Young v. U.S. Dist Ct N Dist MS

Case: 25-60651 Document: 30-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/09/2026

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED March 9, 2026 No. 25-60651 Lyle W. Cayce Summary Calendar Clerk ____________ Katie Young, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Defendant—Appellee. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi USDC No. 4:25-CV-153 ______________________________ Before Jones, Smith, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: * Katie Young, proceeding pro se, moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in this appeal of the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of her complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. The motion is a

_____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

Case: 25-60651 Document: 30-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/09/2026

No. 25-60651 challenge to the district court’s certification that the appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).

Young fails to address meaningfully the district court’s reasons for the dismissal of her complaint. Pro se briefs are afforded liberal construction.

See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, when an appellant fails to identify any error in the district court’s analysis, it is the same as if the appellant had not appealed the decision. Brinkmann v. Dall.

Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

Because Young has failed to meaningfully challenge any factual or legal aspect of the district court’s dismissal of her complaint, she has abandoned the critical issue of her appeal. See id. Thus, the appeal lacks arguable merit and is therefore frivolous. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.