Plaintiffs-Appellants Norman J. Man-ton, Jr. (“Mantón”) and Sherrie Buras Mantón (collectively “Mantons”) appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants-Appellees St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Rodney Jack Strain, Jr. (“Strain”), St. Tammany Parish Sergeant Brian O’Cull (“O’Cull”), and St. Tammany Parish (collectively “Parish”). The district court dismissed the Mantons’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1 concluding that the Mantons had failed to raise an issue of material fact. We AFFIRM the district court.

This case arises from the circumstances surrounding Manton’s arrest. After an interview with a suspect in a bank fraud, a Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office detective learned that Mantón was also involved in the fraud. After several additional interviews, the detective informed St. Tammany officer O’Cull about Manton’s involvement in the scheme. O’Cull obtained a search warrant for Manton’s home and an arrest warrant for Mantón. On January 24, 2008, Police searched Manton’s residence and found a shotgun, which violated the terms of his state probation. The next day, St. Tammany police arrested Mantón for bank fraud and a probation violation. Police held Mantón for four months and released him when the State dropped the bank fraud charges. The Mantons then sued the Parish under § 1983, alleging that the Parish had violated Manton’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights with an unlawful search and seizure. 2

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, taking the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. QBE Ins. Corp. v. Brown & Mitchell, Inc., 591 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2009).

The Mantons allege that the Parish violated Manton’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when the Parish searched Manton’s home and arrested Mantón because the Parish lacked probable cause for valid warrants. “A police officer seeking the issuance of a ... warrant must present an affidavit containing facts sufficient to ‘provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.’ ” Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1109 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). In submitting an affidavit for a warrant, an officer may rely upon “information provided by other officers.” Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, Tex., 883 F.2d 400, 407 (5th Cir. 1989).

The Mantons offer three arguments in support of their claims. First, the Man-tons argue that police did not have probable cause because the affidavits used to obtain the warrants were based upon false information. The Mantons, however, have failed to demonstrate that the affidavits contained false information. Second, the Mantons argue that O’Cull lacked probable *330 cause because he did not have personal knowledge of the investigation’s facts. This argument is without merit: When preparing a warrant affidavit, an officer may rely upon information from other officers. Bennett, 883 F.2d at 407. Third, the Mantons assert that the arrest of Man-ton was illegal because a Jefferson Parish detective told O’Cull not to arrest Manton. But, even if this was true, the Mantons fail to cite any authority that indicates this is a constitutional violation. Therefore, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment.

We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.