Jorge Turrubiartes-Gonzalez pleaded guilty to a single-count indictment charg *812 ing him with illegal reentry by a previously deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b). On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in applying the 12-level “crime of violence” enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2015) based on his prior conviction of burglary of a habitation in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a).

We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines, including its determination that a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 2L1.2. United States v. Diaz-Corado, 648 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2011). In United States v. Conde-Castaneda, 753 F.3d 172, 176-77 (5th Cir. 2014), we held that § 30.02(a) is a divisible statute and that a conviction under § 30.02(a)(1) qualifies as a generic burglary. We recently revisited the holding in Conde-Castaneda in light of Mathis v. United States, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016). United States v. Uribe, 838 F.3d 667, 670 (5th Cir. 2016) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1359, 197 L.Ed.2d 542 (2017). In Uribe, we decided that § 30.02(a) “is elements-based, it is divisible and the modified categorical approach applies.” Id. at 671. The state court documents clearly show that Turrubiartes-Gonzalez was convicted under subsection (a)(1) of the Texas burglary statute. Accordingly, the district court properly applied the 12-level ‘‘crime of violence” enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii).

AFFIRMED.