Case: 24-20424 Document: 56-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/06/2025

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals ____________ Fifth Circuit FILED No. 24-20424 August 6, 2025 ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Clerk United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Emil Bon Chicol-Najarro, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:24-CR-31-1 ______________________________ Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and Duncan and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: Emil Bon Chicol-Najarro challenges the report-upon-reentry condition of his supervised release. Because the challenged condition creates a conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement and its written judgment, we VACATE the condition and REMAND to the district court.

I Chicol-Najarro pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation and conviction of a felony offense. His presentence investigation report (PSR) Case: 24-20424 Document: 56-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/06/2025

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recommended a condition of supervised release requiring Chicol-Najarro to “report to the nearest probation office within 72 hours” every time he enters the United States. The district court did not mention Chicol-Najarro’s PSR or the recommended report-upon-reentry condition at sentencing; however, the condition appears in the court’s written judgment. Chicol-Najarro timely appealed, challenging the inclusion of the report-upon-reentry condition in the written judgment.

II Our standard of review “depends on whether [the defendant] had an opportunity to object before the district court.” United States v. Martinez, 47 F.4th 364, 366 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2020)). “If he had the opportunity, we review for plain error; if he did not, we review for abuse of discretion.” Id. Chicol-Najarro did not have the opportunity to object to the report-upon-reentry condition at sentencing, so we review for abuse of discretion.

III The district court must orally pronounce discretionary, but not mandatory, conditions of supervised release. United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). The statute regulating supervised release conditions, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), dictates whether a condition is discretionary or mandatory. Id. at 559. To satisfy the pronouncement requirement, a sentencing court must give a defendant “notice . . . and an opportunity to object.” Id. at 560. “Oral in-court adoption of a written list of proposed conditions provides the necessary notice.” Id. However, “the mere existence of such a document is not enough for pronouncement”; rather, “the court must orally adopt that list of conditions within the document when the defendant is in court and can

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object.” United States v. Woods, 102 F.4th 760, 768 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th 292, 298 (5th Cir. 2023)).

When we review for abuse of discretion, “[t]he key determination is whether the discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment is a conflict or merely an ambiguity that can be resolved by reviewing the rest of the record.” Id. at 767 (quoting United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2006)). If it is merely an ambiguity, “we look to the sentencing court’s intent to determine the sentence.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 2006)). If the discrepancy creates a conflict, “the oral pronouncement controls.” United States v. Martinez, 250 F.3d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2001). A conflict exists when “the written judgment broadens the restrictions or requirements of supervised release from an oral pronouncement[.]” Mireles, 471 F.3d at 558.

IV Because the report-upon-reentry condition is not mandatory under Section 3583(d), the district court was required to pronounce it at sentencing.

See Diggles, 957 F.3d at 559. The “mere existence” of Chicol-Najarro’s PSR, without the court’s oral adoption of the document when he “[was] in court and [could] object,” does not satisfy the pronouncement requirement. See Woods, 102 F.4th at 768 (quoting Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th at 298).

Inclusion of the report-upon-reentry condition in the district court’s written judgment creates a conflict with its oral pronouncement because the condition “broadens the . . . requirements” of Chicol-Najarro’s release. See Mireles, 471 F.3d at 558; see also United States v. Magallon-Contreras, 810 F.App’x 281, 284 (5th Cir. 2020) (explaining that report-upon-reentry is more burdensome than a standard condition of release because it applies to both unlawful and lawful reentry into the United States). A conflict exists, so “the oral pronouncement controls.” Mireles, 471 F.3d at 557.

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V We VACATE the report-upon-reentry condition and REMAND to the district court to conform the judgment to its oral pronouncement.