Francisco Diaz-Sierra pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after removal and was sentenced to 46 months of imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred by applying the crime-of-violence enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2015) based on his prior Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation. We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Njoku, 737 F.3d 55, 75 (5th Cir. 2013).

Diaz was convicted of burglary under Texas Penal Code § 30.02. Section 30.02 is a divisible statute, and we have held that a violation of § 30.02(a)(1) constitutes generic burglary of a dwelling for purposes of the crime of violence enhancement. See United States v. Uribe, 838 F.3d 667, 670-71 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1359, 197 L.Ed.2d 542 (2017); § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) & comment. (n.l(B)(iii)) (2015). Because the state court documents reflect that Diaz pleaded guilty to an offense under § 30.02(a)(1), the district court did not err in applying the crime-of-violence enhancement. See Uribe, 838 F.3d at 671.

AFFIRMED.