Michael Tindall appeals his jury conviction for bank robbery, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of Dr. Ronald Fisher, an expert on the reliability of eyewitness identification. Tindall contends that because his conviction is based on circumstantial evidence and witness identifications based on his voice and gait, Dr. Fisher’s testimony would have helped the jury to determine the reliability of the identifications.

Tindall has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Fisher’s testimony. See United States v. Jackson, 50 F.3d 1335, 1340 (5th Cir. 1995). Because the witnesses who identified Tin-dall had previously known and worked with him for one to 20 years, their identifications were based on their familiarity with Tindall. The Government also presented much circumstantial evidence corroborating the witnesses’ identifications, showing that a few days before the robbery Tindall rented a car identical to the robber’s getaway car; that he returned the car about 20 minutes after the robbery; that two days before the robbery, he was in the area of a truck which had a stolen license plate that was one digit different from the license number a teller identified as being on the getaway car; that he made

a large $5000 cash deposit into his bank account about one hour after the robbery; that he was having severe financial problems at the time of the robbery; that the robber’s helmet was very similar to one worn by Tindall and Lieutenant John Buckholtz in charitable go-cart races; and that police found a helmet very similar to the robber’s helmet in Tindall’s garage. Further, Tindall’s counsel was also able to cross-examine the identification witnesses thoroughly to bring out any problems or weaknesses in their testimony. This case is more similar to United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986), and United States v. McGinnis, 201 Fed.Appx. 246 (5th Cir. 2006), than to United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164, 166 (5th Cir. 1987). The evaluation of the reliability of the witnesses’ identification was within the common sense of the jury and did not require the aid of expert testimony. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Dr. Fisher’s testimony would have been more confusing to the jury than helpful. Therefore, Tindall has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Fisher’s testimony.

AFFIRMED.