Est of La'Mello Parker v. MS Dept

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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED ____________ June 6, 2025 No. 24-60208 Lyle W. Cayce ____________ Clerk Estate of La’Mello Parker; L. S., a minor, by and through Kevin Smith his next friend, individually and on behalf of all entitled to recover, Plaintiffs—Appellants, versus Mississippi Department of Public Safety; Troy Peterson, Harrison County Sheriff, in his individual and official capacities; Harrison County, Mississippi; Chris Allen, Harrison County Deputy, in his individual and official capacities; Harry Moskowitz, Harrison County Deputy, in his individual and official capacities; City of Gulfport, Mississippi; Michael Moran, Gulfport Police Officer, in his individual and official capacities; John Doe, Mississippi Highway Patrol Troopers 1–8, in their individual and official capacities; John Does, 1–75, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi USDC No. 1:23-CV-185 ______________________________ Before Stewart, Clement, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge: Three-month-old La’Mello Parker died in the crossfire of a volatile and deeply tragic confrontation. His father—a fugitive wanted for double Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 homicide—held La’Mello in his arms as a human shield and opened fire on law enforcement. Officers returned fire, with a single bullet striking and killing La’Mello, ending his life before it had truly begun.

Acting as representatives, La’Mello’s grandfather and brother filed suit against law enforcement at every level—city, county, and state—alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claims under Mississippi tort law. The district court dismissed the case in full, concluding that the officers’ actions during the fast-moving hostage crisis—while devastating in consequence—did not amount to constitutional wrongdoing, and that qualified immunity shielded the officers from suit.

However distressing the facts, constitutional liability requires more than tragedy—it requires a legal wrong. And in moments of split-second peril, that standard is exacting. The district court found no violation. Neither do we.

We AFFIRM.

I A The facts are both harrowing and heartbreaking.

On May 3, 2021, law enforcement responded to a shooting in Baker, Louisiana. Two individuals had been fatally shot, and a baby—La’Mello Parker—was missing. The initial investigation identified La’Mello’s father, Eric Smith, as the suspected shooter and kidnapper.

A warrant was issued for Smith’s arrest, and law enforcement soon located him traveling eastbound on Interstate 10 near the Mississippi state line. Officers initiated pursuit and deployed spike strips to disable his vehicle.

After driving over the spike strips and puncturing multiple tires near mile marker 11, Smith pulled over, exited the vehicle with La’Mello pressed to his Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 chest, and fired a round at a Mississippi Highway Patrol trooper. No officers returned fire at that time.

Smith reentered his vehicle and continued east on I-10. More officers joined the pursuit, and they deployed additional spike strips near mile markers 29 and 31. Throughout the chase, officers remained in communication with Harrison County Dispatch, repeatedly confirming that Smith was armed, had already fired at law enforcement, and that an infant hostage was in the vehicle.

Farther ahead, officers established roadblocks at mile markers 41 and and positioned snipers and a hostage negotiator. But before Smith could reach those roadblocks, Harrison County Deputy Chris Allen rammed Smith’s vehicle from behind with his patrol car, pushing it into the median and disabling it.

Deputy Allen exited his vehicle and joined officers nearby. With their weapons drawn, officers surrounded Smith, who was still holding La’Mello.

A few seconds later, Deputy Allen noticed that his K9 had exited the patrol car and went to retrieve it. As Deputy Allen pursued the dog, Smith lowered his car window and fired his handgun.

In response, at least ten officers—including Harrison County Deputy Harry Moskowitz, Gulfport Police Officer Michael Moran, a U.S. Marshall serving on a regional task force, and John Doe Mississippi Highway Patrol Troopers 1–8—opened fire. Tragically, one of the unidentified Mississippi troopers fatally shot La’Mello.

B On La’Mello’s behalf, his grandfather and brother (Plaintiffs) sued the Mississippi Department of Public Safety (DPS); Harrison County; the City of Gulfport; Harrison County Sheriff Troy Peterson, and Deputies Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

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Chris Allen and Harry Moskowitz; Gulfport Police Officer Michael Moran; John Doe Mississippi Highway Patrol Troopers 1–8; and John Does 1–75.

The complaint asserted claims under § 1983 for violations of La’Mello’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, based on both direct and bystander liability theories. Plaintiffs also brought state-law claims under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act against Mississippi DPS, Harrison County, and various individual officers, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11 et seq. In addition, they pursued Monell municipal-liability claims against Mississippi DPS, Gulfport, and Harrison County. 1 Mississippi DPS moved for judgment on the pleadings; the remaining defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied them in part.

First, the court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring federal claims against the officers who fired their weapons but did not strike La’Mello—namely, Sheriff Peterson, Deputies Allen and Moskowitz, Officer Moran, and their respective employers, the City of Gulfport and Harrison County. Only the claim against Deputy Allen and Harrison County for ramming Smith’s vehicle survived the standing inquiry.

Next, turning to the merits, the district court concluded that none of the officers violated La’Mello’s constitutional rights. The officers were entitled to qualified immunity, the court held, as it was not excessive for Deputy Allen to use his patrol car to stop Smith, or for officers to “fir[e] their service weapons to defend against and subdue Smith, a murderer who had just fired first at law enforcement.” And even assuming a constitutional violation, the court found that the right was not clearly established.

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The district court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims, reasoning that the alleged conduct was more properly evaluated under the Fourth Amendment. But in any event, it held that the officers’ “actions of returning fire at an armed and dangerous suspect d[id] not shock the conscience” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Finally, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ bystander liability and Monell claims for failure to allege an underlying constitutional violation. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims.

Plaintiffs timely appealed.

II We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

To survive such a motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 2 A plaintiff’s factual allegation must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 3 At this stage, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. 4 We apply the same standard when reviewing a judgment on the pleadings. 5

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We likewise review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing, again accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. 6 III Because standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite, we begin there. 7 To establish standing, Plaintiffs must show (1) an injury in fact, (2) fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant officers, and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. 8 There is no dispute that La’Mello and his family suffered an obvious injury—one that is plainly redressable through damages under § 1983. The only question, then, is traceability.

Plaintiffs assert two constitutional claims of excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments: (A) the fatal shooting of La’Mello, and (B) the forcible ramming of Smith’s car. The district court found that Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue the former but had standing as to the latter. That was error. Plaintiffs have standing to pursue both.

A First, as to the shooting: The district court held that La’Mello’s death was not fairly traceable to the defendant officers or their employers because Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 none of the named officers fired the single shot that killed him. 9 Plaintiffs do not dispute that ballistics testing confirmed only one bullet struck La’Mello—and that it came from Doe Trooper 1. Nor do they dispute that neither Peterson nor Allen discharged their weapons that day. But the traceability analysis does not end with the identity of the shooter. La’Mello’s injury may be fairly traced to the conduct of other officers in two ways: (1) through their alleged bystander participation in Doe Trooper 1’s use of excessive force, and (2) through their affirmative conduct in escalating the confrontation and creating the conditions that led to the fatal shot. Either theory is sufficient to establish traceability—and thus standing—at the pleading stage. 10 Plaintiffs allege that the officers harmed La’Mello not only by firing their weapons but also by failing to prevent the final shot. According to the complaint, the officers “had a duty to prevent the others from depriving La’Mello of his civil rights and refused to do so.” Under this bystander- liability theory, the officers’ inaction contributed to La’Mello’s death. 11 On Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 that view, it is immaterial whether a given officer fired at La’Mello or struck him. What matters is that Doe Trooper 1’s bullet caused the injury, and the other officers allegedly stood by and let it happen. That chain of causation is sufficient to establish traceability. Plaintiffs therefore have standing to bring bystander-liability claims against the named defendant officers and their respective employers. 12 In addition to their bystander theory, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that La’Mello’s injury was caused, at least in part, by the officers’ conduct leading up to the shooting. However attenuated, that causal link suffices to establish traceability for purposes of standing.

To establish traceability, Plaintiffs must show “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of”—that is, the injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct, and not the result of an independent action by a third party not before the court. 13 Unlike tort Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 law, Article III causation imposes no stringent or inflexible standard. 14 Indeed, “an indirect causal relationship will suffice” 15 for standing, and plaintiffs may satisfy the requirement by alleging “a chain of causation between defendants’ [conduct] and plaintiffs’ injuries.” 16 It is often enough that the defendant’s conduct was one of multiple contributing causes. 17 And “the fact that the defendant is only one of several persons who caused the harm does not preclude a finding of causation sufficient to support standing.” 18 Even an uncertain or indirect causal connection may suffice at the pleading stage. 19

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Plaintiffs have cleared this low causation bar at the standing stage.

Even if Doe Trooper 1’s bullet was the most immediate cause of La’Mello’s death, Plaintiffs allege that the conduct of the other officers was an additional, indirect cause. According to Plaintiffs, the officers “dangerously escalated the situation leading to La’Mello’s death, and pointed their weapons at him needlessly, and opened fire on him when it was completely unnecessary.”

These actions, Plaintiffs allege, “spurred Trooper Doe 1 to pull the trigger,” and he “actually struck La’Mello with a bullet and killed him.” However attenuated, this remains a plausible chain of causation. Whether that chain is strong enough to sustain a cause of action remains to be seen. But for purposes of standing at the pleading stage, it is enough. 20 * * * Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that La’Mello’s injury is “fairly traceable” to the defendant officers’ failure to intervene—and to their conduct leading up to the fatal shooting. La’Mello’s injuries were not merely “the result of the independent action” of Doe Trooper 1. 21 Accordingly, Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

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Plaintiffs have standing to pursue federal claims arising from the shooting against the named officers—Sheriff Peterson, Deputies Allen and Moskowitz, and Officer Moran—as well as their respective employers, Harrison County and the City of Gulfport.

B Second, as to Deputy Allen’s ramming of Smith’s car, the district court concluded that Plaintiffs had standing to sue both Deputy Allen and his employer, Harrison County. Notably, the defendants do not contest standing on this claim.

All three standing elements are satisfied: (1) La’Mello was fatally injured by Doe Trooper 1’s gunfire; (2) that injury is traceable to Deputy Allen’s act of “recklessly ramming the vehicle in which La’Mello was unrestrained,” which Plaintiffs allege precipitated the shootout between Smith and law enforcement; and (3) a favorable judgment against Allen under § 1983 would redress that injury. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have standing to bring federal claims against Deputy Allen and Harrison County based on the ramming of Smith’s vehicle.

IV We next consider whether the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims on the ground of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” 22 To overcome that shield, Plaintiffs must Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 plead facts showing: “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” 23 Plaintiffs allege that the officers used excessive force in violation of La’Mello’s Fourth Amendment rights in two ways: (A) by shooting at him, and (B) by ramming Smith’s vehicle. The district court held that in neither instance did Plaintiffs plead a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. We agree.

A We begin with the first qualified-immunity inquiry: whether the officers violated La’Mello’s Fourth Amendment rights when they opened fire.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.” 24 To state a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, a plaintiff must show two things: (1) a seizure occurred; and (2) the force used was unreasonable. 25 The Supreme Court has explained that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs “when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 through means intentionally applied.” 26 Neither our circuit 27 nor others28 have definitively resolved whether a seizure occurs when law enforcement intentionally targets a suspect but unintentionally strikes an innocent hostage. But because the parties agree that La’Mello was seized when Doe Trooper 1 shot him, we assume—without deciding—that a seizure occurred, and proceed to consider whether the use of force was reasonable. 29 An officer’s use of force is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the plaintiff shows: “(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” 30 La’Mello’s death plainly satisfies the Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 injury element. We therefore focus on the second and third elements, which “collapse into a single objective-reasonableness inquiry.” 31 To assess whether the force used was reasonable, we apply the factors outlined by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor: (1) “the severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and (3) “whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 32 This analysis considers factors such as the time officers had to make decisions, whether the force used is “measured and ascending” in accordance with the suspect’s aggression, whether the suspect signaled that he was armed, and whether he moved toward or away from law enforcement. 33 We assess reasonableness “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 34 And we are rightly hesitant to “second-guess[ ] a police officer’s assessment, made on the scene, of the danger presented by a particular situation” from the calm remove of chambers. 35 Under these standards, we cannot conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the officers to return fire at Smith—even knowing there was a substantial risk they might strike La’Mello. Smith—who that very morning had murdered two people, opened fire on law enforcement, and abducted his Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 infant son—posed a grave and immediate threat to officers and to the public. 36 Ample precedent supports the reasonableness of using deadly force against an active shooter. 37 Although we have never addressed a case in which officers returned fire at an active shooter knowing they might strike an innocent bystander, we have granted qualified immunity in similar situations—where officers used deadly force with an innocent person in dangerous proximity. 38 The officers’ awareness of the high likelihood of striking La’Mello does not alter our conclusion. The use of force here satisfies the Graham factors, as well as broader principles that justify the use of deadly force.

Beginning with the first Graham factor, officers were pursuing Smith for double homicide and the kidnapping of La’Mello—offenses both grave and violent. Second—and most critically in a deadly force case 39—Smith posed a Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 clear and immediate threat to the safety of officers and the surrounding public. Smith had already fired at law enforcement once and had just done so again. All this unfolded on open interstate. Westbound traffic was halted on I-10, and Smith could have, in seconds, turned his weapon on passing vehicles or reentered his car to resume the chase. 40 Even accepting Plaintiffs’ claim that Smith fired only at Deputy Allen, the “tense and evolving factual circumstances” justified the officers’ belief that Smith posed a continuing threat to them and to the public along the highway. 41 Third, Smith was actively evading arrest—fleeing and firing at law enforcement. That Smith had La’Mello in his arms does not alter the fact that each of the Graham factors weighs decisively in favor of the officers.

Nor does Plaintiffs’ suggestion—that Deputy Allen created the danger necessitating deadly force—alter the analysis. As the Supreme Court recently clarified, the reasonableness of force “requires analyzing the ‘totality of the circumstances,’” 42 including whether officers “allegedly created the danger necessitating deadly force.” 43 To be sure, Deputy Allen ended the chase by ramming Smith’s vehicle and exposed himself to gunfire Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 to retrieve his K9. And perhaps, but for those actions, the ensuing shootout might not have occurred. But it was Smith—not Deputy Allen—who created the encounter by opening fire, prompting the officers to respond in kind.

That singular fact distinguishes this case from Barnes, where the officer invited danger by leaping onto a suspect’s moving vehicle to prevent flight.44 Here, Deputy Allen acted reasonably in seizing a safe opportunity to end a perilous pursuit. 45 It was Smith who turned the encounter deadly. 46 The reasonableness analysis also considers how quickly officers resort to force, 47 and how close they are to the threat when doing so. 48 Both factors favor the officers here. Aware that a child’s life was at risk, they did not rush to employ deadly force. When Smith fired at officers earlier, they held their fire and instead employed nonlethal measures—roadblocks, spike strips, and ramming his vehicle. Only after Smith fired again did the officers return fire.

Deputy Allen was just fifteen feet from Smith’s vehicle when he left cover— and Smith opened fire. At that moment, officers “did not have the luxury of engaging in negotiation or deliberation” to persuade Smith to put down his weapon or step away from La’Mello. 49 They returned fire swiftly, in direct Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 response to Smith’s own shot—more than what the law requires to justify deadly force. 50 The tragic facts of this case make our conclusion difficult. We do not and cannot condone the shooting of an innocent child by law enforcement.

But the law requires us to assess reasonableness from the vantage of a reasonable officer on the scene—not with the clarity of 20/20 hindsight. And from that perspective, we cannot deem it unreasonable for officers to return fire at an active shooter who had endangered both them and the public—even if, tragically, the shooter used an innocent child as a shield. To hold otherwise would risk discouraging officers from taking decisive action in active-shooter situations. Would it be preferable for officers to hesitate—to allow an armed assailant using an innocent shield to escape, risking still more potential lives?

The officers here were forced to make that fraught moral judgment in the split second after Smith fired on one of their own—“in haste, under pressure, and . . . without the luxury of a second chance.” 51 We cannot second-guess that decision after the fact—from the remove and repose of our chambers. 52 As the First Circuit has aptly observed: It is inevitable that the police response to violent crime will at times create some risk of injury to others, including innocent bystanders. We decline to hold that the mere presence of risk reflects a callous indifference to the constitutional rights of Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 19 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 those individuals potentially harmed. Any other conclusion would both chill law enforcement officers in the performance of their duties and encourage hostage-taking and criminal activity in public settings so as to minimize police intervention. 53 The officers’ use of force, while tragic in consequence, was not excessive. They did not violate La’Mello’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Even assuming a constitutional violation, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time. 54 We have never held that returning fire at an active shooter who is holding a hostage constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation. And while plaintiffs need not identify “a case directly on point” in order to show the law was clearly established, they must provide “authority at a sufficiently high level of specificity” to put law enforcement officers on notice that such conduct “is definitively unlawful.” 55 Plaintiffs chiefly rely on Coon v. Ledbetter, which upheld a constitutional claim after an officer fired indiscriminately into a trailer, knowing the suspect’s four-year-old daughter was inside. 56 But Coon turns on Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 20 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 a critical distinction: The suspect there was no longer actively shooting when officers returned fire. 57 Here, by contrast, Smith had just fired at Deputy Allen and was visibly aiming his weapon through the vehicle window. The officers did not fire “indiscriminately”—they fired directly at Smith, who, tragically, was holding La’Mello in his arms. Smith’s active use of deadly force at the moment officers fired back places this case outside Coon’s ambit.

Coon therefore cannot provide the clearly established law necessary to overcome qualified immunity. 58 Plaintiffs also cite Grandstaff, but it, too, is distinguishable. There, officers mistakenly shot and killed an innocent man, believing he was an armed suspect they were pursuing nearby. 59 We upheld a jury verdict finding that use of deadly force was unjustified. 60 But unlike the Grandstaff officers— who “poured their gunfire at the truck and into the [innocent] person” “without awaiting any hostile act or sound” 61—the officers here fired only after Smith shot first. Moreover, the Grandstaff officers “showed no inclination to avoid inflicting unnecessary harm upon innocent people. They simply saw a target and fired.” 62 Here, by contrast, the officers exercised restraint—holding their fire even after Smith shot at them once and only Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 21 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 responding when he fired directly at Deputy Allen. The recklessness that doomed the officers’ conduct in Grandstaff is absent here. That case thus cannot provide “clearly established law” rendering the officers’ conduct unconstitutional.

In sum, no case cited by Plaintiffs—nor any precedent in this circuit— would have “provided ‘fair warning’ to the defendants ‘that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.’” 63 Accordingly, even if the officers’ decision to fire at Smith while he held La’Mello constituted a constitutional violation, the law was not clearly established at the time of the incident—and qualified immunity applies.

B Turning to the ramming of Smith’s car, we again begin with the first qualified-immunity prong: whether the officers violated La’Mello’s Fourth Amendment rights.

The ramming of Smith’s car plainly constituted a seizure as to Smith. 64 But whether it also amounted to a seizure of La’Mello—who was not the intended target—is far less certain. Still, even assuming the ramming qualifies as a seizure of La’Mello, Plaintiffs’ excessive-force claim falters for want of a critical element: injury. 65 Plaintiffs acknowledge that La’Mello sustained no injury from the ramming itself—only from the gunshot that Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 22 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 ultimately claimed his innocent life. To the extent Plaintiffs argue that the ramming escalated the confrontation, culminating in the fatal gunfire, that contention concerns the viability of their shooting claim—not the ramming itself. As discussed above, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the shooting.

Because Plaintiffs do not allege that La’Mello suffered any injury from the ramming, they have not shown that Deputy Allen used excessive force in violation of La’Mello’s constitutional rights. Deputy Allen is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

V Plaintiffs alternatively argue that the officers’ use of excessive force violated La’Mello’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. This argument fails for two independent reasons.

First, although excessive force claims may sometimes be brought under the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, they must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment when that more specific constitutional provision applies. That is, when a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection, “the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.” 66 Accordingly, a due process claim is viable only when the alleged misconduct is “not susceptible to proper analysis” under the Fourth Amendment. 67 Here, because the parties do not dispute that a seizure occurred, the Fourth Amendment governs. That alone forecloses Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims.

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Second, even if we assumed the Fourteenth Amendment applied, Plaintiffs’ claims would still fail on the merits. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids any State from depriving a person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 68 The Supreme Court has made clear that only the most extreme use of force violates the Fourteenth Amendment—namely, actions that “can properly be characterized as arbitrary[] or conscience shocking.” 69 This is a deliberately high bar. “[O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’” 70 Conduct shocks the conscience only when it is “so ‘brutal’ and ‘offensive’ that it did not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency.” 71 Indeed, “even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful purpose to spark the shock that implicates” constitutional protections. 72 “A purpose to cause [the] harm is needed . . . .” 73 Nothing in the officers’ conduct meets that demanding threshold.

Ramming a suspect’s vehicle to end a pursuit is not the kind of arbitrary or conscience-shocking conduct the Constitution forbids. Nor do Plaintiffs allege that Deputy Allen intended to harm La’Mello when he rammed the car. They concede the act amounted, at most, to “reckless Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 24 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 endangerment,”—conduct insufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 74 And although a closer call, firing at an active shooter using a human shield is likewise neither arbitrary nor conscience-shocking. Plaintiffs do not claim that officers intended to harm La’Mello. Their intended target was Smith. Even assuming the decision to fire was “precipitate recklessness,” that is not enough. Recklessness, however tragic in outcome, does not meet the Fourteenth Amendment’s demanding standard. 75 With the benefit of hindsight, one might question the officers’ decision to fire when they did. But firing back at an active shooter who posed an immediate threat to officers and bystanders is not so indisputably “brutal” or “offensive” as to cross the constitutional line. 76 And in any event, Plaintiffs cite no precedent in our circuit clearly establishing that such conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

The officers are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims.

VI In addition to their direct Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims, Plaintiffs assert bystander liability under § 1983 against Case: 24-60208 Document: 87-1 Page: 25 Date Filed: 06/06/2025

No. 24-60208 each individual officer and seek municipal liability under Monell against the Mississippi DPS, the City of Gulfport, and Harrison County. The district court properly dismissed both claims.

Both bystander liability and municipal liability require Plaintiffs to plead an underlying constitutional violation. 77 As discussed above, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged a violation of La’Mello’s Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Plaintiffs’ bystander-liability and municipal-liability claims fail.

VII La’Mello Parker’s death is an unspeakable tragedy. And no outcome in this case can undo the anguish of a life cut short or ease the sorrow of those who mourn him.

La’Mello’s family has standing to seek justice on his behalf against every officer involved in the tense and volatile sequence of events that culminated in the shooting. But the constitutional standards that bind us do not turn on hindsight or heartbreak. Judged from the perspective required by law—that of officers forced to make split-second decisions under threat of lethal violence—we cannot say their conduct was unconstitutional. Faced with an armed fugitive who had murdered two people, who posed a grave and immediate danger to officers and the public, and who despicably used his infant son as a shield—the officers’ decision to return fire, though devastating in its consequence, was not unreasonable, nor did it rise to the level of conduct that shocks the conscience.

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Bound by our controlling precedent, we therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims.