Carlos Harges pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to failing to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SOR-NA). Prior to his guilty plea, Harges moved unsuccessfully to dismiss his indictment, arguing in part that Congress improperly delegated to the Attorney General the power to decide whether SORNA’s registration requirements applied to sex offenders, like Harges, who were convicted before SORNA went into effect. In his plea agreement, Harges reserved the right to raise this issue on appeal.

We have addressed and rejected previous challenges to SORNA based on the nondelegation doctrine. See United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 917 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 262-64 (5th Cir. 2009). Harges recognizes our precedent, but urges that Reynolds v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 975, 181 L.Ed.2d 935 (2012), calls into question its continued applicability. Reynolds, however, did not explicitly or implicitly overrule Johnson and Whaley; accordingly, we are bound by those decisions. See United States v. Short, 181 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999). Consequently, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.