Kathleen Jennings, Louisiana prisoner #468423, appeals the dismissal, as time barred, of her 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, which she filed to challenge her jury trial conviction of second degree murder. Jennings contends that her § 2254 petition was timely in light of Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 129 S.Ct. 681, 172 L.Ed.2d 475 (2009).

A one-year limitations period applies to state prisoners filing federal habeas petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). In most cases, the limitations period runs from the date that the conviction being challenged became final through “the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Under Jimenez, when a habeas petitioner is granted the right to file an out-of-time appeal, “‘the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review’ must reflect the conclusion of the out-of-time direct appeal, or the expiration of the time for seeking review of that appeal.” Jimenez, 129 S.Ct. at 686-87 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)).

Accordingly, Jennings’ one-year limitation period began to run upon expiration of the 90-day period for seeking a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court following the Louisiana Supreme Court’s denial, on direct review, of her writ application. See Sup.Ct. R. 13.1. In view of the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jennings also argues the merits of her constitutional claims. Because a COA was *907 not granted as to these issues, we will not consider them in this appeal. See Lackey v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1997).

JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED; MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL DENIED.