Chansavath Thipprachack challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis supporting his guilty plea to the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in McFadden v. United States, 567 U.S. 519, 135 S.Ct. 2298, 192 L.Ed.2d 260 (2015), calls into question our holding in United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1988), that the offense does not require knowledge of a firearm’s interstate nexus. Relying on Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012), Thipprachack additionally contends that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds the federal government’s power under the Commerce Clause.

Because McFadden does not unequivocally direct this court to overrule Dancy, “we are not at liberty to overrule our settled precedent.” United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2013). Moreover, as Thipprachack concedes, his Commerce Clause argument is foreclosed by Alcantar, which rejected a similar challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). Alcantar, 733 F.3d at 145-46.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is DENIED. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). Its alternative motion for an extension of time is DENIED as unnecessary.