Jesus Marrufo appeals his conviction for failing to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SOR-NA), 1 a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Four issues remain, each of which is foreclosed by court precedent.

First, Marrufo makes what he is calling a sufficiency of the evidence claim. The parties agree that the government had to prove that Marrufo (1) was required to register under SORNA, (2) traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, and (3) “knowingly fail[ed] to register or update a registration as required by [SORNA].” 2 Marrufo focuses on the third prong, urging conviction requires proof the defendant “knew” the specific SORNA requirements. We have consistently rejected this type of argument, commenting that “ignorance of the law is not a defense” and “ ‘SORNA’s criminal provision is not a specific intent law.’ ” 3

*405 Second, Marrufo suggests that his conviction -violates due process because Texas has not yet implemented SORNA’s provisions. This court has already rejected that line of attack. 4 Third, Marrufo argues that, with SORNA, Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause. The defendant concedes this argument is foreclosed by United States v. Whaley. 5 Last, Marrufo urges that SORNA violates his due process rights for not giving sex offenders notice of its registration requirements, but concedes that Whaley also forecloses this argument. 6 AFFIRMED.