Stephen Michael Ewing appeals his jury trial convictions for conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service and multiple counts of tax evasion, mail fraud, making a false statement to a government agency, and making false statements in relation to health care matters. On appeal, Ewing argues only that his previously retained counsel provided ineffective assistance during pre-indictment discussions with the Government. Ewing asserts that his counsel failed to advise him of the risks of his cooperation with the Government and failed to negotiate any sort of immunity agreement in return for his cooperation.

In the absence of a right to counsel, a defendant has no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); *698 Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88, 102 S.Ct. 1300, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 (1982). The Supreme Court has held that the “right to counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the defendant.” United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984). Adversary judicial proceedings may begin “by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972).

In the instant case, although Ewing was warned in 2004 that he might have some criminal exposure, “adversary judicial proceedings” did not commence until an indictment was filed 2007. See Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 187, 104 S.Ct. 2292; Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877. Because Ewing’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached, he had no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during his pre-indictment discussions with the Government. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546.

AFFIRMED.