Israel Perez-Jimenez pleaded guilty to illegal reentry and was sentenced to 30 months of imprisonment. The advisory guidelines calculations included an eight-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C) for a prior, aggravated felony conviction based on Perez-Jimenez’s Texas convictions for burglary of a building and burglary of a vehicle. Perez-Jimenez now argues that the district court erred by characterizing his offenses as aggravated felonies under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) for the purposes of convicting and sentencing him under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). Relying on Johnson v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), Perez-Jimenez argues that the definition of a crime of violence in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which is incorporated by reference into § 1101(a)(43)(F)’s definition of an aggravated felony, is unconstitutionally vague on its face. Perez-Jimenez’s arguments are foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259).

Additionally, Perez-Jimenez challenges his enhanced sentence under § 1326(b), arguing that because the indictment did not allege a prior conviction, his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum penalty for a conviction under § 1326(a). He challenges the validity of Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), in light of Apprendi v. *939 New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). Perez-Jimenez correctly concedes that his argument is foreclosed.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.