Following his guilty-plea conviction of illegal reentry, Francisco Alvaro-Velaseo was sentenced to 48 months of imprisonment, including a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) on account of his conviction of second-degree kidnapping under North Carolina General Statutes § 14-39. Avaro-Velasco contends that the district court “committed reversible plain error by convicting, sentencing, and entering judgment against Alvaro-Ve-lasco under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) based on its determination that his prior kidnapping conviction qualified as a conviction for a ‘crime of violence’ under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and thus one for an ‘aggravated felon/ under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).” Relying primarily on Johnson v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), Alvaro-Velaseo maintains that the definition of a crime of violence in § 16(b), as incorporated by reference into the definition of an aggravated felony in § 1101(a)(43)(F), is unconstitutionally vague on its face. He further contends that this court cannot apply § 16(b) in this case without violating due process.

The government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance, urging that Alvaro-Velasco’s reasoning is foreclosed by United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259). The government is correct that Gonzalez-Longoria forecloses Alvaro-Ve-lasco’s facial vagueness challenge to § 16(b) and his challenge to our applica *855 tion of § 16(b) on due-process grounds. 1 See id. Accordingly, the motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment is AFFIRMED. The government’s alternate motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED as unnecessary.