A jury convicted Omar Demortius Williams of possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base (crack) within 1,000 feet of a public school (count one) and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (count two). The district court sentenced Williams to life in prison on count one and 240 months on count two and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).

Williams argues that the imposition of a life sentence is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. He argues that the gross disproportionality between his life sentence and the sentences for similar crimes in this and other jurisdictions makes his life sentence unconstitutional. Williams asserts that the prior convictions that qualified him for the life sentence were “relatively minor offenses,” two being state jail felonies and one, a more serious felony. He asks this court to consider the disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine sentences and argues that a departure based on such disparity can be reasonable.

Williams’s arguments are foreclosed. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991); United States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 436 (5th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, (Aug. 20, 2009) (No. 09-7385); United States v. Parker, 505 F.3d 323, 330-31 *513 (5th Cir. 2007). Williams’s reliance on Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007) is misplaeed. Kimbrough recognized that district courts remain bound by the statutory minimum sentences in § 841(b)(1). Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 107, 128 S.Ct. 558.

Accordingly, Williams’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.