Charles Egbert Clarke, a native and citizen of Guyana, petitions this court for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal and affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) order finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had committed an aggravated felony; removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) because he had been convicted of a controlled substance violation; and removable pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. Because Clarke did not present any argument before the BIA challenging the IJ’s determination that he was removable pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), no such argument may be considered now. See Witter v. INS, 113 F.3d 549, 554 (5th Cir. 1997). Section § 1227(a)(2)(B)© provided an alternate basis for his removability, and, therefore, any challenges to his removability now are unavailing.

Clarke contends that the BIA erred in finding that he had committed an aggravated felony such that he was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. Clarke was convicted in New York in 2006 of criminal possession of crack cocaine in the seventh degree after he had been convicted in New York in 1995 of criminal possession of cocaine in the seventh degree. The BIA did not err in concluding that Clarke had committed an aggravated felony for immigration law purposes. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 570 F.3d 263, 266-68 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1012, — L.Ed.2d - (2009); Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284, 290-91 (5th Cir. 2007). Clarke also claims that several due process violations occurred with respect to his removal proceedings. Because those claims were not exhausted before the BIA, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider them. See Roy v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 137 (5th Cir. 2004).

Clarke has also filed a petition for review (PFR) of the BIA’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. The argu- *732 merits involved in that PFR are identical to arguments raised with respect to Clarke’s PFR from the BIA’s dismissal of his appeal. Accordingly, Clarke’s PFR from the denial of his motion for reconsideration lacks merit for same reasons above. The Government moves to dismiss Clarke’s PFR from the denial of his motion for reconsideration.

For the reasons stated above, Clarke’s PFR from the dismissal of his appeal is DENIED, his PFR from the denial of his motion for reconsideration is DENIED, and the Government’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as unnecessary.