Esteban Garcia-Guillen pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry and was sentenced within the advisory guidelines range to 46 months in prison. Garcia-Guillen now appeals the district court’s imposition of a 16-level enhancement for a prior crime of violence pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. However, conceding that his sole issue on appeal is foreclosed by circuit precedent, he moves for summary disposition.

Garcia-Guillen contends that his prior conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 does not constitute a crime of violence for purposes of the § 2L1.2 enhancement. As Garcia-Guillen concedes, he did not raise this argument in the district court, so our review is for plain error. See United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2009). Garcia-Guillen asserts that the Texas offense of burglary of a habitation does not constitute burglary of a dwelling because it defines a dwelling owner as including a person with a greater right to possession. According to Garcia-Guillen, this “greater right to possession” theory is unique to Texas and makes the offense broader than generic burglary.

We recently rejected a materially indistinguishable argument. See United States v. Morales-Mota, 704 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2374, 185 L.Ed.2d 1091 (2013). In light of Morales-Mota, the district court did not commit any error, plain or otherwise, in imposing the enhancement.

The motion for summary disposition is GRANTED. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.