Anderson v. Hutson
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Anderson v. Hutson, 114 F.4th 408 (5th Cir. 2024)
Anderson v. Hutson
Opinion
Case: 23-30633 Document: 132-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/26/2024
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
August 26, 2024
No. 23-30633 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Kent Anderson; Steven Dominick; Anthony Gioustavia;
Jimmie Jenkins; Greg Journee; Richard Lanford;
Leonard Lewis; Euell Sylvester; Lashawn Jones,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
United States of America,
Intervenor Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Susan Hutson, Sheriff, Orleans Parish, Successor to Marlin N. Gusman,
Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
City of New Orleans,
Third Party Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:12-CV-859
______________________________
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No. 23-30633
Before Smith, Wiener, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:
This appeal stems from twelve years of litigation against, inter alia, the
Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office regarding constitutionally inadequate housing
and medical care for jail detainees at Orleans Parish Prison. In 2013, the
district court approved a consent decree proposed by Plaintiffs, the United
States, and former Sheriff Gusman. The City and Sheriff also stipulated to
developing the plan for adequate housing and care. After years of stalemate,
a compliance director and the former Sheriff proposed a plan to construct a
mental health annex, known as Phase III, at the existing jail. The former
Sheriff was a driving force behind that decision. But as temporary housing for
detainees became untenable, the district court ordered the parties to proceed
with their stipulations and Phase III. No party appealed those orders. Now,
there’s a new Sheriff in town, and she has moved to terminate all orders
concerning Phase III. The district court denied the motion. Plaintiffs class
and the United States argue chiefly that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear
the appeal. We agree and DISMISS for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
We previously described the facts in detail. See Anderson v. City of New
Orleans, 38 F.4th 472, 475-78 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Anderson I”). We do not
repeat them here. However, because the arguments are strikingly similar, we
begin with Anderson I. There, we considered the City of New Orleans’s
(“City”) motion for relief from the orders on Phase III.
In 2016, after years of delay and disagreements about implementation
of the consent decree, the parties entered a stipulated order which, at the
parties’ request, the district court entered as an order of the court
(“Stipulated Order”). As relevant here, the Stipulated Order provided that
“the City, the Sheriff, and the Compliance Director shall develop and finalize
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a plan for . . . appropriate housing for prisoners with mental health issues and
medical needs.”
After extensive consultation with the parties, the Compliance
Director submitted a Supplemental Compliance Action Plan (“Plan”). The
Plan recommended the construction of a new treatment facility called “Phase
III” on existing Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office property, with eighty-nine
beds to house detainees, an infirmary, and treatment space for all detainees
with certain medical and mental-health needs. In 2017, Sheriff Gusman
signed the Plan, along with the Compliance Director. The City indicated that
the parties were “moving forward” with the construction of Phase III and
that “the project should be completed within 24 to 40 months.”
Two years later, in 2019, despite its earlier commitment to the
Stipulated Order, the City wanted to explore alternatives to Phase III. The
district court ordered the City to comply with the Plan and direct the
architect to begin Phase III construction and programming “as soon as
possible” (“January 2019 Order”). Subsequently, the City informed the
district court that it was “actively working” with Sheriff Gusman and the
compliance director “to program, design, and construct a Phase III project
that meets the requirements of the Consent Decree, and does so in a cost-
effective manner.” Accordingly, the court ordered the City and Sheriff to
“continue the programming phase of Phase III,” to “work collaboratively to
design and build a facility that provides for the constitutional treatment of
[detainees with serious mental-health and medical needs] without undue
delay, expense[,] or waste,” and to provide monthly progress reports to
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“advise the Court of the City’s progress toward construction of Phase III”
(“March 2019 Order”). 1
After entry of the March 2019 Order, however, the City unilaterally
ordered the architect and project manager to stop Phase III. The City filed a
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), arguing that changed
circumstances warranted relief from the district court’s January 2019 and
March 2019 Orders (collectively “2019 Orders”). Specifically, the City
argued that Section 3626(a)(1)(C) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”) prohibited the court from ordering the construction of a new jail
facility. The City also moved for a stay of those orders. Following a two-week
hearing, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, later
adopted by the district court, denying the City’s motions. The City appealed.
In Anderson I, we affirmed the district court’s decision. 2 As relevant
here, we declined to rule on the merits of the City’s PLRA argument, holding
that, because “Rule 60(b)(5) may not be used to challenge the legal
conclusions on which a prior judgment or order rests,” the Court lacked
jurisdiction over “the substance of the January and March 2019 orders.”
Anderson I, 38 F.4th at 478, 479. We explained that “Rule 60(b) simply may not be used as an end run to effect an appeal outside the specified time limits, otherwise those limits become essentially meaningless.”Id.
(citation omitted); see alsoid.
(“Rule 60(b)(5) may not be used to challenge the legal
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1
To be clear, this appeal does not concern the consent decree referenced by the
dissent. The Sheriff’s motion only addresses the Stipulated Order and 2019 Orders, not the
2013 consent decree. Thus, we consider whether we have jurisdiction over those orders
only.
2
The panel permitted Sheriff Hutson, who was inaugurated as the new Sheriff of
Orleans Parish in May 2022, to file an amicus brief and participate in oral argument with
respect to the City’s appeal. Anderson I, 38 F.4th at 480.
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conclusions on which a prior judgment or order rests.” (quoting Horne v.
Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 477 (2009))).
After Anderson I, Sheriff Hutson was automatically substituted as a
party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), replacing Sheriff
Gusman. 3 Meanwhile, the City entered a construction contract and began
work on Phase III. Sheriff Hutson, her counsel, and several members of her
Office’s staff were included in monthly discussions regarding the ongoing
construction of Phase III.
Over a year after Sheriff Hutson was sworn into office, however, she
moved to “terminate all prospective relief regarding the construction of the
Phase III jail pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b).” The magistrate judge
recommended the denial of the Sheriff’s motion and the entry of an order
embodying the terms of the Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (“CEA”),
which was negotiated by the parties and signed by the former Sheriff. 4 In July
2023, the district court adopted that recommendation with amendments
unrelated to this appeal. In so doing, the district court made findings
_____________________
3
Rule 25(d) provides that “[a]n action does not abate when a public officer who is
a party in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action
is pending. The officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party.”
4
To clarify, the terms of the CEA are not in dispute. Sheriff Hutson did not object
to any of its discrete provisions despite having the opportunity to do so. Nonetheless, the
dissent takes issue with the CEA’s terms involving a federal contract clause. Compare post
at 2 n.1 (citing Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600
U.S. 181, 208 (2023)) with C.F.R. § 200.321 (“The non-federal entity must take all
necessary affirmative steps to assure that minority businesses, women’s business
enterprises, and labor surplus area firms are used when possible.”). Setting aside the red
herring, the record reflects that the order “embodying the terms of the CEA would not be
an order authorizing’ a project. Rather, it would set out the various conditions under
which the project will be conducted and spell out the City’s and the Sheriff’s respective
obligations during the project.’” After all, that is the natural result of parties negotiating
and signing an agreement.
5
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pursuant to Section 3626(a)(1)(A), (B) of the PLRA for at least the third time
in this case.
The Sheriff appealed and twice moved to stay “all orders regarding
the construction of the Phase III jail.” A panel of this court denied those
motions. The Phase III facility remains “in progress at 12.82% complete.”
II.
This case is déjà vu all over again. 5 Similar to the City, Sheriff Hutson
argues—under a different procedural mechanism—that the PLRA bars the
district court from ordering the construction of Phase III. Anderson I, 38 F.4th
at 478. As always, we have jurisdiction to determine our own jurisdiction. Brown v. Pac. Life Ins. Co.,462 F.3d 384, 390
(5th Cir. 2006).
The Sheriff suggests two primary bases 6 for appellate jurisdiction over
the 2019 Orders. 7 First, the Sheriff contends that we have jurisdiction over
a court’s denial of a motion to terminate pursuant to the PLRA. Second, the
Sheriff argues that we have jurisdiction over the refusal to modify a consent
decree. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
In opposition, Plaintiffs and the United States argue that we have
jurisdiction over the denial of a motion to terminate, but we lack jurisdiction
over the substance of the 2019 Orders and Stipulated Order. Moreover, they
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5
Springboards to Educ., Inc. v. Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Indep. Sch. Dist., 33 F.4th 747,
748 (5th Cir. 2022) (footnote citation omitted).
6
The Sheriff asserts a third basis for appellate jurisdiction: federal question
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. As Plaintiffs explain, Section 1331 speaks only to the “original jurisdiction” of the “district courts,” not to our appellate authority. See28 U.S.C. § 1331
.
7
Although the Sheriff has not specified the exact orders on appeal, we assume the
Sheriff challenges the 2019 Orders. To the extent the Sheriff challenges additional orders,
such as the Stipulated Order, our analysis encompasses all.
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contend that the Sheriff’s motion is not the proper procedural mechanism
for the relief sought. 8
We now turn to jurisdiction and the function and scope of the Sheriff’s
motion. As before, “we have jurisdiction to review the denial of
the . . . motion, but not the underlying . . . orders.” Anderson I, 38 F.4th at
477-78; see Ruiz v. United States,243 F.3d 941, 945
(5th Cir. 2001).
A.
Section 1292(a)(1) confers jurisdiction over appeals from
“[i]nterlocutory orders . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.” 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). “Just as it has done with the collateral order doctrine, the Court has approached this statute somewhat gingerly lest a floodgate be opened’ that permits immediate appeal over too many nonfinal orders.” In re Deepwater Horizon,793 F.3d 479, 491
(5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Switz. Cheese Ass'n, Inc. v. E. Horne’s Mkt., Inc.,385 U.S. 23
, 24–25 (1966)). “A district enforceable by contempt, and designed to accord or protect some or all of the substantive relief sought in the complaint in more than a temporary fashion.’”Id.
at 491 (quoting Police Ass’n of New Orleans Through Cannatella v. City of New Orleans,100 F.3d 1159, 1166
(5th Cir. 1996)). “On the other
injunction according to its terms or designates procedures for enforcement
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8
Separately, Plaintiffs note that the Sheriff’s and City’s reliance on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1) undermines the Sheriff’s purported basis for termination: that the district
court’s enforcement of a “private settlement agreement” to build Phase III violates the
PLRA. To invoke § 1292(a)(1), however, there must be a “consent decree” or
“injunction” that the Sheriff’s motion sought to “modify.” § 1292(a)(1). Here, the Sheriff
disavows the existence of any consent decree regarding the Phase III facility. Thus, the
Sheriff’s § 1292(a)(1) argument is a nonstarter.
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without changing the command of the injunction.’” Id. “Interpretation,
then, is not modification . . . . [T]aking a practical view of modification, [we]
[] beyond the terms used by the parties and the district court to the
substance of the action.’” Id. (quoting In re Seabulk Offshore Ltd., 158 F.3d
897, 899 (5th Cir. 1998)).
“In addition to showing that an order granted, modified, refused, or
dissolved an injunction, a party challenging an interlocutory order must show
.’” In re Deepwater Horizon, 793 F.3d at 492(quoting Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad. Co.,437 U.S. 478, 480
(1978)).
For example, in In re Deepwater Horizon, we dismissed the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction regarding an order interpreting part of a massive class-
action settlement. 9 Id. at 492. There, defendants argued that an order constituted an injunction or, alternatively, the court’s subsequent denial of the motion for reconsideration was a modification of the injunction.Id.
We assumed arguendo that the order was an injunction or modification but explained that defendants failed serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence[s].’”Id.
(quoting Gardner,437 U.S. at 480
). Thus, we concluded that defendants could not invoke jurisdiction under Section 1292(a)(1).Id. at 492
.
Like In re Deepwater Horizon, the Sheriff’s jurisdictional argument
fails under Section 1292(a)(1). As the district court observed, “the Sheriff
Phase III Orders. That turn of phrase does not change the fact that she is
directly attacking the validity of the orders as being prohibited under the
_____________________
9
See 15B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc.
Juris. § 3916 (2d ed.) (hereinafter “Wright & Miller”).
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PLRA.” The Sheriff has not shown that the district court refused to modify
or dissolve an injunction. Rather, the court’s orders []’”
the consent decree without changing the command of the injunction.’” In
re Deepwater Horizon, 793 F.3d at 491(quoting Switz. Cheese Ass’n, Inc., 385 U.S. at 24–25). Accordingly, the court’s orders were an interpretation of the stipulated relief.Id.
To suggest otherwise would open a “floodgate” of repetitive and untimely appeals.Id.
To be clear, this does not mean that the parties are prohibited from
filing a proper motion to terminate under the PLRA. But, as discussed in Part
B, the Sheriff has not done so. Even assuming arguendo that the district
court’s observation was a modification of an injunction, or refusal to dissolve
an injunction, the Sheriff has not pointed to
irreparable, consequence[s].’” In re Deepwater Horizon, 793 F.3d at 492(quoting Gardner,437 U.S. at 480
). 10 However, there are well-documented risks of inadequate housing and care for detainees at Orleans Parish Prison. Anderson I,38 F.4th at 475
(explaining that the jail was still “not adequate for
detainees with mental-health needs or who were suicidal”). Indeed, despite
the consent decree requiring the Sheriff’s Office to implement systemic and
durable reforms, the independent monitor has reported that the jail “has
regressed slightly” and “the same deficiencies are likely to continue to be
noted time and time again.” Hence, the 2019 Orders and CEA followed.
_____________________
10
On this, the dissent misconstrues this opinion. Post at 3 n.5. First, the issue is that
the Sheriff has not satisfied any evidentiary burden. Second, it is false to suggest that the
district court ordered the construction of a prison. Anyone familiar with this case can recall
the factual and procedural history that refutes any assertion that courts have ordered the
construction of a prison. Third, and to reiterate, the Sheriff does not challenge the 2013 consent
decree. Instead, she challenges the judicially enforceable orders that came years later. That
argument was foreclosed in Anderson I. Finally, the dissent raises arguments concerning
“irreparable consequences” that the Sheriff herself has not raised in the district court or
on appeal. Thus, we do not entertain them here.
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In addition, we are bound by Anderson I. The law of the case doctrine
“generally prevents reexamination of issues of law or fact decided on appeal
subsequent appeal.’” 11 Bigford v. Taylor, 896 F.2d 972, 974(5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Auto Transp., S.A.,763 F.2d 745, 750
(5th Cir. 1985); see Arizona v. California,460 U.S. 605, 618
(1983)). However,
“the issues need not have been explicitly decided; the doctrine also applies
In re AKD Invs., 79 F.4th
487, 491(5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Alpha/Omega Ins. Servs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,272 F.3d 276, 279
(5th Cir. 2001)).
In Anderson I, the City moved to “suspend all orders regarding the
programming, design, and construction of a new Phase III jail facility”
because, inter alia, the PLRA purportedly prohibits the construction of Phase
III. The magistrate judge conducted a two-week hearing on that motion and
recommended that the court deny the City’s motion. It did so. Then, we
affirmed the district court’s decision. Although we declined to rule on the
merits of the City’s PLRA argument, we nonetheless concluded that the
City’s post-judgment motion under “Rule 60(b)(5) may not be used to
challenge the legal conclusions on which a prior judgment or order rests,”
and we lacked jurisdiction over “the substance of the January and March
2019 orders.” Anderson I, 38 F.4th at 478, 479. “Rule 60(b) simply may not
be used as an end run to effect an appeal outside the specified time limits,
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11
In addition to the law of the case doctrine, we are bound by the rule of orderliness:
“It is a well-settled Fifth Circuit rule of orderliness that one panel of our court may not
overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening change in the law, such as by a
statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or our en banc court.” United States v.
Traxler, 764 F.3d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Thus, we cannot ignore the well-settled principles that Anderson I applied to the facts of
this exact case.
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otherwise those limits become essentially meaningless.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Now, the Sheriff makes the same argument but with different
procedural mechanisms: motions to terminate and stay all orders regarding
the construction of Phase III. We have already denied the motions to stay 12
Phase III, and we now address the motion to terminate.
Again, “we have jurisdiction to review the denial of the . . . motion,
but not the underlying . . . orders.” Anderson I, 38 F.4th at 477-78. The Sheriff’s appeal is “restricted to the questions properly raised by the post- judgment motion” and it does “not extend to revive lost opportunities to appeal the underlying judgment.” 15B Wright & Miller § 3916 (quoting Anderson I,38 F.4th at 478
); see Bowles v. Russell,551 U.S. 205, 209
(2007) (“This Court has long held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Just as “a Rule 60(b) motion may not be used as a substitute for a timely appeal from the judgment or order from which the motion seeks relief,” a purported motion to terminate under the PLRA cannot “be used as an end run to effect an appeal outside the specified time limits.” Id. at 478 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The decision in Anderson I applies here “ as both cases concern the well-settled principles of post-judgment proceedings. In re AKD Invs.,79 F.4th at 491
(quoting Alpha/Omega Ins. Servs.,272 F.3d at 279
); see 15B Wright & Miller § 3916. Contrary to the Sheriff’s suggestion, the law of the case does not change based on the name of the motion “for that would exalt nomenclature over substance.” Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. of Illinois,434 U.S. 257, 272
(1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring). This is particularly true
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12
See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
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when the substance of the motions are identical. The issue here and in
Anderson I was whether the PLRA prohibits the 2019 Orders and Stipulated
Order. Like Anderson I, “the timely notice of appeal in a civil case is a
jurisdictional requirement” and we cannot create an exception for the
Sheriff’s motion as that time has long passed. Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d
777, 781 (5th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we lack appellate jurisdiction to review
the substance of the 2019 Orders and Stipulated Order. 13
The dissent argues that the law of the case doctrine does not apply. In
so doing, it mischaracterizes the position of the United States and the orders
of the district court. Post at 4. In reviewing the court’s denial of the Sheriff’s
motion, we find that the Sheriff made the same post-judgment arguments as
the City did in Anderson I. The Sheriff later clarified that she is relying on a
different subsection of the PLRA. Accordingly, what the United States and
district court correctly explained is: “to the extent that the Sheriff was
attempting to revive the City’s already-rejected argument that the 2019
Orders violated Section 3626(a)(1)(C) the PLRA, such argument was
precluded under the law of the case doctrine.” Then, the district court and
the United States agreed that the law of the case doctrine does not bar the
Sheriff’s private settlement agreement argument regarding Section
3626(c)(2), (g)(6). The United States contends that the Sheriff’s argument
“nonetheless fails for other reasons.” Here, we do not reach those other
reasons because we lack jurisdiction. Indeed, as the United States principally
argued, this court lacks appellate jurisdiction over the substance of the 2019
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13
The dissent concedes that the Sheriff’s motion seeks relief from the 2019 Orders
but nonetheless suggests that the post-judgment rule addressed in Anderson I has no impact
on this appeal. Post at 7. But “[o]bviously, this well-established rule is critical to this
appeal.” Anderson I, 38 F.4th at 478. The fact that the Sheriff attempts to circumvent
procedural history and rules under the guise of a PLRA motion does not mean we can ignore
Anderson I.
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Orders, and the PLRA is not a proper vehicle to challenge them. Thus,
because we lack jurisdiction, we do not reach the issue of private settlement
agreements.
B.
Next, we address the procedural basis for the district court’s denial of
the Sheriff’s motion to terminate. Again, in Anderson I we concluded that we
may review the district court’s denial of the City’s motion, but it would be
improper to review the 2019 Orders and Stipulated Order. “Interpreting
effective unreviewability to permit appeal in this case would signify that each
time [the Sheriff or City] could show a handful of claims arguably impacted
by the district court’s interpretation of the [Stipulated] Agreement, it could
immediately appeal to this court. The limited benefits of such unrestricted
access to the appellate court are outweighed by the attendant systemic
disruption and institutional cost.” See In re Deepwater Horizon, 793 F.3d at
489(citing Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter,558 U.S. 100, 112
(2009); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.,511 U.S. 863, 884
(1994)).
As a procedural matter, Plaintiffs and the United States argue that the
Sheriff has not presented a proper basis for a motion to terminate under
Section 3626(b) of the PLRA. The district court agreed. The Sheriff argues
that the 2019 Orders and Stipulated Order impermissibly enforce a private
settlement agreement under the PLRA. On the other hand, the City, which
already made similar arguments in Anderson I, states that “its legal challenges
to the Phase III facility have come to a definitive end . . . and the City does
not now espouse a position contrary to the prior rulings of the magistrate,
district or appellate courts in this appeal.”
To begin, simply naming a document “motion to terminate” does not
automatically establish a basis for jurisdiction or relief. See, e.g., Moody Nat’l
Bank of Galveston v. GE Life & Annuity Assurance Co., 383 F.3d 249, 251 (5th
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Cir. 2004) (“As an initial matter, it is important to make clear that the fact
that GE labeled its motion as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend is
immaterial; a motion’s substance, and not its form, controls.”). Moreover, it
is true that a district court’s denial of a proper motion to terminate relief under
Section 3626(b)(1)(A) is subject to appeal. But, as Plaintiffs argue, the
Sheriff’s filing is a “motion to terminate” in name only. 14
Section 3626(b) establishes the parameters in a prison conditions civil
action for “termination of relief.” “Although the PLRA entitles [a party] to
terminate remedial orders such as these after two years unless the district
violation of the Federal right,’ § 3626(b)(3), [the Sheriff] has not attempted
to obtain relief on this basis.” Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 515 (2011).
The Sheriff claims instead that the March 2019 Order and “associated
orders” violate the PLRA. See Moody Nat’l Bank of Galveston, 383 F.3d at
251. 15
_____________________
14
The dissent relies on Ruiz v. United States to argue that the Sheriff’s motion is a
proper vehicle for challenging the 2019 Orders and Stipulated Order. Post at 7. In Ruiz, the
defendants moved to terminate a consent decree and this court had jurisdiction pursuant
to § 1292(a)(1). Ruiz, 243 F.3d at 945. Here, it bears repeating that the Sheriff has not
moved to terminate the consent decree. Rather, she challenges the Stipulated Order and
2019 Orders. Thus, Ruiz does not support the dissent’s contention that we may review
those orders.
15
In addition, the Sheriff argues that she cannot be bound by her predecessor’s
prior decisions as to the Stipulated Order and CEA. Specifically, she contends that even if
the district court’s orders are enforceable, they are not enforceable against her because she
was not a party to the stipulated agreement. Because that argument is a procedural matter,
we will briefly address it. In actions against defendants in their official capacity, individual
office holders may come and go, but the defendant never changes because the office, not
the person occupying it, is the party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), 1961 Advisory
Committee Note; see also, e.g., Deauville Assoc. v. Murrell, 180 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir.
1950)(explaining that even if a party has changed, such as in the case of a transfer or
14
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The Supreme Court has made clear that Section 3626(b) acts as a
mechanism for termination of prospective relief when such relief is no longer
necessary to correct a violation of a federal right. Id.Our court has done the same. For example, in Castillo v. Cameron County,238 F.3d 339
(5th Cir. 2001), we explained that, in deciding whether to grant a motion to terminate, a district court should consider whether a “current and ongoing violation” exists, based on “conditions in the jail at the time termination is sought . . . to determine if there is a violation of a federal right.” See also Ruiz,243 F.3d at 950-951
; Brown v. Collier,929 F.3d 218, 253
(5th Cir. 2019) (affirming district court’s termination of a consent decree that was no longer “necessary to correct current and ongoing violations” of federal law); Guajardo v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just.,363 F.3d 392, 398
(5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (same). Our sister circuits agree. See, e.g., Porter v. Clarke,923 F.3d 348, 367
(4th Cir.
2019), as amended
in Section 3626(b)(3) demonstrates that it knew how to “clear[ly]
command” that courts may not use their equitable authority in the case of a
In this case, Sheriff Hutson has not argued that the relief is no longer
necessary to correct the existing constitutional violations. Rather, she alleges
that Section 3626(a)(1)(C) prohibits the existence of the 2019 Orders and
Stipulated Order. But nothing in Section 3626(b) supports this argument.
Thus, the “motion to terminate” fails procedurally because it neither
provides a basis for the district court to grant it under Section 3626(b), nor a
basis to review the 2019 Orders and Stipulated Order.
_____________________
assignment of rights under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c), that “would not justify
our disturbing all prior orders and decrees entered in this controversy and unfavorable to”
the current party); In re Bernal, 207 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 2000). Therefore, the Sheriff
fails to furnish any legal support for this argument, and it is foreclosed.
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Here, the Stipulated Order provided, inter alia, that “the City, the
Sheriff, and the Compliance Director shall develop and finalize a plan for . . .
appropriate housing for prisoners with mental health issues and medical
needs.” The Stipulated Order and March 2019 Order each included a finding
of compliance with the limitations set forth in § 3626(a). This court has
already rejected the argument that the unchanged text of the PLRA somehow
constitutes a circumstance justifying the suspension of the 2019 Orders and
the Stipulated Order. See Anderson I, 38 F.4th at 477-78. Moreover, the
district court’s 2023 order includes the PLRA findings that “prospective
relief” extends “no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right” in this case. The district court has also made abundantly clear
that it did not order the construction of a prison, but rather enforced the
Stipulated Order. Thus, the district court ordered the parties to effectuate
the plans they had voluntarily and contractually bound themselves to
undertake. 16 Therefore, the district court has not erred in denying the
motion.
III.
Even assuming arguendo that we could reach the merits of the
Sheriff’s claim, the lack of effort and time implementing Phase III would
undermine a motion for termination. The Supreme Court has explained that
appeals such as this one are premature.
When a court attempts to remedy an entrenched constitutional
violation through reform of a complex institution, such as
this . . . prison system, it may be necessary in the ordinary
_____________________
16
The dissent chooses to ignore those contractual obligations by suggesting that
the Sheriff may turn back the clock to reconsider all orders that her predecessor stipulated
and agreed to. No cases support such a broad interpretation of the PLRA and appellate
jurisdiction. Perhaps that is why a panel, including Judge Smith, denied the Sheriff’s
motions to stay the construction of Phase III twice.
16
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No. 23-30633
course to issue multiple orders directing and adjusting ongoing
remedial efforts. Each new order must be given a reasonable
time to succeed, but reasonableness must be assessed in light
of the entire history of the court’s remedial efforts.
Brown, 563 U.S. at 516. Given that Phase III is “in progress at 12.82%
complete” and the Sheriff and City have been slow to effectuate any
stipulated remedy, the record shows that a motion to terminate is at best
premature and we lack jurisdiction to review it.
We therefore DISMISS this appeal.
17
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No. 23-30633
Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The majority wants to build a prison. Though the law and the facts
stand in its way, that hardly thwarts its zealous resolve. So it takes a hatchet
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) and turns a blind eye to bind-
ing circuit precedent.
The result? An opinion with reasoning that, at every turn, is fatally
compromised. Some parts are totally unhinged. And the remainder is
incomprehensible. I respectfully dissent.
I.
Twice the majority acknowledges that “we have jurisdiction to review
the denial of the . . . motion.” Op. at 6, 10 (quotation omitted). A fortiori, it
has conceded that, instead of dismissing, it must consider the merits of the
motion to terminate.
So, even before we consider any of the majority’s assertions in detail,
already shaky is its decree that the appeal be dismissed “for lack of jurisdic-
tion.” Op. at 14. The majority has “no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or
the other would be treason to the Constitution.” NOPSI v. Council of the City
of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358(1989) (quotation omitted). Frivolous and futile are the majority’s attempts to abandon its - tion . . . to exercise [its] jurisdiction.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976).
First, the majority tries to recast the district court’s denial merely as
an “interpretation” of its prior orders. Op. at 8–9. That is an epic blunder.
The majority has totally overlooked the fact that as part of its order denying
Hutson’s motion to terminate, the district court’s entered “the terms of the
Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (“CEA”) previously negotiated by former
.. . . and the City.” ROA.19500.
The CEA contains new terms purporting to bind Orleans Parish Sher-
18
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No. 23-30633
and the city to various terms and obligations regarding
the construction of the Phase III facility.1 None of the CEA’s terms was
contained in the district court’s previous orders, which merely required the
city to construct Phase III. But its latest precisely how the city must
construct that new facility.
Now, per court order, Phase III construction must “proceed pursuant
to the . . . terms of the CEA.” ROA.19519. That plainly stan-
tive relief sought in the complaint. 2
injunctive relief that provides an independent basis for appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
Second, the majority’s recharacterizing of the refusal to terminate
doesn’t hold any water. See Op. at 8–9. Per Ruiz
v. United States, 243 F.3d 941(5th Cir. 2001), “[a] district court’s order denying [a] motion[] to terminate [a] consent decree” is “a refusal to dissolve an injunction,” seeid. at 945
. 3
No wonder the order denying the motion to terminate contains all of
the requisite features of an injunction. 4 It (1) is directed to Hutson—a party
1
Included in those terms, inter alia, is the requirement that “[a]ny party to [the
minority businesses[] . . . are used when possible.” ROA.19347.
include,” inter alia, “[a]ssuring that . . . minority businesses[] . . . are solicited whenever
they are potential sources.” ROA.19347–48. But see Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v.
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 208 (2023) (“Distinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” (quotation omitted)).
2
Integrity Collision Ctr. v. City of Fulshear, 837 F.3d 581, 586 (5th Cir. 2016) (order-
ing the city to include two particular companies on its non-consent tow list “provides sub-
stantive relief” and “is therefore an injunction appealable under [§ ]1292(a)(1)”).
3
See also Ruiz v. Scott, Nos. 96-21118, 97-20068, 1997 WL 533095, at *6 (5th Cir.
Aug. 6, 1997) (unpublished) (“[S]hould the district court deny, in whole or in part, defen-
dants’ motion to terminate, [they] may then appeal under [§] 1292(a)(1).”).
4
Injunctions are “[o]rders that are directed to a party, enforceable by contempt,
and designed to accord or protect some or all of the substantive relief sought in the com-
plaint in more than a temporary fashion.” Police Ass’n of New Orleans Through Cannatella v.
19
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No. 23-30633
to the proceedings—and (2) expressly contemplates enforcement through
“cit[ations] for contempt” and “severe sanctions.” Further, it (3) both
(a) refuses to dissolve any part of the consent judgment and (b) purports fur-
ther to enjoin OPSO by entering it into an agreement with the city that “set[s]
conditions of construction for the Phase III facility” in furtherance of the
consent judgment’s aims. Thus, the court has appellate jurisdiction to review
the denial of the motion to terminate under § 1292(a)(1), which provides that
“the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from . . . [i]nterlocu-
tory orders . . . refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.”
Third, two judges on a panel cannot exclude Hutson’s motion to ter-
minate by creating a one- our statutory appellate jurisdiction.
Any such attempt is bound to crash and burn. “When assessing an order’s
appeala dictional
inquiry.’” In re Deepwater Horizon, 793 F.3d 479, 485 n.5 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,437 U.S. 463, 473
(1978)). “Instead, the focus should be on the entire category to which a claim belongs.”Id.
(cleaned up).
Denials of motions to terminate under the PLRA are treated as
“refusal[s] to dissolve an injunction.” Ruiz, 243 F.3d at 945. Thus, the denial of Hutson’s motion belongs to a class of orders for which appellate juris- diction lies. That alone ends the jurisdictional dispute. Pointless is the major- motions to which it belongs. 5 City of New Orleans,100 F.3d 1159, 1166
(5th Cir. 1996) (quoting 16 Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3922 (West)) (alteration
in original).
5
does not impose “any serious, perhaps irreparable, consequences.” Op. at 9 (cleaned up).
Yes, you read that right—according to the majority, it is no big deal if a federal court
forces the political subdivision of a coordinate sovereign to build a prison, in conformance
express threats of “severe sanctions” and “contempt
20
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No. 23-30633
Lastly, the majority posits that it is bound by the law-of-the-case doc-
trine and the rule of orderliness, because the decision in Anderson I, 38 F.4th
472 (5th Cir. 2022), “concern[s] the well-settled principles of post-judgment
proceedings.” Op. at 11 (citations omitted).
As to that, the majority stands alone. That position is frivolous, and
the DOJ “The United States [] agrees that the law of the case
doctrine does not bar this argument.”
For good reason too, as Anderson I considered only the City of New
Orleans’s direct appeal of a Rule 60(b)(5) motion for relief from a judgment
or order. See 38 F.4th at 478. No other independent issue of law was appealed by the city. Seeid. at 479
(“[T]he only basis for appeal is the Rule 60(b)
motion.”). So nothing in Anderson I bears on this panel’s jurisdiction over a
motion proceeding under a completely distinct procedural mechanism—i.e.,
§ 3626(b) of the PLRA.
The majority’s position also fails at an even more fundamental level.
Namely, it relies on the assumption that the motion to terminate constitutes
a direct attack on the original consent judgment itself. But Hutson’s motion
does nothing of the sort.
The consent judgment provides prospective relief for unconstitutional
prison conditions. That relief is implemented and enforced by the district
court through its continuing supervisory jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction, how-
ever, is limited—the court cannot “grant[] further relief [that] exceed[s] its
of court.” ROA.19520.
So unhinged and so indefensible, the majority’s assertion hardly merits a response.
That’s because the “serious consequence” prong from Carson v. American Brands, Inc.,
450 U.S. 79(1981), “does not apply to orders granting or denying injunctions,” Atwood Turnkey Drilling, Inc. v. Petroleo Brasilerio, S.A.,875 F.2d 1174, 1176
(5th Cir. 1989).
“Orders which explicitly grant or deny injunctive relief are immediately appealable as of
Ali v. Quarterman,
607 F.3d 1046, 1048(5th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Thus, the order denying Hutson’s motion to terminate is “appealable as of right, right away.” Sherri A.D. v. Kirby,975 F.2d 193, 203
(5th Cir. 1992) (cleaned up).
21
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No. 23-30633
remedial authority.” Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Concordia Parish, 906 F.3d 327, 335
(5th Cir. 2018).
Relevant here, the PLRA limits both (1) the scope and extent of relief
that courts can grant in prison conditions cases, see 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), and (2) the court’s power to continue enforcing (i.e., not terminate) relief that it had previously granted, see § 3626(b). Put another way, the provisions in PLRA are “restrict[ions on] courts’ authority to issue and enforce prospec- tive relief.” Miller v. French,530 U.S. 327, 347
(2000). Relief ordered in
excess of either (1) or (2) is necessarily an ultra vires act by the district court.
Motions to terminate must therefore be granted where the continued
enforcement of pre-existing relief—irrespective of any prior determinations of
validity—fails to satisfy § 3626(b)’s requirements. An order issuing prospec-
tive relief can be both (1) completely valid and enforceable at the time it was
ordered and (2) subsequently terminable for providing relief beyond the
scope permitted by the PLRA.
Consequently, Hutson’s motion to terminate can be granted even if we
assume, arguendo, that the prior orders are fully valid and enforceable. A
fortiori, Hutson’s motion is not a direct attack on the validity of the consent
judgment. Baseless is the majority’s claim to the contrary.
The majority’s position becomes even more untenable if we take as
given, arguendo, its assertion that a motion to terminate the continuation of
non-PLRA-compliant relief
order that initially granted such relief. Op. at 11 (cleaned up). Per the rea-
soning of the majority, Hutson’s motion would be timely only if she appealed
within sixty days of the district court’s 2019 orders. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(B). 6
6
See Op. at 11 (“the timely notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional require-
ment
passed.”) (cleaned up).
22
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No. 23-30633
The majority’s groundbreaking rule proves way too much, as it would
turn the entirety of § 3626(b) into a dead letter. That’s because the PLRA sets
a minimum amount of time that must pass before a motion to terminate can
:
(i) 2 years after the date the court granted or approved the
prospective relief;
(ii) 1 year after the date the court has entered an order deny-
ing termination of prospective relief under this para-
graph; or
(iii) in the case of an order issued on or before the date of
enactment of the [PLRA], 2 years after such date of
enactment.
§ 3626(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).
None of the requisite time periods in § 3626(b)(1)(A) falls within the
initial time to appeal directly an order granting relief. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(A)–(B). So, per the majority’s rationale, orders prescribing prospec-
tive relief are interminable once the time for direct appeal has expired—
thereby erasing PLRA motions to terminate from the U.S. Code. 7
In sum, this court’s appellate jurisdiction is indisputably secure. The
majority is duty-bound to exercise that jurisdiction and decide the merits of
Hutson’s motion to terminate.
II.
The majority claims that “the fails procedurally
because it [does not] provide[] a basis for termination under Section 3626(b)”
of PLRA. Op. at 13. That is patent error—and plainly so, too—had the
majority carefully considered the text of the statute.
A. Burden Allocation
PLRA provides that “prospective relief . . . must be terminated on the
7
Nor does Rule 60(b) get the majority out of its legal quandary. The PLRA
expressly provides that motions to terminate exist in addition to “otherwise . . . legally
3626(b)(4).
23
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No. 23-30633
motion of any party,” 8 unless the district court
(1) remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing viola-
tion of the Federal right,
(2) extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of
the Federal right, and . . .
(3) is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct
the violation.[ 9]
What must Nothing but
show the requisite passage of time—e.g., “2 years after the date the court
granted or approved the prospective relief.” 10
Hutson has done just that. Her motion expressly invoked § 3626(b)-
(1)(A) and referenced the “Orders of January 25, 2019 and March 18, 2019
Regarding Phase III Jail Facility.” More than two years have elapsed since
“the date the court granted or approved” those orders. § 3626(b)(1)(A)(i).
Thus, Hutson has carried her burden of proof by showing the requisite
passage of time. See Guajardo, 363 F.3d at 395. She need do nothing more.
From that point onward, the PLRA shifts the burden to the parties
opposing termination. It is their job—not Hutson’s—
3626(b)(3). 11 Put another way, the
—alone—must prove that the prospective relief
complies with the § 3626(b) factors.
So the majority turns PLRA upside down when it faults Hutson for
failing to provide a basis for termination under § 3626(b) because she “ha[d]
8
Brown v. Collier, 929 F.3d 218, 228(5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added); see § 3626(b)(1)(A); see also Ruiz,243 F.3d at 950
.
9
§ 3626(b)(3) (cleaned up) (emphasis added).
10
§ 3626(b)(1)(A)(i); see also Guajardo v. Tex. Dept. of Crim. Just., 363 F.3d 392, 395
(5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
11
Brown, 929 F.3d at 228; see also Guajardo,363 F.3d at 396
(explaining that the
burden of proving the requisite § “is obviously on the party opposing
termination”).
24
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No. 23-30633
not a[verred] that the relief is no longer necessary to correct constitutional
violations.” Op. at 13. The burden of proving the requisite §
“is obviously on the party opposing termination.” Guajardo, 363 F.3d at 396.
B. Requisite Findings
Prospective relief must
Ruiz,
243 F.3d at 950; see also supra part II.A. and “based on the record.” § 3626(b)(3). “It is not enough . . . simply [to] state in conclusory fashion that the requirements of the consent decrees sat- isfy those criteria.” Castillo,238 F.3d at 354
(quoting Cason, 231 F.3d at 784–
85).
—that is, “a current and ongoing violation”—
the court “must look at the conditions in the [institution] at the time termin-
ation is sought.” Id. at 353. Violative conditions that have “existed in the past,” or those that “may possibly occur in the future,” are wholly inapposite.Id.
In other words, nothing but violations “exist[ing] at the time the district court conducts the § 3626(b)(3) inquiry Id. (quoting Cason,238 F.3d at 784
).
that
each requirement imposed . . . -narrowness-intrusiveness
criteria.” Id. at 354 (quoting Cason, 231 F.3d at 784–85) (emphasis added).
on a provision-by-
provision basis.” Id.(quotation omitted). Additionally, they must be based solely on “the nature of the current and ongoing violation.”Id.
(quotation
omitted) (emphasis added).
Relief must be terminated unless it “currently complies with the need-
narrowness-intrusiveness requirements.” Id. (emphasis added). That is, the
court must grant the motion to terminate any provision granting relief not
Ruiz, 243 F.3d at 950. The denial
of Hutson’s motion falls far short of the “ dards” that the district
25
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No. 23-30633
court was required “to . . . follow[] when [it] consider[ed] whether to ter-
minate a consent decree providing for prospective relief.” Id.
For starters, the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation lacks
any of the analysis required under § 3626(b)(3). The closest the R&R gets to
is reference to years’-
orders themselves.
Similarly, much of the order relies on past Just like the R&R,
the order explicitly relies on years-
Indeed, the court expressly relied on its having “already found that proceeding
with Phase III is necessary to remedy a constitutional violation.”
Plainly, past -
3626(b)’s requirements. Cas-
tillo held—in no uncertain terms—that courts must make “make new -
ings” based on “the conditions . . . at the time termination is sought, not at
conditions that existed in the past.” 238 F.3d at 353–54 (quotation omitted)
(emphasis added). Nothing in the district court’s denial shows that any of
the prospective relief “currently complies with the need-narrowness-
intrusiveness requirements, given the nature of the current violations.” Id.
at 354 (emphasis added).
references to a monitors’ report post-
restates the monitors’ conclusion that “the design and construction of Phase
III” is “[a]n important part of the long-term solution to the lack of compli-
ance with the consent judgment in the areas of medical and mental health.”
Likewise, the second blindly regurgitates the monitors’ opining that “hous-
[ing] in [Orleans Justice Center (“OJC”)] . . . is inadequate for the housing
of [inmates with acute mental health issues].”
Even considering those two references, the court’s analysis still fails
to meet § 3626’s requirements in any regard.
26
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No. 23-30633
First conditions in the [OPSO system]
at the time termination was requested
ongoing’ violation of a federal right.” Castillo, 238 F.3d at 354.
Second, not once does it mention whether OPSO was failing to comply
with any of the terms of the consent judgment. The closest it gets is its ref-
erence to the monitors’ report. But even that just alludes to “the areas of
medical and mental health.” Such a conclusory statement—made at the high-
est levels of generality—provides zero insight into which of the consent judg-
ment’s sixty-nine provisions relating to health or mental care might continue
to satisfy § 3626(b)(3)’s requirements.
Third, there is no analysis showing that any of the consent judgment’s
conditions, or the relief previously ordered by the court, is still needed to cure
ongoing constitutional violations. At most, its quoting the monitors’ report
merely suggests that Phase III can contribute to compliance with the consent
judgment’s requirements. But s —nothing guarantees
that the report’s recommendations or the initial consent judgment continues
to track constitutional minima, as § 3626(b) requires. 12
In short, the court’s analysis leaves us with no idea what the current
violations are (if any), how any violations are addressed by the consent judg-
ment’s conditions (if they are at all), or why those conditions are the least
intrusive means to remedy the violation.
So its conclusion— -
ties to proceed pursuant to the previously[ ]negotiated terms [regarding the
federal rights”—“does not reach the needed level of particularization” and
12
report might not be per se
violations of any constitutional right. See Castillo, 238 F.3d at 354. Improving conditions may therefore render previously PLRA-complaint requirements no longer necessary and, thus, properly terminable. After all, “[t]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Farmer v. Brennan,511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994) (cleaned up).
27
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No. 23-30633
“is not supported with enough evidence in the record,” Castillo, 238 F.3d
at 354 (cleaned up). The PLRA does not allow the district court to deny ter-
mination of relief merely by speculating that “there is no reason to think that
Phase III is no longer necessary.”
C. Termination Is Required as a Matter of Law
Termination of relief is the only valid course of action—even if we
assume, arguendo
but see supra part II.B. That’s because the district court would commit per se
error that the prospective relief enforced in the status quo
§ 3626(b)(3)’s criteria.
Section 3626(b)(3) is constrained by § 3626(a)(1)(C), which applies to
all parts of § 3626. Section 3626(a)(1)(C) expressly provides that “[n]othing
in this section shall be construed to authorize the courts, in exercising their
remedial powers, to order the construction of prisons or the raising of taxes,
or to repeal or detract from otherwise applicable limitations on the remedial
powers of the courts.”
We must therefore construe situations in which relief may continue
under § 3626(b)(3) consistently with § 3626(a)(1)(C)’s limitations. 13 So the
3623(a)(1)(C)—
including “order[ing] the construction of prisons”—can never qualify as pre-
liminary relief that, in the words of § 3623(a)(1)(C), “shall not terminate”
under § 3623(b)(3).
Were that not so, a district court would be required to continue enforc-
ing (i.e., refuse to terminate) relief that it has no authority to continue pro-
viding. That would indisputably butcher the plain meaning of the statutory
text. Section 3626(a)(1)(C) means what it says when it uses the phrase
13
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Inter-
pretation of Legal Texts 179–181 (2012) (harmonious-reading canon).
28
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No. 23-30633
“[n]othing in this section.” 14
Even
§ 3626(b)(3)’s requirements. Section 3626(a)(1)(C) “has restricted [the dis-
trict] court[’s] authority to issue and enforce prospective relief.” Miller,
530 U.S. at 347. 15 Thus, the court necessarily acts ultra vires if it continues
enforcing prospective relief relating to the construction of the Phase III facil-
ity.
of action.
* * * * *
Albeit well intentioned, a majority of two has decided that the con-
struction of a new prison is “a cause so compelling” that the law can be
skirted. 16 To the contrary, however, this court’s jurisdiction is secure, and
the motion to terminate should have been granted. I respectfully dissent.
14
See United States v. Rayo-Valdez, 302 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2002) (“It is a basic
tenet of statutory construction that “it is necessary to give meaning to all [] words and to
).
15
See also Saahir v. Estelle, 47 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Just as the scope of
the consent decree does not enlarge the court’s jurisdiction, the way the parties agreed to
-
dictional bounds of the federal courts.”); v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 806 F.3d 289,
298 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Jurisdiction in an ongoing institutional reform case only goes so far
’” (quoting United States v. Texas, 158 F.3d
299, 311 (5th Cir. 1998)).
16
Sambrano v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 21-11159, 2022 WL 486610, at *37 (5th Cir.
Feb. 17, 2022) (unpublished) (cleaned up) (Smith, J., dissenting).
29
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