 881, 887 (5th Cir. 2006). A factual finding is clearly erroneous only if, based on the entirety of evidence, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. United States v. Valdez, 453 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2006). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible in light of the entire record. Id.

Parra failed to establish the information contained in the PSR was materially untrue. See United States v. Davis, 76 F.3d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1996). The district court therefore did not clearly err in relying on the drug types and quantities set forth in the PSR. See United States v. Vital, 68 F.3d 114, 120 (5th Cir. 1995). Because drug types and quantities were known, the underlying offense level was determinable. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in applying § 2Sl.l(a)(l) rather than § 2S1.1(a)(2).

While Parra’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Cuellar v. United States, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1994, 170 L.Ed.2d 942 (2008). Parra concedes that, in light of Cuellar, the factual basis was sufficient to support his money laundering conviction because it set forth evidence indicating why he moved the money. Because Parra intentionally relin *533 quished his right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis, this issue is unre-viewable. See United States v. Musquiz, 45 F.3d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.