Jimerson v. Lewis
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jimerson v. Lewis, 94 F.4th 423 (5th Cir. 2024)
Jimerson v. Lewis
Opinion
Case: 22-10441 Document: 00517052310 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 22-10441
____________ FILED
February 1, 2024
Karen Jimerson; JJ; JJ; XP; JP, Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
Mike Lewis, Lt,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:20-CV-2826
______________________________
Before Stewart, Dennis, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge:
A search warrant showed the correct address for the target house, but
police officers executed the warrant at an incorrect address. The homeowner
brought suit against the officers under Section 1983. When denying summary
judgment on the issue of qualified immunity for the officer who led the
search, the district court held that fact questions prevented deciding the
issue. We find no genuine disputes of material fact. The disputed issue is
one of law. We conclude that this officer’s efforts to identify the correct
residence, though deficient, did not violate clearly established law.
REVERSED and REMANDED for dismissal.
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No. 22-10441
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2019, at approximately 7:15 p.m., Waxahachie Police
Department (“WPD”) SWAT Team Commander Mike Lewis received a
call from a Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) officer. The DEA officer
needed assistance executing a search warrant that night on a suspected
methamphetamine “stash” house located at 573 8th Street, Lancaster, Texas
(“target house”). The officer provided Commander Lewis with information
about a drug deal involving the target house. Lewis requested further
information, including pictures of the target house, whether “the location
was fortified,” whether “it appeared to have surveillance equipment,” and
whether “there were any exterior indicators on the property that children
may be present.” He also “requested identifying information on the
[methamphetamine] seller, as well as prior law enforcement history at that
address” involving the Lancaster Police Department (“LPD”).
In response, Lewis received pictures showing the front of the house
and was told there was “surveillance established at the location.” DEA
agents told Lewis that they saw no fortification or surveillance cameras at the
property or any evidence of children. The agents had no description of the
people occupying the target house.
Lewis entered the information into the WPD SWAT’s risk analysis
assessment worksheet, which scored the incident within the range for
“optional SWAT deployment.” Consequently, Lewis contacted the WPD
Chief and received approval to activate the SWAT team. He also gathered
information on the target house from the Dallas Central Appraisal District
website, including that the house was 744 square feet, was built in 1952, and
had a “large, deeply extending backyard.”
Lewis then briefed SWAT officers at the WPD. The group decided
to have a six-member team enter the target house and a three-member team
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enter the detached garage and backyard. Thereafter, Lewis received “real-
time intelligence that surveillance officers at the scene reported a truck
pulling a white box trailer [had] pulled up in front of the target location.” 1
When Lewis received a copy of the warrant, he confirmed the address of the
target house. The officers then finalized their preparations. LPD Officer
Zachary Beauchamp led the SWAT team to the target house. Beauchamp
was followed by the SWAT team vehicle, then Lewis in his marked patrol
unit, then the Waxahachie K9, and then several unmarked DEA vehicles.
Beauchamp was directed “to stop about a house before the target location,
so SWAT officers could make an approach on foot.”
When they arrived at the area, the SWAT team vehicle’s driver saw
Beauchamp’s vehicle stop abruptly, “causing him to believe [Beauchamp]
may have driven too far and stopped them too close to the target location.”
As the officers exited their vehicles, Beauchamp pointed to the house with
the truck and white trailer in front of it, and officers began their approach. As
the SWAT team began gathering on the front porch, however, Lewis realized
that the house did not look like the house from intelligence photos. The
SWAT team had assembled at 583 8th Street, not at the target house at 573
8th Street.
When Lewis looked one house to the left, he decided the layout of the
front of that house matched the one in the intel photos. Lewis noticed that
“[f]rom left to right, it had one large window, followed by the front entry
door, followed by a small window and then [four] larger windows.” He also
noticed that “[t]he driveway was . . . on the left side of the property,” and he
believed numbers on the front of the house read “573,” though the porch
_____________________
1
The record indicates that this intelligence was not accurate. Later investigation
revealed that the white trailer was in front of 583 8th Street — not the target house.
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light obscured his view. This house, it turns out, was also the wrong house.
The house Lewis identified was 593 8th Street, two doors down from the
target house.
Nevertheless, Lewis told the team that they were at the wrong house
and instructed them to “go to the house just to the left of the house where
they were.” That house was the home of plaintiffs Karen Jimerson, James
Parks, and their two young sons and daughter. Officers ran to the front of the
plaintiffs’ house, deployed a flashbang, broke the front windows, and
breached the door. The officers began a protective sweep and checked for
occupants. They “encountered two females” whom they told to get on the
ground. The officers then encountered an adult male, but before they could
direct him to get down, SWAT team members yelled “Wrong House!”
The SWAT team left the plaintiffs’ home and proceeded to the target
house. After the target house was secured, Lewis returned to the plaintiffs’
house, where he joined other DEA agents who were already checking on the
plaintiffs’ welfare. Plaintiff Karen Jimerson reported some pain in her side.
Lewis called an ambulance and she was taken to the hospital. Lewis also
coordinated with a glass company to make repairs and remained on the scene
until 1:30 a.m.
A WPD internal investigation determined that “reasonable and
normal protocol was completely overlooked” and the WPD Chief of Police
stated that these kinds of mistakes should not happen. Lewis was suspended
for two days without pay.
In September 2020, the plaintiffs brought this action under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1983. They alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment and several
state laws against 20 John Doe defendants. They later amended their
complaint, naming each of the individuals in the WPD SWAT team who
executed the warrant, including Lewis. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs’
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state-law tort claims were dismissed. The defendants moved for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity, and the matter was referred to a
magistrate judge for pretrial management.
The magistrate judge recommended the district court grant qualified
immunity to all the officers, whether they entered the house or not. The
magistrate judge also concluded the plaintiffs failed to show that Lewis did
not make reasonable efforts to identify the target house.
The district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s analysis on
qualified immunity except with respect to whether Lewis made reasonable
efforts to identify the target house. The court found “a genuine dispute of
material fact regarding whether [Lewis] made the necessary reasonable effort
to identify the correct residence and whether his actions were ‘[in]consistent
with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be
searched,’” quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987). The court
denied Lewis qualified immunity. Lewis timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Under the collateral order doctrine, “the denial of a motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity is immediately
appealable . . . to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Melton v.
Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 261(5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Our summary judgment review is de novo. Joseph ex rel. Joseph v. Bartlett,981 F.3d 319, 331
(5th Cir. 2020). Our review is limited to considering issues of law, including the legal significance of factual disputes identified by the district court.Id. at 331
. That means “we may evaluate whether a factual dispute is material (i.e., legally significant), but we may not evaluate whether it is genuine (i.e., exists).”Id.
(emphasis in original). “Because the plaintiff is the non-moving party, we construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Melton,875 F.3d at 261
.
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“A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff
demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights and (2) the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light
of clearly established law at the time of the violation.” Porter v. Epps, 659
F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011).
As a preliminary matter, Lewis argues the plaintiffs failed to plead and
argue that his efforts to identify the correct house were unreasonable. A
plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity “must specifically identify
each defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.” Thomas
v. Humfield, 32 F.3d 566,1994 WL 442484, at *5
(5th Cir. 1994). The
plaintiffs complied with the need for specificity by alleging in the complaint
that Lewis “was the person in charge” of the mistaken raid on their home,
and in their summary judgment arguments that Lewis was the “overall leader
of [the] misconduct” and that he overlooked “reasonable and normal
protocol.”
As to the merits, Lewis does not challenge the district court’s analysis
of whether defendants violated the plaintiffs’ rights under federal law. The
Fourth Amendment provides that individuals have a right “to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has held that
officers must make “reasonable effort[s] to ascertain and identify the place
intended to be searched” in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment.
Garrison, 480 U.S. at 88. Thus, unreasonableness would seem relevant to
the first component of the analysis for qualified immunity, not just the
second. Regardless, Lewis’s arguments are limited to the second part of the
qualified immunity analysis, and we examine those arguments now.
We mention again that the district court denied qualified immunity
because there was a “genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether
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[Lewis] made the necessary reasonable efforts to identify the correct
residence.” As we stated earlier, we cannot review a district court’s
determination that a factual dispute is genuine. Bartlett, 981 F.3d at 331. We are to decide, though, legal significance, i.e., whether disputed facts are material to resolution of the case.Id.
The district court did not find any evidentiary dispute about what
Lewis and others did before entering the incorrect house. Instead, the
dispute was whether those actions constituted “necessary reasonable
efforts.” Whether defendants’ actions were “objectively unreasonable in
light of clearly established law” is a “purely legal question.” Kinney v.
Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 347(5th Cir. 2004). Indeed, it is useful to divide this second component of qualified immunity into two questions: “whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively unreasonable in the light of that then clearly established law.” Hare v. City of Corinth,135 F.3d 320
, 326 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted).
Consequently, as a legal issue for our de novo review, we consider
whether Lewis’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
established law. See id. at 325–26. Clearly established law is determined by
reference to “controlling authority[,] or a robust consensus of persuasive
authority.” Delaughter v. Woodall, 909 F.3d 130, 139(5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The keystone in this analysis is fair warning.Id.
at 139–40. To overcome qualified immunity, plaintiffs must cite “a body of relevant case law [] in which an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated” a defendant’s constitutional rights. Bartlett,981 F.3d at 330
(quotation marks and citations omitted). “While there need not be ‘a case directly on point,’ the unlawfulness of the challenged conduct must be ‘beyond debate.’”Id.
(quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd,563 U.S. 731
, 741 (2011)).
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Compliance with the Fourth Amendment requires a law enforcement
officer’s “reasonable effort[s] to ascertain and identify the place intended to
be searched.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 88. In applying that general principle, the district court relied on two opinions. One was a nonprecedential opinion of this court. Rogers v. Hooper,271 F. App’x 431
(5th Cir. 2008). The other was nonprecedential in the Fifth Circuit because it was issued by a different circuit court of appeals. Hartsfield v. Lemacks,50 F.3d 950
(11th Cir.
1995). 2 The plaintiffs do not cite any other authority.
In Rogers, we affirmed a grant of qualified immunity. Rogers, 271 F.
App’x at 436. Officers secured a warrant to search a suspected drug house.Id. at 432
. Before executing the warrant, officers drove by the target house to confirm its location.Id.
They saw a maroon vehicle parked in front of the target house.Id.
The officers then briefed their team on the location of the home and developed a plan for executing the warrant.Id.
The night of the warrant’s execution, however, the maroon vehicle was parked in front of the house next door to the target house.Id.
Officers broke into that house before ultimately realizing their mistake.Id.
We emphasized that the officers made several efforts to identify the
correct residence, including conducting “initial surveillance of the house
_____________________
2
A nonprecedential opinion “cannot be the source of clearly established law for
qualified immunity analysis.” Marks v. Hudson, 933 F.3d 481, 486(5th Cir. 2019). Nevertheless, such opinions may be used to illustrate clearly established law. Bartlett,981 F.3d at 341
n.105; see also Cooper v. Brown,844 F.3d 517
, 525 n.8 (5th Cir. 2016). As for Hartsfield, “[w]e have not previously identified the level of out-of-circuit consensus necessary to put the relevant question ‘beyond debate’” and to constitute clearly established law. Morrow v. Meachum,917 F.3d 870, 879
(5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ashcroft,
563 U.S. at 741). It is unlikely that one out-of-circuit case is sufficient.
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shortly before the warrant was executed, though [the officers] increased the
chance for mistake by approaching the house in the opposite direction than
they would use later.” Id. at 435. There were differences in appearance
between the mistaken house and target house, but “those differences were
less noticeable at night.” Id. Further, we acknowledged the confusion that
arose from the fact that “a car that earlier had been thought to be in front of
the house to be searched was instead in front of the [p]laintiffs’ home when
the search began.” Id. “[T]he officers made reasonable efforts, though
obviously insufficient ones, to identify the correct house.” Id.
In Hartsfield, the Eleventh Circuit determined than an officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity when he executed a warrant at the wrong
residence. 50 F.3d at 956. The officer had been to the proper residence the day before.Id. at 951
. On the day of the raid, though, he did little to assure
he was leading officers to the correct address:
As it is uncontroverted that the numbers on the houses are
clearly marked, and that the raid took place during daylight
hours, simply checking the warrant would have avoided the
mistaken entry. Moreover, evidence before the court showed
that the houses were located on different parts of the street,
separated by at least one other residence, and that their
appearances were distinguishable.
Id. at 955. “[S]earching the wrong residence when [the officer] had done nothing to make sure he was searching the house described in the warrant” violated clearly established law.Id.
The dissent argues Hartsfield and Rogers constitute clearly established
law that distinguishes Lewis’s actions as objectively unreasonable under the
fair warning analysis. Even if these two nonprecedential opinions were
indicative of clearly established law, they would not support that Lewis
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violated that law. Lewis erred, but he made significant efforts to identify the
correct residence. As the district court summarized, Lewis
(1) reviewed the search warrant; (2) conducted additional
searches on the target residence through the Dallas Central
Appraisal District website; (3) ran a computerized criminal
history search of the occupant of the target residence; (4)
debriefed with DEA agents twice; (5) was provided with “real-
time intelligence that surveillance officers at the scene reported
a truck pulling a white box trailer just pulled up in front of the
target location and stopped;” and (6) observed the home and
took note of the front windows, driveway, and the numbers on
the front of the home in an attempt to confirm the residence as
being the target location.
To elaborate on that final point, Lewis was careful to confirm the house had
the proper arrangement and size of windows, but only later became aware
that those window features were shared by the plaintiffs’ home. Moreover,
Lewis’s confusion was compounded by misleading intelligence. When
officers arrived, the white-box trailer was not parked in front of the target
house. Lewis correctly identified that fact, but then erred in redirecting the
officers. Lewis was far more careful than the officers in the two opinions cited
to us as showing he violated clearly established law.
The “central concern” when evaluating the immunity question “is
whether the official has fair warning that his conduct violates a constitutional
right.” Delaughter, 909 F.3d at 140. That means the “dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Morrow,917 F.3d at 875
(emphasis in original) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Here, the plaintiffs have not cited authority demonstrating that
Lewis’s conduct violated clearly established law.
We REVERSE the district court’s denial of summary judgment to
Lewis and REMAND in order for the district court to dismiss this suit.
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James L. Dennis, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The district court
properly denied qualified immunity to Lieutenant Mike Lewis, commander
of the Waxahachie Police Department (WPD) SWAT team. The Jimersons’
Fourth Amendment claim against Lewis is based on his failure to take
sufficient steps to ensure that his team executed a no-knock warrant at the
correct address. The district court found that factual disputes as to the
reasonableness of Lewis’ efforts to identify the target house precluded
granting qualified immunity to Lewis. While I agree with the majority’s
finding that there are no factual disputes as to Lewis’ actions in leading the
SWAT team to the wrong residence, I disagree that Lewis is entitled to
qualified immunity 1 under clearly established law.
Based on the undisputed facts in this case, Lewis failed to use the
intelligence he received from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that
would have easily allowed him to direct the SWAT team to the target house.
The DEA alerted Lewis that the house number was painted on the curb and
affixed to a wooden pole on the deck, and that the target house was the
thirteenth one on the block. Despite having this information, Lewis did not
even check the number of the house before instructing the SWAT team to
execute the warrant on the Jimersons’ home—separated from the target
_____________________
1
It’s worth noting that one of our colleagues recently suggested that “the Supreme
Court’s original justification for qualified immunity—that Congress wouldn’t have
abrogated common-law immunities absent explicit language—is faulty because the 1871
Civil Rights Act expressly included such language.” Rogers v. Jarrett, 63 F.4th 971, 980 (5th
Cir. 2023) (Willett, J., concurring); see also Alexander A. Reinert, Qualified Immunity’s
Flawed Foundation, 111 CAL. L. REV. 201, 207–08 (2023) (arguing that “the problem with
current qualified immunity doctrine is not just that it departs from the common law
immunity that existed when Section 1983 was enacted,” but also that “no qualified
immunity doctrine at all should apply in Section 1983 actions, if courts stay true to the text
adopted by the enacting Congress and other evidence of legislative intent.”).
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house by more than one 2 residence—by deploying a flash bang, breaking all
their front windows using the “break and rake” technique, and forcing open
the front door. Lewis wrote in an incident report that he “believed” the
numbers on the Jimersons’ home to be that of the target house, despite the
fact that he admitted his view was obscured because the Jimersons “had a
brightly glowing porch light directly above them that was causing a reflection
on the siding of the house.” Regardless of Lewis’ ability to see the numbers
on the home, the search warrant alerted him that the target house number
was written on the curb in front of the house and on a wooden pole supporting
the house—not on the front of the house like at the Jimerson residence. Even
more glaring are the notable physical distinctions between the two houses:
while there is a prominent wheelchair ramp that protrudes from the Jimerson
house with railings that appear to be waist-high, the target house had no such
ramp and featured a chain-link fence around the perimeter of the property—
differences evident from the photographs of the target house provided to
Lewis before the execution of the warrant.
Though it is undisputed that Lewis violated the Jimersons’ Fourth
Amendment rights in executing a SWAT-style entry into their home without
a warrant, the majority finds that the Jimersons’ claim fails because Lewis’
actions were not objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.
Specifically, the majority concludes that there is not enough legal authority
supporting the Jimersons’ contention that Lewis’ efforts to locate the target
residence were constitutionally deficient. While the majority is certainly
correct that “[a] clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that
_____________________
2
As the majority opinion acknowledges, the SWAT team initially assembled on the
front porch of the wrong house. After Lewis recognized that the SWAT team was at the
wrong house, he instructed the SWAT team to execute the warrant on the Jimerson
residence, which was in the opposite direction of the target residence.
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every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates
that right,” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11(2015), they nonetheless unfairly limit the legal authority the Jimersons may rely on in rebutting Lewis’ assertion of qualified immunity. The “focus” of the qualified immunity analysis is whether the officer had “fair notice” that his conduct was unlawful, and here the clearly established law gave Lewis ample warning of the constitutionally sufficient efforts required to ensure he directed the SWAT team to the correct residence. Brosseau v. Haugen,543 U.S. 194, 198
(2004) (“focus” of qualified immunity analysis is “whether the officer had
fair notice that her conduct was unlawful”).
Contrary to the majority’s assertion that there is no clearly established
law that would have put Lewis on notice of the unlawfulness of his actions,
the Supreme Court has stated that officers must make “a reasonable effort to
ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88(1987). In Garrison, officers mistakenly executed a search warrant on the wrong apartment because they believed that the third floor of an apartment complex contained only one rather than two apartments.Id.
There, the Supreme Court found that the officers made a reasonable effort to identify the correct apartment because “[t]he objective facts available to the officers at the time suggested no distinction between McWebb’s apartment and the third-floor premises.”Id.
Specifically, the officers made a “reasonable effort” to identify the target residence where they: (1) went to the premises to see if it matched the description given by an informant; (2) checked with the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company to ascertain in whose name the third floor apartment was listed; and (3) checked with the Baltimore Police Department to make sure that the description and address of the suspect matched the information provided by the informant.Id.
at 81–82, 85–86 n.10.
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Moreover, Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950(11th Cir. 1995) “aptly illustrates the established right” at issue in the Jimersons’ claim against Lewis. Seeid. at 955
(recognizing as “clearly established law” that “absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, a warrantless search of a residence violates the Fourth Amendment, unless the officers engage in reasonable efforts to avoid error”); see also Cooper v. Brown,844 F.3d 517, 525
(5th Cir. 2016) (where a case “does not constitute clearly established law for purposes of QI” it may still “aptly illustrates the established right”). In Hartsfield, the Eleventh Circuit denied qualified immunity where an officer “had the warrant in his possession” yet “did not check to make sure he was leading the other officers to the correct address” Hartsfield,50 F.3d at 955
. There, the officers’ efforts to identify the target of the search warrant were insufficient where: (1) the numbers were clearly marked on the houses; (2) the houses were separated by at least one other residence; and (3) the houses were physically distinguishable; (4) there were no exigent circumstances; and (5) the raid occurred during the daytime.Id.
at 952–55. Here, similarly, the numbers on the houses were clearly marked (despite it being nighttime), the houses were separated by at least one residence and were physically distinguishable, and there were no exigent circumstances. While Lewis arguably did more to identify the correct residence than the officer in Hartsfield, who “did nothing to make sure he was leading the officers to the correct residence,” Lewis nonetheless could have easily avoided the mistaken entry by “simply checking” the house number or using other information at his disposal to identify the correct residence.Id. at 955
. In light
of Hartsfield’s guidance interpreting the clearly established law in Garrison,
the Jimersons rebutted Lewis’ assertion of qualified immunity.
Our unpublished decision in Rogers v. Hooper, 271 F. App’x 431 (5th
Cir. 2008) also supports the denial of qualified immunity to Lewis. In Rogers,
we affirmed a grant of qualified immunity to an officer who mistakenly led his
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team to the wrong house where: (1) the two houses were next to each other;
(2) the officer had previously been at the correct house twice; and (3) the
minor differences between the houses were “less noticeable at night.” Here,
in contrast, the houses were not next to each other, and Lewis could have
easily checked the number of the target house that was painted on the curb
and affixed to a wooden beam supporting the home’s porch. Moreover, the
obvious physical distinctions between the houses would have been noticeable
even at night; while the target house had a chain-link fence around it, the
Jimerson house did not have any fence and featured a wheelchair ramp with
waist-high railings along it. Because Lewis did not take the same steps 3 as the
officer in Rogers to identify the correct residence, our nonprecedential case
law also supports the denial of qualified immunity.
In light of the efforts identified as adequate by the Supreme Court in
Garrison and elaborated on by circuit courts, Lewis had “fair notice” of the
minimum efforts required to comply with the Fourth Amendment when
identifying a house for the purposes of executing a search warrant. Brosseau,
543 U.S. at 198; see also Hope v. Pelzer,536 U.S. 730, 731
(2002) (“Qualified
immunity operates to ensure that before they are subjected to suit, officers
are on notice that their conduct is unlawful.”). In light of clearly established
law, as announced in Garrison and elucidated in Rogers and Hartsfield, it is
“beyond debate” that Lewis’ constitutionally deficient efforts to identify the
_____________________
3
Notably, the officers in Rogers and Garrison each previously visited the correct
houses as part of their efforts to identify the target of the search warrant, whereas here
Lewis made no such attempts. See Rogers, 271 F. App’x at 433–43 (officers “had been at
the correct house at least twice before”); Garrison, 480 U.S. at 86 n.10 (“The officer went
to [the target residence] and found that it matched the description given by the
informant.”). WPD Police Chief Wade Goolsby even testified that after this incident, the
WPD implemented additional procedures requiring officers to “get[] eyes on the location
so that [the officer] not only sees the target, but the surrounding homes” before executing
a search warrant.
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target house were objectively unreasonable. Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,
741 (2011). The panel should affirm the district court’s denial of Lewis’
assertion of qualified immunity.
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