Melbin Ruben Alcantara Mejia appeals the 30-month within-guidelines sentence imposed following entry of his guilty plea to a charge of illegal reentry after removal. We affirm.

Alcantara Mejia reiterates his challenge to the eight-level enhancement imposed under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(B) based on his Texas conviction for delivery of cocaine, for which he received a six-month sentence. In his view, the Texas conviction did not qualify as a drug trafficking offense because Texas’s definition of delivery is broader than the definition of a drug trafficking offense under § 2L1.2. He asserts that the Texas offense of delivery may be committed by “administering” a controlled substance. He further contends that, for the same reasons, the Texas offense does not qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).

Alcantara Mejia’s claims are foreclosed. See United States v. Teran-Salas, 767 F.3d 453, 460-62 (5th Cir. 2014). In Teran-Salas, we held that there is no “realistic probability that Texas would prosecute [the] crime under an ‘administering’ theory in a way that does not also constitute either ‘dispensing1 or ‘distributing* under the federal sentencing guidelines.” 767 F.3d at 460; see id. at 458-62. Further, “[e]ven without considering the drug type or quantity, conviction under the administer prong is not a realistic probability because no previous Texas case has involved a conviction under this prong.” Id. at 461. Therefore, we concluded that the Texas offense of possession with intent to deliver cocaine was a drug trafficking offense under the Guidelines and an aggravated felony under § 1326(b). Id. at 461-62 & n. 5. By parity of reasoning, the Texas offense of delivery of cocaine is a drug trafficking offense under the Guidelines and an aggravated felony within the meaning of § 1326(b). See id. at 457 n. 1, 461-62 & n. 5.

AFFIRMED.