Case: 23-10159      Document: 117-1        Page: 1   Date Filed: 03/12/2024




        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                            ____________                                  FILED
                                                                    March 12, 2024
                              No. 23-10159                           Lyle W. Cayce
                            ____________                                  Clerk

Alexander R. Deanda, on Behalf of Himself and Others Similarly
Situated,

                                                         Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                  versus

Xavier Becerra, in his official capacity as Secretary of Health and Human
Services; Jessica Swafford Marcella, in her official capacity as
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs; United States of
America,

                                       Defendants—Appellants.
               ______________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                   for the Northern District of Texas
                         USDC No. 2:20-CV-92
               ______________________________

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Haynes and Duncan, Circuit
Judges.
Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:
                            Introduction
      Since 1970, the federal Title X program has given clinics hundreds of
millions of dollars in grants to distribute contraceptives and other family
planning services. By statute, Title X grantees must serve “adolescents”
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                                  No. 23-10159


while also “[t]o the extent practical . . . encourag[ing] family participation.”

(a). The question before us is whether Title X preempts a
Texas law giving parents the right to consent to their teenagers’ obtaining
contraceptives. See Tex. Fam. Code § 151.001(a)(6).
       We hold that Title X does not preempt Texas’s law. A grantee can
comply with both. Moreover, Title X’s goal (encouraging family
participation in teens’ receiving family planning services) is not undermined
by Texas’s goal (empowering parents to consent to their teen’s receiving
contraceptives). To the contrary, the two laws reinforce each other. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment declaring that Title X does not
preempt Texas’s parental consent law.
       In doing so, we agree with the district court that the plaintiff,
Alexander Deanda, has standing. If Title X preempts Texas’s law, as the
government maintains, it would nullify Deanda’s right to consent to his
children’s medical care. That invasion of Deanda’s state-created right alone
creates Article III injury. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 

 (2016);
Warth v. Seldin, 

 (1975).
       Because we agree on preemption, we need not reach the district
court’s holding that Title X violates Deanda’s constitutional right to direct
his children’s upbringing.
       We depart from the district court on one point, however. Its final
judgment partially vacated a regulation, 

(b), which forbids
Title X grantees from notifying parents or obtaining their consent. The
regulation, promulgated after Deanda filed suit, was not challenged by
Deanda under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) or otherwise.
Nor did the summary judgment order address the regulation’s validity or
preemptive force. We therefore conclude that the court erred by vacating the
regulation under 

(2) of the APA.




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                                  No. 23-10159


       Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and
RENDER.
                             I. Background
                                      A.
       In 1970, Congress enacted Title X of the Public Health Service Act to
“mak[e] comprehensive voluntary family planning services readily available
to all persons desiring such services.” 

(1), 

, 1504 (1970) (codified as amended at 

 et seq.). The law
authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) “to make grants to and enter into contracts with public or
nonprofit private entities to assist in the establishment and operation of
voluntary family planning projects which shall offer a broad range of
acceptable and effective family planning methods and services.”

(a). Grants “shall be made in accordance with such
regulations as the Secretary may promulgate.” 

 § 300a-4(a).
       “Title X grantees have served the teenage population from the
inception of the program.” Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Heckler,

, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1983). A 1978 amendment made this explicit,
requiring grantees to include “services for adolescents.” 

(a)(1), 

, 3093 (1978); see also Heckler, 712 F.2d at 652 (noting
the 1978 amendment “simply codified accepted past practice” with respect
to providing services to “sexually active adolescents”) (quoting S. Rep. No.
822, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1978)).
       In 1981 Congress amended Title X to require that, “[t]o the extent
practical,” grantees “shall encourage family participation in projects assisted
under this subsection.” 

(b)(1), 

, 570
(1981). In 1983, the Secretary promulgated regulations requiring grantees to
notify parents before prescribing contraceptives to minors and to comply




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                                     No. 23-10159


with state parental notification and consent laws. See 

 (Jan.
26, 1983). Those regulations never went into effect, however, because the
D.C. and Second Circuits ruled them unlawful. See Heckler, 712 F.2d at 663–
64; New York v. Heckler, 

 (2d Cir. 1983). The courts
reasoned that Congress had declined to add such requirements to Title X and
that, in any event, the regulations would “undermine” a “primary purpose”
of the program—making “family planning services readily available to
teenagers.” Heckler, 712 F.2d at 660, 663.
        As a result, the Secretary’s “longstanding guidance” to Title X
grantees has been that they cannot require parental consent or even notify
parents. See, e.g., 

, 56,166 (Oct. 7, 2021) (“Specifically
with respect to adolescents, courts have for decades recognized minors’
rights to receive confidential services under the Title X program.”) (citing
Heckler, 

)). The Secretary formalized this policy by
promulgating a final rule in October 2021. See id. at 56,144. While reiterating
that “[t]o the extent practical, Title X projects shall encourage family
participation,” the rule forbids grantees from requiring parental consent or
notifying parents before or after a minor receives family planning services. 

(b).
                                          B.
        In 2020, Alexander Deanda filed a federal lawsuit challenging the
Secretary’s administration of the Title X program. He alleged that he is the
father of three minor daughters1; that he is raising his daughters according to
his Christian beliefs to abstain from pre-marital sex; and that he wants to be
        _____________________
        1
          Following oral argument, the Secretary filed a suggestion of mootness claiming
interrogatory responses revealed that Deanda’s daughters were now all adults. Deanda’s
response, accompanied by his affidavit, stated that one of his daughters remains a minor.
Accordingly, we decline the Secretary’s request to declare the case moot.




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                                       No. 23-10159


informed if any of his children access or try to access contraceptives. He
further alleged that Texas law gives him a right to consent before his children
obtain       contraceptives.     See   Tex.      Fam.     Code      § 151.001(a)(6);
§ 102.003(a)(1). Finally, he alleged that the Secretary administers Title X
unlawfully by funding grantees who provide contraceptives to minors
without notifying parents or obtaining parental consent. Accordingly,
Deanda sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of himself and a
putative class, claiming that the Title X program violates (and does not
preempt) Texas law and that it violates his constitutional right to direct his
children’s upbringing as well as his rights under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”).2 After the district court declined to certify a
class, Deanda moved for summary judgment on his own behalf, which the
district court granted.
         The district court first ruled that Deanda had standing because the
Secretary’s administration of Title X threatens his right under Texas law “to
consent to his children’s medical care” and also “increas[es] the risk that
[his] children might access birth control without his knowledge or consent.”
On the merits, the court concluded that Title X does not preempt Texas’s
parental consent law and also that the Secretary’s administration of Title X
violates Deanda’s constitutional right to direct the upbringing of his children.
         The court then ordered the parties to file proposed final judgments.
Deanda’s          proposed     judgment     argued    that     under   the   APA,

(2), he was entitled to vacatur of the October 2021 HHS
regulation, 

, prohibiting parental notice or consent. (That
regulation was promulgated after Deanda sued and after the parties initially
cross-moved for summary judgment.) The Secretary objected, arguing

         _____________________
         2
             Deanda later withdrew his RFRA claim.




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                                  No. 23-10159


Deanda had brought no APA claim nor sought vacatur of any regulations,
and moved to strike that part of Deanda’s proposed judgment.
       The final judgment declared that the Secretary’s administration of
Title X violated Deanda’s rights under Texas law and his constitutional right
to direct his children’s upbringing. Notwithstanding the Secretary’s motion
to strike, the judgment also vacated the second sentence of 

under APA § 706(2). The district court then requested supplemental
briefing on that latter issue but ultimately denied the Secretary’s motion to
strike. The court reasoned that partial vacatur of the regulation “follow[ed]
necessarily” from the court’s substantive holdings.
       The Secretary timely appealed.
                       II. Standard of Review
       We review standing and preemption de novo. See Crown Castle Fiber,
L.L.C. v. City of Pasadena, 

 (5th Cir. 2023) (citations
omitted). We also review summary judgments de novo. See Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex., 

 (5th Cir. 2022); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review the vacatur of a regulation under the APA for
abuse of discretion. Data Mktg. P’ship, LP v. United States Dep’t of Lab., 

 (5th Cir. 2022).
                              III. Standing
       First, we address standing. As noted, the district court ruled Deanda
had standing because the Secretary’s administration of Title X (1) seeks to
undermine Deanda’s state right to consent to his children’s medical care, and
(2) increases the risk that his children will obtain contraceptives without his
knowledge or consent. On appeal, the Secretary contests both conclusions.
We conclude that Deanda has standing under the first theory, so we need not
address the second.




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                                        No. 23-10159


                                             A.
        To have standing to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show he has
suffered an injury traceable to the defendant which the court’s judgment
would likely redress. Laufer v. Mann Hosp., L.L.C., 

 (5th
Cir. 2021) (citing Spokeo, 

). One kind of injury occurs when a
defendant invades a statutorily-created right that protects the plaintiff. “The
actual or threatened injury requirement of Article III may exist solely by
virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing.” Wendt v. 24-Hour Fitness USA, Inc., 

 (5th Cir.
2016) (quoting Warth, 

) (cleaned up).3 In such a case, the
statute must “grant[] persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial
relief.” 

 (quoting Warth, 

). Violating the statute,
however, does not “automatically” guarantee standing: “Article III
standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory
violation.” Spokeo, 

. So, a “bare procedural violation, divorced
from any concrete harm” would not “satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.”

        _____________________
        3
          See also Diamond v. Charles, 

, 65 n.17 (1986) (“The Illinois Legislature,
of course, has the power to create new interests, the invasion of which may confer
standing.”) (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 

, 41 n.22 (1976)); Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 

 (1982) (recognizing Article III injury may exist
“solely” due to invasion of plaintiff’s statutory rights) (citing Warth, 

));
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 

, 617 n.3 (1973) (recognizing “Congress may enact
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury
would exist without the statute”) (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 

 (1972) (White, J., concurring)); Hardin v. Ky. Util. Co., 

 (1968)); In re
Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 

 (3d Cir. 2017) (“That
the violation of a statute can cause an injury in fact and grant Article III standing is not a
new doctrine.”) (and collecting cases); Utah ex rel. Div. of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v.
United States, 

 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Although Article III standing is a
question of federal law, state law may create the asserted legal interest.”); Cantrell v. City
of Long Beach, 

 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[S]tate law can create interests that
support standing in federal courts.”).




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                                      No. 23-10159

 (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 

 (2009)). But
sometimes violating the statute is enough: “[T]he violation of a procedural
right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute
injury in fact,” and “a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional
harm beyond the one [the statute] has identified.” Id. at 342 (citations
omitted).
        Under those principles, Deanda has standing based on the Secretary’s
attempt to undermine his state right to consent to his daughters’ obtaining
contraceptives. It is undisputed that Texas affords Deanda a right to consent
to his minor children’s medical care, including whether they receive
contraceptives and other family planning services. See Tex. Fam. Code
§ 151.001(a)(6) (providing “[a] parent of a child has . . . the right to consent
to the child’s . . . medical and dental care”). It is also undisputed that Deanda
may sue to enforce that right. See id. § 102.003(a)(1) (allowing “a parent of
the child” to file suit). Nor can it be doubted that the Secretary’s policy is to
“inva[de]” the right Texas confers on Deanda. Warth, 

. The
Secretary distributes millions of dollars in grants annually to Texas clinics on
the express condition that they provide contraceptive services to minors
without notifying their parents or seeking parental consent. See 

(b).4 And, in the Secretary’s view, this policy trumps the
notice-and-consent rights of Texas parents like Deanda. See Ensuring Access

        _____________________
        4
         In 2022, for instance, the Secretary granted $26,520,156 to clinics in “Region VI”
alone, which includes Texas and four other states. Office of Population Affairs,
Title X Family Planning Annual Report, 2022 National Summary 75
(October 2023), available at opa.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-10/2022-FPAR-
National-Summary.pdf. Using those Title X funds, Region VI clinics provided
contraceptives to 21,972 children under eighteen, almost ninety percent female. 

.
Nationwide, the Secretary provided $248,666,814 to Title X clinics in 2022. 

.
Those clinics, in turn, provided contraceptives to 205,108 children under eighteen—
including 47,909 under fifteen. 

.




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                                 No. 23-10159


to Equitable, Affordable, Client-Centered, Quality Family Planning Services, 

, 56,166 (Oct. 7, 2021) (explaining that 

(b)
protects “adolescent confidentiality” and that family “involvement” is
unnecessary). So, the Secretary’s policy would not merely “inva[de]”
Deanda’s state-conferred parental rights. Warth, 

. It would
obliterate them.
       This is not a case where Deanda has alleged a “bare procedural
violation, divorced from any concrete harm.” Spokeo, 

; see also
Summers, 

 (“[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some
concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation . . . is insufficient to
create Article III standing.”). Those situations are unlike this one, as a
review of the leading Supreme Court cases shows. Start with Spokeo. The
plaintiff sued an internet search company for violating the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”) by disseminating “incorrect” information about
him. 

. As the Court explained, not all FCRA violations inflict
Article III injury: “It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an
incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm.” 

.
Or take Spokeo’s sequel, TransUnion. The Court held procedural FCRA
violations would not cause injury-in-fact where a misleading credit report was
never even disseminated. See TransUnion L.L.C. v. Ramirez, 

 (2021) (“The mere presence of an inaccuracy in an internal credit file, if
it is not disclosed to a third party, causes no concrete harm.”). Finally, take
Summers. Plaintiffs challenged Forest Service regulations exempting a timber
project (Burnt Ridge) from notice-and-comment, allegedly in violation of
federal law. 555 U.S. at 490–91. The Court held any procedural violation did
not concretely injure plaintiffs because litigation over Burnt Ridge had
settled. See 

 (explaining “deprivation of a procedural right without
some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation—a procedural right
in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III standing”).




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                                 No. 23-10159


       Merely describing these “bare procedural right” cases shows why
they do not apply here. To begin with, none involves a federal program that,
by design, seeks to preempt a state-conferred right. Furthermore, Deanda
does not complain that the Secretary is violating some technical component
of federal or state law with no real-world consequences to him. Cf.
TransUnion, 

; Spokeo, 

; Summers, 

. He complains, rather, that the Secretary’s policy purports to obliterate
the parental rights he now enjoys under Texas law. In other words, if the
Secretary’s view prevails, Deanda’s existing right to consent to his children’s
receiving contraceptives from Title X providers will disappear. That is the
“concrete interest[],” Summers, 

, which Texas law protects
and which the Secretary’s policy would vaporize.
       Finally, the Supreme Court has told us to consider whether Deanda’s
claimed injuries bear “a close relationship to harms traditionally recognized
as providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts.” TransUnion, 

 (citing Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340–41). To be sure, his alleged harms are
“intangible,” but that does not prevent them from also being “concrete” for
Article III purposes. See 

 (“Various intangible harms can also be
concrete.”); Spokeo, 

 (“Although tangible injuries are perhaps
easier to recognize, . . . intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”).
Deanda’s injuries plainly qualify as harms long recognized by our courts.
       As the district court correctly reasoned, Deanda alleges injuries to his
religious exercise and parental rights that have perennially been honored by
American courts. For example, he claims the Secretary’s policy burdens his
right to exercise his Christian belief that his minor children should abstain
from pre-marital sex. Such rights are, as the Supreme Court has explained,
part of our “enduring American tradition.” See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of
Rev., 

 (2020) (“Drawing on ‘enduring American
tradition,’ we have long recognized the rights of parents to direct ‘the



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                                        No. 23-10159


religious upbringing’ of their children.”) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 

, 213–14 (1972)).5 He also claims interference with his parental rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment—rights our courts have traditionally
protected. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 

 (1997) (“In
a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due
Process Clause includes the righ[t] . . . to direct the education and upbringing
of one’s children.”).6 True, parental rights over their children’s medical
treatment are not unlimited. See, e.g., L.W. by and through Williams v.
Skrmetti, 

 (6th Cir. 2023) (“This country does not have a
custom of permitting parents to obtain banned medical treatments for their
children and to override contrary legislative policy judgments.”). But “it
cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” Troxel v.



        _____________________
        5
          See also Yoder, 

 (observing “the values of parental direction of the
religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have
a high place in our society”) (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 

 (1925); Ginsberg
v. New York, 

 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 

 (1923)).
        6
          See also, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 

 (1978) (“We have recognized
on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally
protected”); Parham v. J. R., 

 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically
has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental
authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course.”);
Santosky v. Kramer, 

 (1982) (discussing “[t]he fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”); M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., 

 (1996) (“Choices about . . . the upbringing of children are among
associational rights this Court has ranked as ‘of basic importance in our society.’”)
(quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 

 (1971)); Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Org., 

, 256–57 (2022) (discussing “the right to make decisions about the
education of one’s children”) (citing Pierce , 

)).




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                                  No. 23-10159


Granville, 

 (2000) (plurality op.). The injuries Deanda asserts
fall within this “enduring American tradition.” Espinoza, 

.
                                      B.
       The Secretary raises two objections to standing. First, Deanda has not
alleged that his minor daughters have obtained or tried to obtain (or are likely
to obtain) contraceptives from a Title X provider. Second, Deanda effectively
raises a generalized grievance to Title X. We disagree with both points.
       The Secretary first argues that Deanda must do more than allege the
nullification of his right to consent to his children’s medical care. Deanda
must also allege his children “have . . . obtained or sought to obtain family-
planning services from a Title X provider” or “are likely to do so in the near
future.” That is a puzzling argument. A key goal of the Secretary’s policy is
to get contraceptives into children’s hands without their parents knowing. See

(b) (forbidding “any Title X project staff [from] notify[ing]
a parent or guardian before or after a minor has requested and/or received
Title X family planning services”). So, imagine two dads. One dad’s
daughter gets the Pill from a Title X clinic, and the dad never finds out.
According to the Secretary, he has no standing to sue. The other dad finds
out. According to the Secretary, he can sue. That makes little sense. Parents’
standing to sue should not depend on whether the Secretary has successfully
kept them in the dark about their children’s sex lives. See Heckler, 712 F.2d
at 353 (Bork, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It would be no
small matter to decide, as proponents of the rule would put it, that the federal
government will assist teenagers in conducting active sexual lives but that
their parents may not be told.”).
       In any event, the Secretary misunderstands the claimed injury.
Deanda asserts injury to his state-secured parental rights to notice and
consent. Contrary to the Secretary’s argument, that injury is not “premised




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                                 No. 23-10159


on [his] minor children’s receiving family-planning services.” It is premised
on the Secretary’s express goal of overriding Deanda’s parental rights under
Texas law. The attempted erasure of those rights is “sufficient . . . to
constitute [an] injury in fact,” without Deanda’s needing to “allege any
additional harm beyond the one [Texas] has identified.” Spokeo, 

 (citations omitted); see also Warth, 

 (“The actual or
threatened injury required by Art[icle] III may exist solely by virtue of
‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing[.]’”)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)). To be sure, if one of Deanda’s
daughters did get contraceptives from a Title X provider without his
knowing, that would also injure Deanda. But it would mean Deanda had been
injured not once but twice—once by the Secretary’s nullifying his parental
rights and a second time by the Secretary’s succeeding in delivering birth
control to Deanda’s daughter behind his back.
       The Secretary next argues that, if Deanda has standing, then “any
parent (or potential parent) in Texas would presumably have standing to sue
HHS for its administration of the Title X program.” We disagree. This case
does not concern all “parents or potential parents.” It concerns only a parent
with particular religious beliefs about raising his children. And even if that
category includes many other parents, “[t]he fact that an injury may be
suffered by a large number of people does not of itself make that injury a
nonjusticiable generalized grievance.” Spokeo, 

 n.7; see also
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 

 (1998) (“[W]here a harm is
concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found ‘injury in fact.’”)
(citations omitted)). The Secretary’s policy is to spend millions to get
contraceptives to minors without telling their parents. It should not come as
a shock that there could be a correspondingly large number of parents who
can challenge it in court.




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                                       No. 23-10159


        In any event, Deanda’s injury is not a “generalized grievance.” That
is a case where “the impact on [plaintiff] is plainly undifferentiated and
‘common to all members of the public.’” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 

 (1992) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 

, 176–77
(1974)). Deanda’s injury is personal. He sues as a father who, for religious
reasons, wishes to exercise his state-conferred right to keep his children from
accessing birth control without his knowledge or consent—not as an
“undifferentiated” member of the general public. See, e.g., United States v.
Texas, 

, 703–04 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Standing
doctrine . . . preserves a forum for plaintiffs seeking relief for concrete and
personal harms while filtering out those with generalized grievances that
belong to a legislature to address.”).
                                            C.
        In sum, Deanda has shown an Article III injury because the Secretary
seeks to preempt his state-conferred right to consent to his children’s
obtaining contraceptives.7 Deanda easily satisfies the other standing
components. The injury to Deanda’s parental rights flows directly from the
Secretary’s administration of Title X. See, e.g. Louisiana v. U.S. Dep’t of
Energy, 

, 468–69 (5th Cir. 2024). That injury would be redressed
if we declared that the Secretary’s policy did not preempt Texas law or was
otherwise unlawful. See 

                                 IV. Preemption
        We turn to the question whether Title X preempts Texas’s parental
consent law. The district court held there was no preemption because a Title

        _____________________
        7
          We therefore need not consider Deanda’s alternate argument that the Secretary
injures him by increasing the risk that his children will obtain contraceptives from a Title
X provider.




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                                  No. 23-10159


X grantee could comply with the Texas law while also complying with Title
X’s statutory directive that grantees “[t]o the extent practical . . . shall
encourage     family     participation”     in   family     planning   projects.

(a). The Secretary contends this was error for several
reasons. After setting out the principles guiding our inquiry, we consider each
argument in turn.
                                      A.
       Federal preemption of state law flows from the Supremacy Clause:
       This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
       shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
       which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
       shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
       State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
       Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2; see Kansas v. Garcia, 

 (2020)
(“The [Supremacy] Clause provides ‘a rule of decision’ for determining
whether federal or state law applies in a particular situation.”) (citation
omitted)). State law is preempted when (1) a federal statute expressly
preempts state law (“express preemption”); (2) federal legislation
pervasively occupies a regulatory field (“field preemption”); or (3) a federal
statute conflicts with state law (“conflict preemption”). See generally Arizona
v. United States, 

, 398–400 (2012).
       Preemption analysis begins “with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Altria Grp., Inc.
v. Good, 

 (2008) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 

 (1947)). This “presumption against preemption is applicable
to ‘areas of law traditionally reserved to the states[.]’” Franks Inv. Co. L.L.C.
v. Union Pac. R. Co., 

 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting In




                                       15
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                                  No. 23-10159


re Davis, 

 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc)); see also Arizona, 

 (“In preemption analysis, courts should assume that ‘the historic
police powers of the States’ are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.’”) (quoting Rice, 

)).
Accordingly, “[t]here is . . . a presumption against preemption of state laws
governing domestic relations, and family and family-property law must do
major damage to clear and substantial federal interests before the Supremacy
Clause will demand that state law will be overridden.” Hillman v. Maretta,

, 490–91 (2013) (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 

 (2001); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 

 (1979)
(cleaned up)).
       With that background in mind, we turn to the Secretary’s arguments
that the Title X program preempts Texas’s parental consent law.
                                      B.
       The Secretary argues that the text of 

(a) conflicts
with, and thus preempts, Texas’s parental consent law. To be precise, the
Secretary does not contend that complying with both provisions is “a
physical impossibility.” Arizona, 

 (quoting Fla. Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 

, 142–43 (1963)). Rather, the
Secretary argues that Texas’s law “stands as an obstacle” to accomplishing
Title X’s “full purposes and objectives.” See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,

 (2000) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 

(1941)). This kind of preemption claim must clear a “high threshold.”
Barrosse v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 

 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Chamber of Com. v. Whiting, 

 (2011)). “Courts may not
conduct ‘a freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in
tension with federal objectives [because] such an endeavor would undercut




                                       16
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                                       No. 23-10159


the principle that it is Congress rather than the courts that pre-empts state
law.’” Ibid.(quoting Whiting, 

).8
                                             1.
        The Secretary properly begins with § 300(a)’s text, which provides:

        The Secretary is authorized to make grants and enter into
        contracts with public or nonprofit private entities to assist in
        the establishment and operation of voluntary family planning
        projects which shall offer a broad range of acceptable and
        effective family planning methods and services (including
        natural family planning methods, infertility services, and
        services for adolescents). To the extent practical, entities which
        receive grants or contracts under this subjection shall encourage
        family participation in projects assisted under this subsection.

(a) (emphasis added). The Secretary targets the italicized
sentence, specifically the requirement that grantees “[t]o the extent
practical . . . shall encourage family participation” in Title X projects.
According to the Secretary, this language conveys that Congress “did not
intend to require parental consent as a condition for adolescents to receive
Title X services,” thus bringing Title X’s goals into conflict with Texas’s
parental consent law. We disagree.
        A straightforward reading of § 300(a) reveals no conflict between
Title X’s objectives and Texas’s. The federal text plainly conveys the
        _____________________
        8
          Two Justices have criticized “purposes and objectives” preemption as contrary
to the Supremacy Clause. See Kansas, 

 (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by
Gorsuch, J.) (“The doctrine of ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption impermissibly rests
on judicial guesswork about ‘broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or
generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not contained with the text of federal
law.’”) (citation omitted)). Until the Supreme Court discards the doctrine, however, we
must apply it. See, e.g., Young Conservatives of Tex. Found. v. Smatresk, 

(5th Cir. 2023) (applying the doctrine); Barrosse, 70 F.4th at 321–23 (same).




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                                        No. 23-10159


overarching goal of encouraging family participation in adolescents’ family
planning decisions. The Texas law pursues the same goal through more
specific means: requiring parental consent before minors obtain
contraceptives. Those objectives reinforce each other. As Deanda argues,
Title X establishes a “floor” for grantees’ participation (encouraging family
participation), and Texas law establishes a specific means of achieving that
goal (obtaining parents’ consent). So, far from undermining Title X’s
purposes, Texas law concretely furthers them. 9
        To reach the opposite conclusion—i.e., that § 300(a) implicitly forbids
requiring parental consent—the Secretary must distort the text. He contends
the “plain meaning of the verb ‘encourage’ suggests” Congress only wanted
grantees to “motivate and advise” minors “to include their family in their
decision-making.” The Secretary offers scant support for that reading
beyond quoting dictionary definitions of “encourage,” such as “to inspire
with courage, spirit, or hope” or “to spur on.”10 That begs the question. How
did Congress want grantees to “inspire” or “spur on” family participation?
Section 300(a)’s broad language does not specify, and we cannot accept the
Secretary’s invitation to read restrictions into it. See, e.g., P.R. Dep’t of

        _____________________
        9
          For that reason, we are unpersuaded by the Secretary’s reliance on Planned
Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 

 (5th Cir. 2005). Sanchez addressed
a Texas law blocking Title X funds from entities that perform abortions. 

. We
suggested the law would be preempted if it conflicted with Title X eligibility requirements
(but we did not decide that question, given that the Texas law possibly allowed grantees to
keep receiving funds if they created separate affiliates). 

 at 338–43. Sanchez is inapposite.
Unlike the law in Sanchez, Texas’s parental consent law does not purport to add
requirements to Title X eligibility. Rather, it is a generally applicable state law.
Furthermore, as explained, Texas’s parental consent law does not conflict with Title X’s
mandate that grantees encourage family participation. By contrast, the Texas law in
Sanchez potentially excluded grantees that Congress had deemed eligible. 

.
        10
          See Encourage, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/encourage (last visited March 7, 2024).




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                                     No. 23-10159


Consumer Aff. v. Isla Petrol. Corp., 

 (1988) [Isla Petrol.]
(preemption cannot depend on “congressional intent in a vacuum, unrelated
to the giving of meaning to an enacted statutory text”). If we did, we would
commit the kind of forbidden “freewheeling judicial inquiry” into “federal
objectives.” Whiting, 

.11
                                          2.
       Moreover, the Secretary ignores the presumption against preempting
state family law. See, e.g., Egelhoff, 

 (“There is indeed a
presumption against pre-emption in areas of traditional state regulation such
as family law.”) (citation omitted)). To defeat that presumption, Congress
must “ma[k]e clear its desire for pre-emption.” Ibid.; see also Isla Petrol., 

 (“As we have repeatedly stated, ‘we start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
       In § 300(a), however, we see no such preemptive desire, clear or
otherwise. If anything, we see the opposite. After all, in 1981 Congress did
not add language to § 300(a) requiring grantees to “discourage” or
“restrict” family participation in family planning. It added language
requiring grantees to encourage family participation. That would be a bizarre
way of announcing Congress’s intent to nullify state requirements that
parents consent to their teenagers’ getting the Pill.

       _____________________
       11
           In a similar vein, the Secretary also argues the “[t]o the extent practical”
language in § 300(a) “indicat[es] that Congress understood that even the goal of
encouraging family participation may well have to give way to other, competing
considerations” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Maybe so. But the point
is that this vague language does not mandate the Secretary’s reading of § 300(a) to
categorically forbid grantees from contacting parents.




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                                      No. 23-10159


                                           3.
        The Secretary next points out that, also in 1981, Congress amended a
different provision—one relating to adolescent pregnancy demonstration
grants under Title XX—to require parental notice and consent. See 

(a), 95 Stat. at 587 (Aug. 13, 1981) (requiring grantees to
“notify the parents and guardians of any unemancipated minor requesting
services” and generally to “obtain the [parent’s] permission”); see
42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(22)(A). According to the Secretary, because § 300(a)
lacks such explicit language, by implication it does not require parental notice
or consent.
        That misses the point. Deanda does not argue that Title X itself
requires parental consent—in fact, he concedes it does not. He argues only
that Title X’s silence on the matter does not preempt a state parental-consent
law, like Texas’s, that may “require more extensive parental involvement
than the bare minimum required by the Title X statute.” So, the 1981 Title
XX amendments are immaterial to the preemption question before us.
                                           4.
        The Secretary then turns to legislative history. He relies on two items:
(1) a failed pre-1981 proposal to require Title X grantees to notify parents, see
Heckler, 712 F.2d at 660 & n.43; and (2) a conference committee report
suggesting grantees would not contact parents directly but would instead
encourage minors to involve their parents. See id. at 657 (quoting H.R. Cong.
Rec. No. 97-208, at 799 (1981)). We are unpersuaded for several reasons.
        First, legislative history, generally of dubious value in statutory
interpretation,12 is especially unhelpful in interpreting § 300(a). Speculating
        _____________________
        12
         See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 

 (2004) (“We should prefer the
plain meaning since that approach respects the words of Congress. In this manner we avoid




                                           20
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                                       No. 23-10159


why legislators rejected language in one bill (the pre-1981 proposed
amendment to § 300(a)) and accepted the language in another (the present
§ 300(a)) is “not the best of guides to legislative intent.” State of Ala. ex rel.
Graddick v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 

, 1068 n.12 (5th Cir. 1981)
(quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 

, 381 n.11 (1969)). Even
worse is the Secretary’s invitation to rely on the conference committee
report, which would effectively amend § 300(a). That is, the Secretary would
use the report to alter the text from

        To the extent practical, entities which receive grants or
        contracts under this subjection shall encourage family
        participation in projects assisted under this subsection.
                                             to

        To the extent practical, entities which receive grants or
        contracts under this subjection shall not contact parents directly
        but shall only encourage family participation adolescents to
        contact their parents in projects assisted under this subsection.

Congress could have adopted the committee’s views by enacting them into
law, but it did not. And, for our part, we cannot end-run Congress by using a
committee report to amend the statute. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 

 (2018) (“[L]egislative history is not the law.”); United States

        _____________________
the pitfalls that plague too quick a turn to the more controversial realm of legislative
history.”); Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 

 (2019) (explaining that
“legislative history is not the law”); Wooden v. United States, 

, 381 (2022)
(Barrett, J., concurring) (noting that “the problems with legislative history are well
rehearsed”); United States v. Moore, 

 (5th Cir. 2023) (explaining that we
“may look to legislative history” only “in very rare cases”); A. Scalia & B. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 46 (2012) (“In the
interpretation of legislation, we aspire to be ‘a nation of laws, not of men.’ This means
(1) giving effect to the text that lawmakers have adopted and that the people are entitled to
rely on, and (2) giving no effect to lawmakers’ unenacted desires.”).




                                             21
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                                  No. 23-10159


v. Safehouse, 

 (3d Cir. 2021) (“The words on the page, not
the intent of any legislator, go through bicameralism and presentment and
become law.”); Scalia & Garner, supra, at 310 (“Even if the members
of each house wish to do so, they cannot assign responsibility for making
law—or the details of law—to one of their number, or to one of their
committees.”) (emphasis added)).
       Second, even if we considered the legislative history cited here, it
speaks only to whether Title X itself requires parental consent. Once again,
that issue is not before us. The issue, instead, is whether Title X preempts
state parental consent laws. See, e.g., Heckler, 712 F.2d at 668 (Bork, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Congress might forbid HHS
from requiring parental notification yet, in recognition of states’ traditional
role in this area, defer to states that have such a requirement.”).
       Third, and most importantly, in areas of traditional state regulation
like family law, Congress must overcome the presumption-against-
preemption by “clear[ly] and manifest[ly]” showing its intent to preempt.
See Arizona, 

; Altria Grp., 555 U.S. at 77; Isla Petrol., 

. Yet, in urging preemption here, the Secretary must paper over the
statute’s silence with legislative history. That is a flashing red sign that no
“clear and manifest” intent to preempt is shown in § 300(a). See, e.g., Isla
Petrol., 

 (no preemption where “[t]here is no text . . . to which
expressions of pre-emptive intent in legislative history might attach”); cf.
United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 

 (1992) (if the “clarity”
necessary to abrogate sovereign immunity “does not exist [in the statute], it
cannot be supplied by a committee report”).
                                       5.
       Finally, the Secretary relies on out-of-circuit cases, principally the
D.C. Circuit’s 2-1 decision in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.




                                       22
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                                       No. 23-10159


v. Heckler, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1983) [Heckler]; but see id. at 665–67 (Bork,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Heckler invalidated the
Secretary’s 1982 regulations requiring Title X grantees to notify parents and
comply with state parental notice-and-consent laws. Id. at 665.13 We disagree
with the Secretary, however, that Heckler provides helpful guidance on the
preemption question before us.
        First and foremost, Heckler addressed only the Secretary’s authority
to promulgate regulations and not whether Title X preempts state law. See
712 F.2d at 656–64. Preemption was not at issue. Moreover, the majority
refused even to consider preemption principles as instructive on whether the
Secretary’s regulations were valid. The majority rejected as “misplaced” the
Secretary’s argument that avoiding preemption supported the regulations,
id. at 664 n.57, instead treating the regulations as “an invalid delegation of
authority to the states.” Id. at 663. Dissenting on this point, Judge Bork
argued that the Secretary’s regulation as to state parental consent laws was
supported by the goal of not preempting state family law. Id. at 668 (Bork, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). So, with respect to the issue before
us—whether Title X preempts state parental consent laws—the Heckler
majority said next to nothing.
        Furthermore, because the Heckler majority did not consider
preemption, it necessarily did not read § 300(a) through the lens of the
presumption-against-preemption. See Egelhoff, 

 (discussing
the “presumption against pre-emption in areas of traditional state regulation

        _____________________
        13
          Three circuits have since followed Heckler. See State of N.Y. v. Heckler, 

 (2d Cir. 1983) (“agree[ing]” with D.C. Circuit decision); Jane Does v. Utah
Dep’t of Health, 

, 254–56 (10th Cir. 1985) (affirming trial court’s adherence to
D.C. Circuit and Second Circuit decisions); Cnty. of St. Charles v. Mo. Fam. Health Council,

, 684–85 (8th Cir. 1997) (relying on D.C., Second, and Tenth Circuits).




                                            23
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                                        No. 23-10159


such as family law”). Judge Bork disagreed on this point, and so his opinion
sheds more light on the issue before us. Even if Title X itself did not require
parental notification, he explained, “yet, in recognition of states’ traditional
role in this area, [Congress might] defer to states that have such a
requirement.” Id. at 668 (Bork, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Bork found support for that view in “the especially high standard that
must be met when inferring preemption of state laws in areas such as family
relations and medical ethics that are traditionally the exclusive or nearly
exclusive province of state law.” Ibid. (Bork, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Hisquierdo, 

). “Where such policies
are at stake,” Judge Bork explained, “it is particularly important that we
make sure Congress intended to oust state laws.” 

        Accordingly, we disagree with the Secretary that Heckler supports his
position in this case.14

        _____________________
        14
           We add that the Heckler majority’s use of legislative history sits uneasily with our
modern precedent. The majority spent two inconclusive paragraphs on the text, see 

, but spent page after page exploring various kinds of legislative history. See 

 at 656–
58 (1981 conference committee report); 

 (1975 and 1978 Senate reports); 

 at
659–60 (1977 Senate, 1978 House, 1978 Senate reports); 

 (1978 failed Volkmer
amendment); 

 at 662–63 (1981 and 1982 Senate reports); 

 (committee
chairman’s statement). The majority even theorized that “despite ritualistic incantations
of the ‘plain meaning rule,’ no occasion for statutory construction now exists when the
[Supreme] Court will not look at the legislative history.” 

 at 657 n.32 (citations omitted).
This use of legislative history jars with modern cases, however. Since Heckler was decided
in 1983, both the Supreme Court and our court have taken a more restrained approach to
using legislative history. See, e.g., Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 

 (2019) (“Even those of us who sometimes consult legislative history will never allow
it to be used to ‘muddy’ the meaning of ‘clear statutory language.’”) (quoting Milner v.
Dep’t of Navy, 

, 572 (2011))); ibid. (observing “this Court has repeatedly
refused to alter FOIA’s plain terms on the strength only of arguments from legislative
history”) (citations omitted)); United States v. Nazerzadeh, 

 (5th Cir.
2023) (explaining, where text is unambiguous, “we are not permitted to look to the
legislative history”); Moore, 

 (explaining legislative history is relevant only




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                                       No. 23-10159


                                           ***
        In sum, we agree with the district court that 

(a) does
not preempt Texas’s parental consent law.15
                                            C.
        The Secretary next argues that Texas’s parental consent law is
independently preempted by a regulation, 

(b). As noted,
the regulation provides:
        To the extent practical, Title X projects shall encourage family
        participation. However, Title X projects may not require
        consent of parents or guardians for the provision of services to
        minors, nor can any Title X project staff notify a parent or
        guardian before or after a minor has requires and/or received
        Title X family planning services.

(b). HHS promulgated the regulation in October 2021,
after Deanda filed suit and after the parties initially cross-moved for summary
judgment. See 

 (Oct. 7, 2021). We decline to reach this
issue because the parties did not raise it in the district court and the district
court’s summary judgment order did not address it.
        Valid agency regulations constitute federal law for preemption
purposes. See, e.g., Butler v. Coast Elec. Power Ass’n, 

 (5th
Cir. 2019) (citing City of New York v. F.C.C., 

 (1988); Fid. Fed.
        _____________________
“in very rare cases”); Scalia & Garner, supra, at 46. And, as noted, the Secretary’s
use of legislative history would add words to § 300(a) that were never enacted.
        15
           We therefore need not and do not address Deanda’s argument that Title X
violates his constitutional right to direct his children’s upbringing. See, e.g., Escambia
County v. McMillan, 

 (1984) (per curiam) (“It is a well established principle
governing the prudent exercise of [federal] jurisdiction that normally [we should] not
decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground on which to dispose of the
case.”).




                                            25
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                                  No. 23-10159


Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 

 (1982) [de la Cuesta];
O’Hara v. Gen. Motors Corp., 

 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also La.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 

, 368–69 (1986) (recognizing “a
federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated
authority may pre-empt state regulation”). In such a case, “the correct focus
is on the federal agency that seeks to displace state law and on the proper
bounds of its lawful authority to undertake such action.” City of New York,

. A regulation intended to preempt state law will be upheld
unless the administrator “has exceeded his statutory authority or acted
arbitrarily.” de la Cuesta, 

 (citing United States v. Shimer, 

, 381–82 (1961); see also 

 (noting preemptive regulations “must
not be ‘unreasonable, unauthorized, or inconsistent with’ the underlying
statute”) (quoting Ridgway v. Ridgway, 

 (1981))).
       On appeal, the parties briefly spar over whether the regulation
independently preempts Texas’s parental consent law. Yet, as both parties
concede, the district court did not address this distinct issue. That is
unsurprising. The regulation was promulgated only after the first round of
summary judgment briefing was complete. Following the regulation’s
issuance, neither party presented any argument about its separate
preemptive force, citing the regulation only as confirming the Secretary’s
longstanding policy of excluding parental notice and consent. The district
court’s summary judgment order—while citing the regulation in passing—
did not address whether the regulation itself preempts state law. That is, the
district court never addressed whether the regulation has independent
preemptive force apart from Title X’s text. Nor did the court address the
antecedent question whether, in promulgating the regulation, the Secretary
“exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily.” de la Cuesta, 

 (citation omitted).




                                      26
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                                 No. 23-10159


       “As we have repeatedly observed, we are a court of review, not first
view.” Rest. L. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 

 (5th Cir. 2023)
(citation omitted). We therefore decline to address in the first instance
whether 

(b) independently preempts Texas’s parental
consent law.
          V. Partial Vacatur of 

(b)
       Finally, the Secretary argues the district court erred by partially
vacating 

(b). Following the summary judgment grant,
Deanda argued for the first time that the district court should vacate the
regulation’s second sentence (that is, the sentence precluding parental notice
and consent) under APA § 706(2). Over the Secretary’s objection, the
district court agreed. Accordingly, the final judgment “holds unlawful and
sets aside” the second sentence under § 706(2). We agree with the Secretary
that this was an abuse of discretion.
       It is true that the “[t]he APA gives courts the power to ‘hold unlawful
and set aside agency action[s].’” Data Mktg. P’ship, 

 (quoting

(2)). Indeed, “[t]he ordinary practice [under the APA] is to
vacate unlawful agency action.” 

 at 859–60 (quoting United States v. Mine
Safety & Health Admin., 

 (D.C. Cir. 2019)). The problem
is that Deanda never challenged the regulation, under the APA or otherwise.
We know of no authority—and Deanda cites none—authorizing a court to
vacate a regulation under § 706(2) in the absence of an APA claim. Cf.
Franciscan All., Inc. v. Becerra, 

, 374–75 (5th Cir. 2022)
(“Vacatur is the only statutorily prescribed remedy for a successful APA
challenge to a regulation.”) (citing 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A)) (emphasis added)).
We take Deanda’s point that the regulation was issued only after summary
judgment briefing was underway. Yet that does not change the fact that
Deanda has not challenged the regulation under the APA.




                                        27
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                                   No. 23-10159


       Deanda responds that the absence of an APA claim does not matter
because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 requires a court to “grant the
relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that
relief in its pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) (emphasis added). We
disagree. Rule 54(c)’s remedial latitude is not unlimited. Although the rule
authorizes relief beyond what a complaint specifically requests, the relief
granted “must be based on what is alleged in the pleadings and justified by
plaintiff’s proof, which the opposing party has had an opportunity to
challenge.” Peterson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 

, 340 n.4 (5th
Cir. 2015) (quoting 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur Miller &
Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2662 (4th ed. 2014), at 165);
see also 10 Moore’s Fed. Prac., Civil § 54.72 (2024) (relief under Rule
54(c) “may not be granted . . . on an issue not properly presented to the court
for resolution”). In other words, “[t]he discretion afforded by Rule
54(c) . . . assumes that a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief not specifically pled
has been tested adversarially, tried by consent, or at least developed with
meaningful notice to the defendant.” Peterson, 

.
       Those conditions for applying Rule 54(c) were unmet here. As noted,
Deanda brought no APA claim and his pleadings do not request vacatur of,
or otherwise challenge, any regulation. See, e.g., Portillo v. Cunningham, 

 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Where this court has found relief improper
under Rule 54(c), the relief has generally been of a substantially different
character from that requested.”). It was only Deanda’s proposed final
judgment that first mentioned vacating 

(b). Cf. 

 (“Rule
54(c) does not permit unrequested relief when it ‘operate[s] to the prejudice
of the opposing party,’ such as when ‘relief is finally sought at a [] late[] stage
of the proceedings.’”) (quoting Peterson, 

). Nor did the
court’s summary judgment order independently address the regulation’s
validity. True, in overruling the Secretary’s objections, the district court




                                        28
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                                      No. 23-10159


suggested its substantive rulings were incompatible with the regulation’s
lawfulness. Be that as it may, that is not the same as adjudicating an APA
challenge to the regulation. Cf. Portillo, 

 (explaining there is
no prejudice in awarding unpled Rule 54(c) relief “when all of the elements
justifying such relief were fully established before the district court”) (quoting
Peterson, 

) (emphasis added).
        Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s final judgment to the
extent it vacates the second sentence of 

(b) under

(2).
                                   Conclusion
        We AFFIRM the district court’s final judgment declaring that the
Secretary’s administration of Title X violates Deanda’s rights under
section 151.001(a)(6) of the Texas Family Code and that “there is nothing in

(a) that purports to preempt state laws requiring parental
consent or notification before distributing contraceptive drugs or devices to
minors.”16 We REVERSE the district court’s final judgment to the extent
it holds unlawful and sets aside the second sentence of 

(b)
under § 706(2) of the APA.
             AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and RENDERED.




        _____________________
        16
          As noted, we need not and do not reach the district court’s holding that the
Secretary’s administration of Title X violates Deanda’s constitutional right to direct his
children’s upbringing.




                                           29