Juan Manuel Ramirez-Villalzana appeals his 46-month, within-guidelines sentence *353 for illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. § 1326, asserting that the district court erroneously applied a 16-level “crime of violence” enhancement, under former U.S.S.G. § 2Ll,2(b)(l)(A)(ii), based on his prior Texas convictions for burglary of a habitation. The enhancement was improper, Ramirez-Villalzana contends, because the Texas burglary statute, Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a), does not categorically define a “generic” burglary of a dwelling and is not divisible in light of Mathis v. United States, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016). We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Calderon-Pena, 383 F.3d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 2004).

In Mathis, the Supreme Court explained that the modified categorical approach may be used to distinguish only between alternative elements of a statutory offense, not alternative means of satisfying a single element. 136 S.Ct. at 2249-50, Whether the district court erred thus turns on whether, in light of Mathis, § 30.02(a)’s three subsections constitute elements or means. While the instant appeal was pending, we concluded that § 30.02(a) is a divisible, elements-based statute. See United States v. Uribe, 838 F.3d 667, 669-71 (5th Cir. 2016). Consequently, “the modified categorical approach applies to determine which of the provisions of § 30.02(a) was the basis of [Ramirez-Villalzana’s] convietion[s].” Id. at 671.

Our review of the permissible record documents reveals that Ramirez-Villalza-na’s prior convictions were based on § 30.02(a)(1) and were therefore “generic” burglaries. See United States v. Conde-Castaneda, 753 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2014); see United States v. Constante, 544 F.3d 584, 585 (5th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the district court properly applied the. 16-level “crime of violence” enhancement.

AFFIRMED.