Floyd Douglas, federal prisoner # 18919-034, appeals the district court’s grant of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence based on the amendments to the crack cocaine Guideline. Douglas argues that the district court abused its discretion in reducing his sentence to near the top of the amended guidelines range, rather than imposing a reduction comparable to his original sentence, which was near the bottom of the guidelines range. Douglas’s appeal waiver does not bar this appeal. See United States v. Cooley, 590 F.3d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 2009).

We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) for an abuse of discretion, and its interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de novo. United States v. Doublin, 572 F.3d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 2009), ce rt. denied, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 517, 175 L.Ed.2d 366 (2009). A sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) is not a full sentencing proceeding; therefore, the reasonableness standard derived from United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 *388 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), does not apply. United, States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 671-72 (5th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed (Jan. 28, 2010) (No. 09-8939); Doublin, 572 F.3d at 237.

Douglas specifically argues that the district court did not properly consider the positive steps he has made towards rehabilitation while he has been incarcerated. The district court was under no obligation to reduce Douglas’s sentence at all, nor was it obligated to impose a particular sentence within the recalculated guidelines range. Evans, 587 F.3d at 673. However, because the district court did, in fact, grant Douglas’s § 3582(c)(2) motion and reduced his sentence, we can assume that the court considered the appropriate factors. Id. Moreover, the district court was not required to provide reasons for imposing the new sentence. Id. at 674. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.