Jose Alvarez Alvarez appeals his 24-month sentence for illegal reentry following deportation and falsely representing himself to be a citizen of the United States. He contends: the sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to accomplish the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and the illegal reentry Sentencing Guideline, § 2L1.2, is flawed because: it gives too much weight to a defendant’s prior convictions; it overstates the seriousness of his illegal reentry offense, which he characterizes as nothing more than an international trespass; and it did not account for his personal history and circumstances.

Although post-Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, and a properly-preserved objection to an ultimate sentence is reviewed for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the district court must still properly calculate the Guideline-sentencing range for use in deciding on the sentence to impose. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 48-51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Alvarez does not claim procedural error. A discretionary sentence imposed, as here, within a properly-calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2011).

After considering Alvarez’ assertions at sentencing, the district court determined a 24-month sentence, the lowest in the applicable advisory Guidelines sentencing range, was appropriate. “[T]he sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) with respect to a particular defendant”. United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 2008). Alvarez’ contentions concerning the weight given his prior criminal convictions and his family history and circumstances fail to rebut the above-referenced presumption that his sentence is substantively reasonable. E.g., United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 565-66 (5th Cir. 2008). Further, his assertion that his sentence is unreasonable because his offense is nothing more than an “international trespass” is foreclosed by our court’s precedent. E.g., United States *480 v. Aguirre-Villa, 460 F.3d 681, 683 (5th Cir. 2006).

AFFIRMED.