Fernando Lopez-Rivera appeals the 85-month within-guidelines sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for illegally reentering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He asserts that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because it was greater than necessary to achieve the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for the following reasons: (i) a prior felony drug trafficking offense was double-counted because it was used to impose a 16-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A) (2015) and to increase his criminal history category from V to VI; (ii) the Guidelines overstated the seriousness of his illegal reentry offense, which did not pose a danger to others; (iii) he came to this country as a young child, and he only returned to see his family; and (iv) he will be deterred from further illegal reentry now that he understands the harsh penalties attendant to the offense.

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Because the district court imposed a within-guidelines sentence, it is presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 338 (5th Cir. 2008). The presumption of reasonableness “is rebutted only upon a showing that the sentence does not account for a factor that should receive significant weight, it gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or it represents a clear error of judgment in balancing sentencing factors.” United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009).

Although Lopez-Rivera challenges the presumption of reasonableness as applied to sentences under § 2L1.2 on the ground that the Guideline is not empirically based, he concedes that the issue is foreclosed. See United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2009). We have rejected Lopez-Rivera’s argument that § 2L1.2’s double-counting of a defendant’s criminal history necessarily renders a sentence unreasonable. See United States v. Duarte, 569 F.3d 528, 529-30 (5th Cir. 2009). In addition, we are not persuaded by the argument that illegal reentry is not a serious offense and does not pose a danger to others. See United States v. Aguirre-Villa, 460 F.3d 681, 683 (5th Cir. 2006). Moreover, the fact that Lopez-Rivera returned to the United States to see his family, after having lived here since he was a young child, is an insufficient ground to rebut the presumption of reasonableness applicable to his sentence. See United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 565 (5th Cir. 2008). Finally, Lopez-Rivera’s contention that the harsh penalties associated with his offense will deter him from returning to the United States serves to support the district court’s sentence. See § 3553(a)(2)(B).

Lopez-Rivera has not shown that the district court abused its discretion, and he has not overcome the presumption of reasonableness. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586; Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d at 338. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED,'