Joel Aristigues Arana-Rivera appeals his 42-month sentence for illegally reentering the United States after being deported. Citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court imposed an upward variance of 16 months above the advisory guideline maximum to protect the public and to deter future criminal conduct. The court based the variance on the seriousness of Arana-Rivera’s prior Virginia convictions for aggravated málicious wounding, robbery, and burglary with a deadly weapon.

All sentences are reviewed for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). Arana-Rivera does not allege any procedural error, but contends only that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. Accordingly, we consider whether the sentence “(1) does not account for a factor that should have received significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or (3) represents a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors.” United States v. Chandler, 732 F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Still, we “give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors," on a whole, justify the extent of the variance,” and reversal is not warranted even if we “might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.

Arana-Rivera asserts that the district court did not give adequate weight to his youth at the time of the prior offenses. The court was aware of Arana-Rivera’s youth but reasonably concluded that he had “committed a pretty adult crime.” The court also heard and rejected an account of the criminal activity, in which defense counsel suggested that Arana-Rivera was little more than a guilty bystander.

Although Arana-Rivera denies asking us to reweigh the sentencing factors, he is necessarily asking us to substitute his assessment of those factors for the district court’s assessment, which is contrary to the deferential review dictated by Gall. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. Further, the degree of deviation was comparable to or less than other above-guideline sentences we have affirmed. See United States v. Herrera-Garduno, 519 F.3d 526, 531-32 (5th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases).

In light of the deference due to the sentencing court, the sentence is not substantively unreasonable, and the judgment is AFFIRMED. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.