Gerald Menson (“Menson”) appeals the district court’s dismissal of his federal and state law claims against the City of Baton Rouge and its Department of Public Works (“DPW’). For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM.

I.

Menson filed this claim on March 2, 2012, alleging that his former employers, *434 the City of Baton Rouge and the DPW, unlawfully terminated him on the basis of age and race. After filing multiple charges of discrimination and retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights (“LCHR”), Menson received a final Dismissal and Notice of Rights from the EEOC on September 6, 2011. The Notice informed Menson that he must file suit within ninety days of receipt of the Notice in order to retain his right to sue on that charge. On November 28, 2011, Menson requested a ninety-day extension. The EEOC denied this request verbally in a telephone call. This denial was further confirmed in an undated letter that stated as follows: “This will confirm our telephone conversation of today wherein you were advised that the EEOC could not extend the ninety days to file a lawsuit in the subject charge of employment discrimination.”

Menson filed this complaint against the City of Baton Rouge and the DPW on March 2, 2012, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1969 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Louisiana'Employment Discrimination Law (“LEDL”), La. Rev.Stat. § 23:301 et seq., La.Rev.Stat. 23:967 Louisiana Whistleblower Statute, and La.Rev.Stat. 30:2027 (Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute). The district court dismissed his claims on the basis of prescription. This appeal followed.

II.

Menson’s claims under Title VII and the ADEA have prescribed. Once a plaintiff has received a right to sue letter from the EEOC, he has ninety days to file a suit or he loses the right to pursue his claims. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002); St. Louis v. Texas Worker’s Comp. Comm’n, 65 F.3d 43, 47 (5th Cir. 1995). We strictly construe the ninety-day limitation period. Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379.

Menson argues that the letter confirming the denial of his extension of time request was ambiguous and constituted his actual right to sue letter, with the ninety-day deadline starting upon its receipt. However, the letter clearly explains, “your dismissal and notice of rights was issued on September 6, 2011.” It then provides a copy of the instructions that were attached to the September 6th letter, explaining the ninety-day deadline.

Menson is correct that the equitable tolling doctrine can, in rare circumstances, serve to suspend prescription. Teemac v. Henderson, 298 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 2002). We apply this doctrine, however, “only sparingly,” Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990). It is not appropriate here, where Menson knew of his rights and failed to act.

It is also undisputed that more than one year has passed between the last act of which Menson complained and the time he filed the complaint; therefore, his state claims have also prescribed. See, e.g., Rubinstein v. Adm’rs of Tulane, 58 F.Supp.2d 702, 708 (E.D.La. 1998) aff'd in part, remanded sub nom. Rubinstein v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2000); Langley v. Pinkerton’s Inc., 220 F.Supp.2d 575, 581 (M.D.La. 2002).

III.

For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Menson’s claims.