Lee Hobdy pleaded guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) and was sentenced to 46 months of imprisonment and a two-year term of supervised release. He challenges the calculation of his guidelines range under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), which states that the base offense level is 20 if the offense occurred after a felony conviction for a crime of violence (“COV”).

Hobdy avers that his Texas robbery conviction no longer qualifies as a COV because the former residual clause and accompanying commentary of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) are invalid in light of Johnson v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). That argument is unavailing, see Beckles v. United States, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 886, 892, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017), and Texas robbery qualifies as an enumerated COV under the former commentary to § 4B1.2. See United States v. Flores-Vasquez, 641 F.3d 667, 670 n.1 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d 376, 380-81 (5th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541; 547-63 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). We need not address Hob-dy’s argument that Texas robbery does not constitute a COV under § 4B1.2 because it lacks the element of use, threatened use, or attempted use of force. See United States v. Olalde-Hernandez, 630 F.3d 372, 376 (5th Cir. 2011).

AFFIRMED.