Plaintiff Natalie Konrick worked as a security guard at a refinery in Louisiana that was owned by Defendant Chalmette Refinery, L.L.C., and operated by Defendant Exxon Mobil Corporation. 1 Konrick sued Defendants, alleging that exposure to toxins while at work caused the stillbirth of her baby. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude the expert testimony of Doctors Robert Harrison, Cynthia Bearer, and Lauren Waters on general causation because it found their opinions were based on unreliable methodologies. The district court then granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants because there was no evidence of general causation. On appeal, Konrick argues that the district court erred in excluding the experts’ testimony.

After reviewing the briefs and record, we find no abuse of discretion. See Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Ergonome Inc,, 387 F.3d 403, 408 (5th Cir. 2004). “District courts must carefully, analyze the studies on which experts rely for their opinions *223 before admitting their testimony.” Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 355 (5th Cir. 2007). In a thorough and well-reasoned order, the district court did just that. Furthermore, both the Supreme Court and this court have affirmed the exclusion of expert testimony that was based upon studies with the same flaws identified by the district court. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145-47, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997); Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452, 460-62 (5th Cir. 2012); LeBlanc ex rel. Estate of LeBlanc v. Chevron USA, Inc., 396 Fed.Appx. 94, 99-100 (5th Cir. 2010); Knight, 482 F.3d at 352-55; Vargas v. Lee, 317 F.3d 498, 501-03 (5th Cir. 2003). Ultimately, the district court fulfilled its gatek-eeping function under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and its progeny. Accordingly, we affirm.