Willie J. Griffin, Jr., federal prisoner # 04667-017, appeals from the order of the district court denying his petition for habe-as corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Griffin argues that he was actually innocent of any offense because his in *147 dictment failed to specify a quantity of cocaine base, an omission that could not be cured by reference to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), as that subsection requires no specific minimum quantity as do the subsections governing larger amounts. He also contends that § 841(b)(1)(C) was inapplicable because it makes reference to cocaine hydrochloride as a Schedule II substance and makes no reference to cocaine base.

A federal prisoner may attack the validity of his conviction in a § 2241 petition if he can meet the requirements of the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Kinder v. Purdy, 222 F.3d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 2000). The prisoner bears the burden of showing that the remedy under § 2255 would be “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 901 (5th Cir. 2001). A petitioner’s inability to meet the procedural requirements of § 2255 is insufficient to meet this burden. Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 452-53 (5th Cir. 2000). Rather, a prisoner who wishes to proceed under the savings clause must establish that his claim “is based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision which establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense” and that the claim “was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been raised.” Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 904.

Griffin cites to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), McQuiggin v. Perkins, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 185 L.Ed.2d 1019 (2013), and Alleyne v. United States, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), in support of his arguments. Those opinions do not support a holding that Griffin’s claim is based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court opinion indicating that he was convicted of a nonexistent offense and that his claim was foreclosed when it otherwise should have been raised. See Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 904.

AFFIRMED.