Case: 24-30043      Document: 195-1         Page: 1   Date Filed: 12/09/2025




        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit
                             ____________                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                       Fifth Circuit


                              No. 24-30043
                                                                     FILED
                                                               August 27, 2025
                             ____________
                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
United States of America,                                            Clerk


                                                         Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                   versus

George Peterson,

                                        Defendant—Appellant.
               ______________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                  for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                        USDC No. 2:22-CR-231-1
               ______________________________

Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and Higginbotham and Southwick,
Circuit Judges.
Jennifer Walker Elrod, Chief Judge:
      We withdraw our prior opinion and substitute the following.
      Following a law enforcement raid on his home and place of business,
George Peterson pleaded guilty to possessing an unregistered suppressor in
violation of various provisions of the National Firearms Act (NFA). On
appeal, he challenges the denial of two pretrial motions: a motion to dismiss
his indictment on Second Amendment grounds and a motion to suppress
evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds.
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                                No. 24-30043


      Assuming without deciding that the Second Amendment protects
suppressors, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Peterson’s motion
to dismiss because we agree with the government that the NFA’s shall-issue
licensing regime is presumptively constitutional under New York State Rifle
& Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 

 (2022), and Peterson’s as-applied
challenge fails on this record. Furthermore, because the exclusionary rule’s
good-faith exception prevents suppression of the suppressor discovered at
Peterson’s home, we also AFFIRM the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress.
                                     I
                                     A
      In the summer of 2022, federal and state law enforcement officers
executed a warrant at PDW Solutions, LLC, Peterson’s firearm business that
he operated out of his home. An Eastern District of Louisiana magistrate
judge issued that warrant based on an affidavit submitted by a Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) officer.
      According to the officer, the ATF had spent several months
investigating Peterson before seeking the warrant. In one instance, the ATF
sent a Jefferson Parish Sherriff’s Office deputy into PDW to purchase two
handguns. Peterson sold the officer the guns, but he did not report the
transaction to the ATF despite 

.126a’s requirement that he
must. In another instance, an undercover ATF agent patronized PDW with
a confidential informant. Even though Peterson was aware that the informant
could not lawfully purchase a firearm, he nevertheless sold the agent two
firearms after watching the informant hand the agent money for the purchase.
Peterson failed to report this transaction as well. And because all of this
occurred at Peterson’s home, the ATF believed that Peterson had also
violated 

(a)(3) by representing, in his federal-firearms-



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                                 No. 24-30043


license application, that he would conduct business only at gun shows and
out of a leased storage unit.
       In light of this information, the magistrate judge issued a warrant
authorizing a search of Peterson’s home (where the ATF alleged he stored
his inventory) and of another structure attached to his home (where it alleged
he conducted business). The warrant also authorized seizure of PDW’s
transactional and financial records, proceeds from firearm sales, firearms
themselves, and computers and other digital devices, among other things.
       The ATF executed the warrant the next day. During the search, ATF
agents discovered a firearm suppressor inside Peterson’s bedroom-closet
safe. Peterson did not purchase this suppressor from a manufacturer; he
acquired materials and a kit to make it himself. The suppressor was in
working condition, but it neither had a serial number nor was registered in
the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.
                                      B
       An Eastern District of Louisiana grand jury indicted Peterson for
possession of an unregistered suppressor under 

, 5861(d),
and 5871.
       In response, Peterson filed a motion to dismiss the indictment and a
motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the ATF’s search of his
property. Peterson argued: (1) that the indictment should be dismissed
because the NFA’s registration scheme violates the Second Amendment as
applied to him; and (2) that the evidence obtained from the ATF’s search of
his home should be suppressed because that search violated the Fourth
Amendment.
       The district court denied both motions, and Peterson agreed to enter
a conditional guilty plea. He reserved the right to appeal the denial of his



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                                 No. 24-30043


motion to dismiss and of his motion to suppress. Peterson elected not to
challenge the NFA’s registration requirement on its face.
       The district court sentenced Peterson to twenty-four months of
imprisonment, and he timely appealed his two preserved issues.
                                      II
       Peterson first challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss. Specifically, he argues that the NFA’s suppressor-registration
requirement unconstitutionally burdens his Second Amendment rights. We
first provide background on suppressors and the NFA before turning to
Peterson’s as-applied challenge on Second Amendment grounds.
                                      A
       A suppressor is “a device that attaches to the muzzle of a firearm and
makes the firearm quieter when discharged.” Paxton v. Dettelbach, 

 (5th Cir. 2024); see also 

(a)(25) (“The terms ‘firearm
silencer’ and ‘firearm muffler’ mean any device for silencing, muffling, or
diminishing the report of a portable firearm . . . .”). Though many use the
term “silencer,” that term “is a misnomer, in that—despite movie
fantasies—a noise suppressor reduces decibels[] but does not actually
‘silence’ the discharge of a firearm. Noise may be muffled or diminished,
and maybe by only a few decibels at that, but it can still be heard.” Stephen
P. Halbrook, Firearm Sound Moderators: Issues of Criminalization and the
Second Amendment, 

, 36 (2015) [hereinafter Halbrook,
Firearm Sound Moderators].
       Suppressors function by causing the gasses emanating from a fired
weapon to do so more slowly and therefore more quietly. 

 at 41–42. Hiram
Maxim (whom TIME Magazine affectionately labeled “Dr. Shush” and
“noise’s bogeyman”) is credited not only with inventing the suppressor but



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                                 No. 24-30043


also with using the same sort of technology to abate the noise produced by
early combustion engines. 

, 45 & n.79.
       Many commentators have recognized the benefits of suppressors. For
example, while many firearms produce “noise levels of between 140–160
decibels, at which level hearing can be permanently impaired,” suppressors
can reduce the noise to around 135 decibels, at which level hearing loss is less
likely to occur.   See Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Accessories and the Second
Amendment: Assault Weapons, Magazines, and Silencers, 

, 249–50 (2020). Further, hunters may use suppressors to avoid
spooking game and to reduce noise pollution in the jurisdictions that permit
suppressors in the field. Halbrook, Firearm Sound Moderators, supra, at 35;
see also id. at 76–78 (collecting European laws on suppressor use for hunting).
Suppressors may also reduce “noise, recoil, and muzzle rise” in self-defense
scenarios, giving the shooter an advantage. See id. at 69.
       Commentators have also noted that criminals infrequently use
suppressors, despite a historical “association of the use of silencers with
criminal acts.” Spitzer, supra, at 249, 252. For example, in the ten-year
period between 1995 and 2004, one researcher found “only two federal cases
where a silencer was used in a murder.” Stephen P. Halbrook, The Power to
Tax, the Second Amendment, and the Search for Which “‘Gangster’ Weapons”
to Tax, 

, 185 (2025) [hereinafter Halbrook, The Power to
Tax]. Another study revealed only sixteen “serious criminal cases” between
2011 and 2017 involving the use of a suppressor. Spitzer, supra, at 252.
Scholars debate whether the lack of association between suppressors and
criminality is due to criminals’ lack of interest in using suppressors, or
whether the NFA has proven effective in keeping them out of the hands of
criminals. Id. Either way, and despite the lack of correlation between
suppressors and criminal activity, some oppose suppressors on the basis that
they may inhibit detection of crime. See id. at 252–53.


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                                        No. 24-30043


        At the federal level, the ATF regulates suppressors through
enforcement of the NFA. 1 The NFA instructs the Attorney General to
“maintain a central registry of all firearms”—known as the National
Firearms Registration and Transfer Record—“in the United States which
are not in the possession or under the control of the United States.” 

(a). The National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record
contains information on each firearm, the firearm’s date of registration, and
the identification and address of the person entitled to possess the firearm.

 § 5841(a)(1)–(3). The term firearm is defined to include any suppressor.
Id. § 5845(a).
        To register a firearm under the NFA, the person making the firearm
must complete an application identifying the firearm and the applicant and
submit it to the ATF. Id. § 5822. The application must contain copies of the
applicant’s fingerprints and his photograph. Id. In addition to submitting an
application, the applicant must pay a $200 “tax” to register the firearm. Id.;
see also id. § 5821(a). A completed application “shall be denied if the making
or possession of the firearm would place the person making the firearm in
violation of law.” Id. § 5822; accord 

. 2


        _____________________
        1
          States also regulate suppressors. At least eight states have banned them outright,
meaning that possession of a suppressor is unlawful even if a person may lawfully possess
a suppressor under the NFA. Halbrook, The Power to Tax, supra, at 184; see, e.g., 

 (“Any person, firm, or corporation who within this state possesses a silencer
is guilty of a felony . . . .”); 

(2). Louisiana, the state in which
agents recovered Peterson’s unregistered suppressor, does not prohibit suppressor
possession.
        2
           The NFA imposes nearly identical registration requirements for applicants who
wish to “transfer” a firearm. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5811–5812; 

.84–.87. The term
transfer is defined to include “selling, assigning, pledging, leasing, loaning, giving away, or
otherwise disposing of.” 

(j). Because Peterson made the unregistered
suppressor that the ATF discovered, we focus on the “making” provisions.



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                                No. 24-30043


       If the application is approved, the individual may then make the
suppressor and, if he does so, he must register it in the National Firearms
Registration and Transfer Record. 

(b). The individual
making the firearm must also mark it with “a serial number which may not
be readily removed, obliterated, or altered . . . .” 

 § 5842(a). If an
application is denied, on the other hand, the $200 tax payment is refunded
and the denial will explain the reason for disapproval. 

.
       The NFA makes it unlawful for an individual to receive or possess a
firearm when the firearm is not registered to him under the National
Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. 

(d); see also 

§ 5871.
                                     B
       We now turn to Peterson’s as-applied challenge to the NFA’s
suppressor-registration requirement under the Second Amendment.
Peterson contends that suppressors are “Arms” protected under the Second
Amendment and that the NFA is unconstitutional. The government agrees
that the Second Amendment protects suppressors, but it maintains that the
NFA is constitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 

 (2022).
                                      1
       “We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an
indictment, including any underlying constitutional claims.” United States v.
Parrales-Guzman, 

 (5th Cir. 2019).
       The Second Amendment protects “the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms.” U.S. Const. amend. II. But as Justice Scalia cautioned in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 

 (2008), that right “is not
unlimited.” United States v. Diaz, 

 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing



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                                 No. 24-30043


Heller, 

), cert. denied, --- S. Ct. ----, 

 (2025).
To identify its limits, we employ a two-step analysis. Bruen, 

.
“We start, as always, with the text.” United States v. Giglio, 

 (5th Cir. 2025). That is, we first consider whether “the Second
Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.” Bruen, 

. If it does, “the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct,”
and we then turn to the second step, which compares our “Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation” against the regulation at issue. See

       In Bruen, the Supreme Court applied the foregoing approach when it
considered the constitutionality of New York State’s prohibition on
possessing firearms without a license. 

 at 11–15. To obtain a license to
carry a pistol outside of the home, New York law required an applicant to
show “proper cause,” meaning a demonstrated “special need for self-
protection distinguishable from that of the general community.” 

(first quoting 

(2)(f); and then quoting In re
Klenosky, 

 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)). In practice, New
York required evidence of threats, attacks, or other “extraordinary danger[s]
to personal safety.” 

 at 13 (quoting In re Martinek, 

(N.Y. App. Div. 2002)). The law vested “licensing officer[s]” with the
decision to issue a license and provided limited judicial review of officers’
decisions. 

 The Court had “little difficulty” concluding that this regime
impinged on the right to bear arms in public, meaning that the law’s
challengers surpassed step one. 

 at 32–33.
       Accordingly, the Court then proceeded to the second step, where it
asked whether New York’s licensing regime fit with our Nation’s tradition
of firearm regulation. The Court’s detailed survey of the “Anglo-American
history of public carry” revealed that historical restrictions touched on the
“intent for which one could carry arms, the manner by which one carried


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                                  No. 24-30043


arms, or the exceptional circumstances under which one could not carry
arms . . . .” Id. at 70. Historical restrictions did not, however, require law-
abiding Americans to demonstrate a special need to exercise their Second
Amendment rights. Id. As the Court explained, it knew “of no other
constitutional right that an individual may exercise only after demonstrating
to government officers some special need.” Id. It therefore concluded that
the New York licensing regime violated the Second Amendment, as made
applicable to New York by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 70–71.
       Relevant here, the Court in Bruen contrasted so-called “may-issue”
licensing regimes like New York’s with “shall-issue” regimes that require
state authorities to issue licenses “whenever applicants satisfy certain
threshold requirements.” Id. at 13. “Because these [shall-issue] licensing
regimes do not require applicants to show an atypical need for armed self-
defense, they do not necessarily prevent ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’
from exercising their Second Amendment right to public carry.” Id. at 38 n.9
(quoting Heller, 

). Rather, “shall-issue regimes, which often
require applicants to undergo a background check or pass a firearms safety
course, are designed to ensure only that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction
are, in fact, ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’” 

 (quoting Heller, 

). Shall-issue regimes do so by applying “narrow, objective, and
definite standards” to guide licensing officials’ decisions. 

 (quoting
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 

 (1969)).
       Because shall-issue regimes employ objective criteria, the Court noted
that nothing in its analysis of the New York may-issue law “should be
interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of the 43 States’ ‘shall-issue’
licensing regimes . . . .” 

 (citing Drake v. Filko, 

 (3d Cir.
2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting)). Justice Kavanaugh likewise addressed the
constitutionality of shall-issue regimes. Id. at 80 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
He also listed some administrative conditions that shall-issue licensing


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                                 No. 24-30043


regimes may impose, like “fingerprinting, a background check, a mental
health records check, and training in firearms handling and in laws regarding
the use of force, among other possible requirements.” Id. at 80.
       Even so, the Court cautioned that shall-issue licensing laws are not
necessarily impregnable. As it explained, shall-issue regimes remain subject
to as-applied challenges where “lengthy wait times in processing license
applications or exorbitant fees deny ordinary citizens their right to public
carry.” Id. at 38 n.9 (majority opinion). Justice Kavanaugh expressed similar
concerns in concurrence, stating that “shall-issue licensing regimes are
constitutionally permissible, subject of course to an as-applied challenge if a
shall-issue licensing regime does not operate in that manner in practice.” Id.
at 80 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
       After Bruen, we considered a challenge to a background-check
requirement and considered the following questions: “What part of Bruen
controls our evaluation of a firearm regulation? Its imposition of an historical
showing to be made by the government? Or its various assurances that it did
not disturb common-place regulations in shall-issue regimes?” McRorey v.
Garland, 

 (5th Cir. 2024). We answered, “the latter.” 

       As we explained in McRorey, the Supreme Court in Heller “described
‘conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms’ as
‘presumptively lawful.’” 

 at 836 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27, 627
n.26). “Bruen did nothing to disturb that part of Heller.” 

 So, we read
Bruen to implement a “presumption” of constitutionality for shall-issue
“ancillary firearm regulations such as background checks preceding sale.”

 at 836–37; see also Md. Shall Issue, Inc. v. Moore, 

, 216, 227
(4th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (concluding that a shall-issue licensing regime was
“presumptively constitutional because it operates merely to ensure that




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                                  No. 24-30043


individuals seeking to exercise their Second Amendment rights are ‘law-
abiding’ persons”), cert. denied, 

 (2025).
       We then considered the McRorey plaintiffs’ challenge to the National
Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), under which federally
licensed firearm dealers first acquire information from prospective firearm
purchasers and then submit that information to NICS for a background
check. 

. After conducting the background check, NICS provides a
federal dealer one of three responses: (1) “Proceed,” if the proposed
purchase would not place the purchaser in violation of 

 or
state law, (2) “Denied,” if the proposed sale would place the purchaser in
violation of those laws, or (3) “Delayed,” if further investigation is required.

 at 834–35 (citing 

(c)(1)(iv)(A)–(C)). In that way, NICS
approval hinges on “narrow, objective, and definite standards” to ensure
that purchasers are “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” 

 at 837 (quoting
Bruen, 

 n.9).          NICS, therefore, was presumptively
constitutional as a shall-issue condition on the purchase of arms. 

 at 838–
39.
       Turning to this case, we assume without deciding that suppressors
constitute “arms” under the Second Amendment, as both parties now
contend. Even so, the NFA suppressor-licensing scheme is presumptively
constitutional because it is a shall-issue regime, as Peterson’s counsel
conceded at oral argument. Oral Argument at 4:45. His briefing before the
district court and this court does not otherwise contest the “shall issue
nature” of the requirement. The NFA provides that the ATF will deny a
firearm-making application if the “making or possession of the firearm would
place the person making the firearm in violation of law.” 

;
see also 

. This is precisely the “objective[] and definite”
licensing criterion held permissible under Bruen. 

 n.9; see 

 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).


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                                 No. 24-30043


       Further, we have no reason to doubt on this record that the NFA’s
fingerprint, photograph, and background-check requirements are “designed
to ensure only that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, ‘law-
abiding, responsible citizens.’” 

 at 38 n.9 (majority opinion) (citation
omitted); see also 

.62–65. Peterson’s failure to make any
showing as to how the requirement places an unconstitutional burden on his
Second Amendment rights alone is dispositive. It is not even clear he could
claim that this requirement posed an unconstitutional burden as applied to
him given his explanation that he failed to register because he “forgot” to do
so. Finally, the NFA enforces its objective shall-issue licensing requirement
through prohibiting suppressor possession by unlicensed persons, 

(d), as did several of the “shall-issue” licensing regimes that Bruen
cited approvingly. See 

 n.1, 38 n.9; see also 

(a).
       Peterson’s merits brief does not address the applicability of the shall-
issue presumption; in fact, it does not cite Bruen at all. Peterson has instead
argued—both in this court and the district court—that the NFA is
unconstitutional under the “two-step” means-end scrutiny that Bruen
overruled almost two years before his appeal was lodged and more than one
year before he filed his motion to dismiss.
       Peterson mentions Bruen’s shall-issue presumption only once, in his
post-oral-argument briefing, where he dismisses the presumption as “dicta.”
But we rejected that argument squarely in McRorey, a case that Peterson
nowhere cites:
       [Plaintiffs] characterize passages such as footnote 9 [of the
       Bruen opinion] as dicta. We, however, “are generally bound by
       Supreme Court dicta, especially when it is recent and
       detailed.” And it doesn’t get more recent or detailed than
       Bruen.



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                                      No. 24-30043


McRorey, 

 (citation omitted).
        These challenged provisions are therefore “presumptively lawful.”

 at 838–39.
                                            2
        We now turn to whether the NFA has been “put toward abusive
ends” through “exorbitant fees” or “lengthy wait times in processing license
applications.” Bruen, 

 n.9. We first note that Peterson brings
an as-applied challenge to the NFA. In such a challenge, we consider the
facts of the defendant’s “own case.” See United States v. Rahimi, 

 (2024).
        Here, Peterson neither alleges that he applied for an NFA license to
make a suppressor, nor asserts that he paid the $200 tax, nor claims that the
tax or application-processing times discouraged him from submitting an
application to the ATF. Instead, he explains that he “simply forgot to do the
paperwork after” he made the suppressor. The record is therefore devoid of
any facts indicating that the NFA has been “put toward abusive ends” as
applied to him. See United States v. Phillips, 

 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“[W]hen we are presented with an as-applied challenge, we examine only
the facts of the case before us and not any set of hypothetical facts under
which the statute might be unconstitutional.”). 3

        _____________________
        3
          For example, Peterson nowhere contends or produces evidence that a $200 tax
as applied to him would “deny” him his Second Amendment rights. See Bruen, 

 n.9; see also Watterson v. ATF, No. 4:23-CV-00080, 

, at *19 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 1, 2024) (rejecting challenge to NFA, in part, because “Plaintiff cannot show
that a $200 tax is so exorbitant that he is effectively denied his Second Amendment right
to bear arms”). We agree with Peterson that the $200 tax denied ordinary citizens the right
to carry when it was initially passed in 1934; at that time, the tax was equivalent to over
$4,800 in today’s money. But that fact has no bearing on whether the tax is
unconstitutional as applied to him today.



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                                         No. 24-30043


        In addition, the record does not reveal how long applicants must wait
for the ATF to process their NFA applications. Peterson cites nothing to
support his claim that current processing times for NFA license approval can
be upwards of eight months. When pressed on his failure to produce
evidence on this claim at oral argument, Peterson’s counsel acknowledged
the lack of evidence, Oral Argument at 6:03, and later offered to file a
supplemental letter brief with the court containing support for his claim. He
has never done so, though it would have been prudent to do so given that the
government at oral argument disputed his eight-month claim and asserted
that current NFA processing times run only “a few days” with “returns as
quickly as one day.” Oral Argument at 20:40. We decline to resolve this
factual dispute and decide only that Peterson’s unsupported claim that
applicants must wait eight months on average before they can obtain a
suppressor is insufficient to overcome Bruen’s presumption. 4 See Justice v.
Hosemann, 

 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that “a developed
factual record” with “[p]articularized facts” is “essential” to support an as-
applied challenge); Does 1-7 v. Abbott, 

, 310 n.3 (5th Cir. 2019)
(reasoning that plaintiffs could not maintain an as-applied challenge because
“they did not plead sufficient facts to support an as-applied challenge, and
the complaint made only general allegations of unconstitutionality”).
                                     *        *         *
        In sum, Bruen’s presumption of constitutionality for shall-issue
licensing regimes applies to the NFA’s application procedures. Peterson

        _____________________
        4
          We note that our court has concluded that the 10-business-day wait time for the
NICS background check is permissible under Bruen. McRorey, 

; see also Md.
Shall Issue, Inc., 

 (upholding shall-issue law when the “record therefore
reveal[ed] that, in some cases, the process for obtaining a handgun qualification license can
take only a few days”).



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                                        No. 24-30043


cannot overcome that presumption because the record does not reveal that
the NFA has effectively “den[ied]” him his Second Amendment rights. 5
Bruen, 

 n.9. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it
denied Peterson’s motion to dismiss the indictment.
        In so holding, we do not foreclose the possibility that another litigant
may successfully challenge the NFA’s requirements. Here, in light of the
parties’ agreement that suppressors are “Arms” for purposes of the Second
Amendment, we decide only that Peterson has failed to “develop any
argument” or record to show that the NFA is unconstitutional as applied to
him.    See United States v. Bridges, 

, 531 (6th Cir. 2025)
(Nalbandian, J., concurring). We need not, and therefore do not, go further.

 (“If it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide
more.” (alteration and citation omitted)).



        _____________________
        5
           Were Peterson able to show the NFA’s requirements had been “put toward[s]
abusive ends” as applied to him, we would proceed to the second step of the Bruen analysis.
McRorey, 

 (alteration in original) (quoting Bruen, 

 n.9). Under
that step, the “government must ‘identify a well-established and representative historical
analogue’” for the NFA. Giglio, 

 (quoting Bruen, 

). We
note that some courts have concluded that the NFA’s suppressor-registration
requirements pass constitutional muster under Bruen’s second step, although we do not
reach that issue here. See, e.g., United States v. Serrano, 

, 1211–13 (S.D.
Cal. 2023) (concluding that suppressors do not fall within scope of Second Amendment
but, even if they did, the NFA’s registration requirements comport with this Nation’s
historical tradition of firearms regulation); United States v. Lightner, No. 8:24-CR-21, 

, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2024) (same); United States v. Villalobos, No. 3:19-
CR-40, 

, at *13 (D. Idaho Apr. 21, 2023) (same and explaining that “the
regulation of silencers is readily analogous to the Nation’s history of imposing commercial
regulations on firearms”); United States v. Beaty, No. 6:22-CR-95, 

, at *8
n.11 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2023) (“The NFA’s record-keeping and attendant payment
requirements are consistent with our Nation’s historical regulation of firearms.”). But see
Oliver Krawczyk, Comment, Dangerous and Unusual: How an Expanding National Firearms
Act Will Spell Its Own Demise, 

, 300–01 (2022).



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                                 No. 24-30043


                                      III
         Next, Peterson challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the
suppressor.
         The district court concluded that the good-faith exception barred
application of the exclusionary rule. On appeal, though, Peterson does not
mention the good-faith exception. He instead argues “that the affidavit in
support of the subject warrant application failed to establish probable
cause . . . in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Even if this were true, it
would not go toward establishing that the good-faith exception does not
apply.    See United States v. Sibley, 

 (5th Cir. 2006)
(enumerating the four scenarios wherein the good-faith exception does not
apply). Accordingly, Peterson has likely forfeited his good-faith-exception
argument. Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 

 (5th Cir. 2021).
         But we need not rest our conclusion on this basis because, as we
explain infra, we would affirm the district court’s good-faith-exception
decision even if Peterson’s argument were preserved. That is, irrespective
of whether the underlying affidavit actually gave rise to probable cause, we
conclude that it was reasonable for the officers executing the warrant to rely
on it. Accordingly, the exclusionary rule does not serve to bar admission of
the suppressor, and the district court rightly denied Peterson’s motion to
suppress.
                                      A
         When considering appeals of motion-to-suppress rulings, we review
“factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” United States v.
Martinez, 

 (5th Cir. 2024).          “The district court’s
determination of the reasonableness of a law enforcement officer’s reliance
upon a warrant issued by a magistrate [judge]—for purposes of determining


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                                 No. 24-30043


the applicability of the good-faith exception . . . —is also reviewed de novo.”
United States v. Cherna, 

, 406–07 (5th Cir. 1999) (italics added).
       If the good-faith exception applies, we “affirm the district court’s
denial of the motion to suppress.” Sibley, 

.
                                      B
       As the district court correctly reasoned, “[t]he good-faith exception
allows reliance on [a] warrant even if the search warrant is defective as long
as that reliance is objectively reasonable.” “Issuance of a warrant by a
magistrate [judge] normally suffices to establish good faith on the part of law
enforcement officers who conduct a search pursuant to the warrant.” United
States v. Craig, 

 (5th Cir. 1988). But the “exception does
not apply when: (1) the magistrate [judge] issuing the warrant was misled by
information in an affidavit that the affiant knew or should have known was
false; (2) the issuing magistrate [judge] abandoned the judicial role; (3) the
warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; or (4) the warrant was so
facially deficient that the executing officers could not have reasonably
presumed it to be valid.” Sibley, 

.
       The district court rightly construed Peterson’s argument as getting
closest to addressing the third exception to the exception. And we agree that,
despite Peterson’s protests, neither it nor any of the other exceptions apply.
As the government relates, the warrant described “Peterson’s false
representation to the ATF that he would not store or sell guns on his
property; three separate law enforcement purchases from PDW; [and]
PDW’s failure to ever file a multiple sales report.” Regardless of whether
these facts would actually give rise to probable cause, they at least present
“indicia of probable cause” sufficient to render belief in its existence
reasonable. See Sibley, 

. Indeed, the affidavit at issue here



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                                 No. 24-30043


stands in stark contrast to the sorts of “bare bones” affidavits that have been
deemed insufficient. See United States v. Brown, 

, 1303 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1991) (collecting examples). Accordingly, we conclude that the officers
who executed the warrant acted reasonably in relying on it. And because
none of the exceptions to the good-faith exception apply, it bars application
of the exclusionary rule and the district court rightly denied Peterson’s
motion to suppress.
                                      IV
       For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of
Peterson’s motion to dismiss and its denial of his motion to suppress.




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