J. Umoren appeals the magistrate judge’s denial of his motion to appoint counsel. The district court record reveals no motion for reconsideration or similar filing seeking a ruling of the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); E.D. Tex.R. CV-72; E.D. Tex.R. app. B, R. 4(A). Nor does the record reveal any ruling by the district court in this regard. “The law is settled that appellate courts are without jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from federal magistrates.” 1 United States v. *357 Renfro, 620 F.2d 497, 500 (5th Cir. 1980) (pretrial matters may be referred to magistrate judges under § 636(b)(1)(A), but appeals must first go to the district court); see also United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying Ren-fro to questions involving representation by counsel). Our analysis is unchanged even if the magistrate judge acted under the general authority of § 636(b)(3), as some precedent suggests may govern the appointment of counsel in civil cases. See Washington v. Estelle, 648 F.2d 276, 281 (5th Cir. 1981); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee’s note (“This rule does not restrict experimentation by the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) involving references of matters other than pretrial matters, such as appointment of counsel.... ”). As we have explained, “[i]f subsection (b) is applicable, ... no direct appeal to the Court of Appeals from the magistrate’s decision is possible,” Glover v. Ala. Bd. of Corrections, 660 F.2d 120, 121 (5th Cir. 1981); see also McLeod, Alexander, Rowel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 925 F.2d 853, 856 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1991), regardless of the particular source of authority within that subsection.

Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.