Jaime Abimel-Medellin appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for'illegal reentry. He argues that the district court reversibly erred by enhancing his base offense level based upon its determination that his prior Texas conviction for assaulting a family member a second time within a year was a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and thus an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).

Abimel-Medellin now argues that the “crime of violence” definition in § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague, both as applied and on its face. He did not raise in the district court his instant argument that § 16(b) is unconstitutional as applied because, in Texas, assaults can be committed recklessly. Accordingly, we review that issue for plain error only. United States v. Neal, 578 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Abimel-Medellin concedes, correctly, that our decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 677-78 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259), forecloses his argument that § 16(b) is unconstitu *290 tional on its face. Furthermore, we held in Gonzalez-Longoria that § 16(b) is constitutional as applied to Texas family-violence assault convictions, like Abimel-Medellin’s, that “consisted of intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing] bodily injury to another.” Id. at 678; see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.11(a); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1). Thus, Gonzalez-Longoria forecloses both of Abimel-Medellin’s constitutional arguments.

The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance based on Abimel-Medellin’s concession that Gonzalez-Longoria forecloses his issues on appeal. The motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED as unnecessary.