Juan Ayavaca-Zeas (Ayavaca) petitions this court for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen his in absentia removal proceedings. Ayavaca argues that the BIA erred by denying his motion to reopen because notice of the March 27, 1995, hearing was only mailed to his attorney. He contends receipt of the notice of hearing by counsel is insufficient and, as a result, his in absentia order should be rescinded.

The decision to reopen proceedings is a discretionary decision, and this court applies a highly deferential abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen. Lara v. Trominski, 216 F.3d 487, 496 (5th Cir. 2000). This court will affirm the BIA’s decision as long as it is not “capricious, racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so irrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result of any perceptible rational approach.” Singh v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Ayavaca has not shown that the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen. Receipt of the notice of hearing by counsel is sufficient notice because personal service on Ayavaca was not practicable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2), *318 (c)(3)(B) (1994). Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ayavaca’s motion to reopen. The petition for review is DENIED.