Charles Edward Sparkman was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. United States v. Sparkman, 289 Fed.Appx. 12, 13 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 939, 173 L.Ed.2d 139 (2009). We affirmed Spark-man’s conviction but remanded the case for resentencing because Sparkman had not been adequately warned about the disadvantages of representing himself at sentencing. Id. On remand, Sparkman was represented by counsel and sentenced to 294 months of imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release. Spark-man now appeals that sentence.

Sparkman was sentenced as an armed career criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). He argues that neither his 1990 conviction for armed robbery, his 1984 conviction for house burglary, nor his 1988 conviction for burglary of an occupied dwelling were violent felonies that qualified as predicate convictions for the enhancement. Because Sparkman concedes that he has two other such predicate convictions, the enhancement was appropriate if any one of the three convictions at issue was a qualifying conviction. See § 924(e). *414 Employing a categorical approach, see Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), and looking only to the documents approved by Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), we conclude that each of the challenged convictions was a qualifying predicate conviction that supported the enhancement. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143.

Sparkman’s brief includes additional arguments that the district court erred in applying offense level enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 and 3C1.1 because the facts supporting those enhancements had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. However, because Spark-man’s sentence was the result of the armed career criminal enhancement, the district court’s determinations with respect to the § 2K2.1 and § 3C1.1 enhancements are irrelevant. Accordingly, we do not reach these arguments.

AFFIRMED.