Jose Mario Castro-Najera (Castro) appeals the 45-month below-guidelines sentence imposed following entry of his guilty plea to a charge of illegal reentry after removal. We affirm.

Castro challenges the 16-level enhancement imposed under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(i) based on his Texas conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, for which he received a sentence longer than 13 months. In his view, the Texas conviction did not qualify as a drug trafficking offense because Texas defines delivery more broadly than § 2L1.2’s drug trafficking offense, given that the Texas offense of delivery may be committed by administering a controlled substance, an act not within the purview of § 2L1.2. He contends further that, for the same reasons, the Texas offense does not qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).

Castro’s claims are foreclosed. See United States v. Teran-Salas, 767 F.3d 453, 460-62 (5th Cir. 2014). In Teran-Sa-las, we concluded that there is no “realistic probability that Texas would prosecute [the] crime under an ‘administering’ theory *411 in a way that does not also constitute either ‘dispensing’ or ‘distributing’ under the federal sentencing guidelines.” 767 F.3d at 460; see id. at 458-62. Further, “[e]ven without considering the drug type or quantity, conviction under the administer prong is not a realistic probability because no previous Texas case has involved a conviction under this prong.” Id. at 461. Therefore, we held that the Texas offense of possession with intent to deliver cocaine was a drug trafficking offense under the Guidelines and an aggravated felony under § 1326(b). Id. at 461-62 & n. 5.

AFFIRMED.