Nicola Miller petitions this Court for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) removal order. An immigration judge found Miller removable pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), as an alien twice convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The BIA affirmed.

The INA affords this Court jurisdiction to review final orders of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). We review de novo the classification of a state conviction as a crime involving moral turpitude. Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2007). In classifying Miller’s conviction of grand theft, Fla. Stat. § 812.014(2)(a), (c)(1), as a crime of moral turpitude, the immigration judge looked beyond the conviction record to a police report, as permitted under the analytical framework proposed by the Attorney General in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (B.I.A. 2008). This Court, however, recently held that the Silva-Trevino framework — insofar as it permits extrinsic examination of documents outside of the conviction record — conflicts with the unambiguous language of the INA. See Silva-Trevino v. Holder, No. 11-60464, 742 F.3d 197, 2014 WL 341213 (5th Cir. 2014). As a consequence, that analytical method does not displace Circuit precedent, which precludes examination of the police report. See Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2006) (describing the Circuit’s modified-eategorieal approach); United States v. Murillo-Lopez, 444 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2006) (listing the documents made available for review by Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005)) (other citations omitted). Accordingly, we GRANT Miller’s petition, VACATE the BIA’s decision, and REMAND for further proceedings.