Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit challenging Texas’s death penalty protocol as violative of their right to be free from an undue risk of serious pain under the Eighth Amendment and as violative of their right to equal protection under the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Previously, we denied a stay, finding that Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their appeal.1 Nothing subsequent leads us to believe that conclusion was in error, and wé affirm dismissal of those claims for the reasons previously stated.

Additionally, Plaintiffs now appeal the dismissal of their other claims, which center on other aspects of Texas’s death penalty protocol, as time barred.2 The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims for each of the Plaintiffs is controlled by Texas’s personal injury statute of limitations.3 In Texas, the statute of limitations for a personal injury runs “two years after the day the cause of action accrues.”4 A cause of action for a method-of-execution claim accrues at the later of two dates: (1) the conclusion of direct review or (2) the adoption of the challenged protocol.5

Direct review of each of the Plaintiffs’ convictions ended between seven and fourteen years ago.6 Texas last changed its *250death penalty protocol by switching to compounded pentobarbital in September 2013, which serves as the latest possible accrual point for any of the Plaintiffs’ causes of action.7 Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed in the district court on August 12, 2016, outside of the two-year limit under the latest-in-time 2013 accrual date.8 The district court did not err in dismissing those claims as time barred. We affirm. All outstanding motions are denied as moot.

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:

I agree with the majority that, on the showing made, Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims fail on the merits. Further ruling on the statutes of limitations is therefore unnecessary. I recognize that Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 2008), is binding authority in this Circuit and requires plaintiffs seeking solely equitable relief to comply with state statutes of limitations. However, I am concerned that our decision in Walker misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), when it read it to overrule Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946), a case that Wilson neither discussed nor even mentioned. As a member of this court has observed, “[t]he question whether a statute of limitations should apply to a claim such as this one, where the plaintiff seeks purely injunctive relief against an injury that, although certainly foreseeable, has not yet occurred, is a difficult one.” Walker v. Epps, 287 Fed.Appx. 371, 379 (5th Cir. 2008) (King, J., dissenting). As she did, I refer the reader to Judge Myron Thompson’s excellent discussion of this subject, published at Jones v. Allen, 483 F.Supp.2d 1142 (M.D. Ala. 2007).