Following the entry of his guilty plea conviction of illegal reentry, Rudith Val- *405 more Guerrero-Araniva was sentenced to 32 months of imprisonment, based in part on an eight-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C) for his prior conviction of the Texas offense of injury to a child under Tex. Penal Code § 22.04. Guerrero-Araniva argues for the first time on appeal that the distinct court plainly erred by characterizing his 1991 Texas conviction for injury to a child as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) for purposes of applying the § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C) sentencing enhancement and for convicting and sentencing him under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). Relying primarily on Johnson v. United States, — U.S.—, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), Guerrero-Araniva argues that the definition of a crime of violence in 8 U.S.C. § 16(b), which is incorporated by reference into § 1101(a)(43)(F)’s definition of an aggravated felony, is unconstitutionally vague on its face. He further contends that this court cannot apply § 16(b) in this case without violating due process. •

The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance, urging that Guerrero-Araniva’s arguments are foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), pet. for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259). The Government is correct that Gonzalez-Longoria forecloses Guerrero-Araniva’s facial vagueness challenge to § 16(b), as well as his challenge to our application of § 16(b) on due. process grounds. 1 See id. Accordingly, the motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternate motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED.