SEC v. Barton

Case: 25-11043 Document: 52-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/03/2026

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 25-11043 Summary Calendar FILED ____________ June 3, 2026 Lyle W. Cayce Securities and Exchange Commission, Clerk Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Timothy Barton, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:22-CV-2118 ______________________________ Before Richman, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: * This appeal is one of numerous appeals 1 involving SEC’s complaint against Timothy Barton for alleged violations of the Exchange Act and Securities Act. Here, Barton challenges the district court’s order lifting a stay of litigation which permitted the bankruptcy court to dismiss several Case: 25-11043 Document: 52-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/03/2026

No. 25-11043 cases involving entities he controlled. We dismiss Barton’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I SEC filed a complaint against Barton and others, alleging they defrauded over 100 investors in violation of the Exchange Act and Securities Act. We have discussed the facts of this case in several opinions, so we do not repeat them here. 2 We limit our discussion to what is pertinent to this appeal.

Prior to SEC filing its complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, ten entities Barton controlled filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions 3 (collectively “Bankruptcy Proceeding”) in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas. After SEC filed its complaint in the district court, in the Bankruptcy Proceeding, the U.S. Trustee moved for the bankruptcy cases to be dismissed. 4 While that motion was pending, the district court entered an “order appointing Case: 25-11043 Document: 52-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/03/2026

No. 25-11043 receiver” that stayed the Bankruptcy Proceeding. We vacated that order because the district court “erred in both determining that the receivership was necessary and determining the scope of the entities covered by the receivership.” 5 On remand, the district court entered a new “order appointing receiver” that we affirmed, and the Supreme Court recently denied Barton’s petition for certiorari seeking review of that order. 6 Like the first receivership, the new receivership order provided for a stay of the Bankruptcy Proceeding. Specifically, it stayed: All civil legal proceedings of any nature, including, but not limited to, bankruptcy proceedings, arbitration proceedings, foreclosure actions, default proceedings, or other actions of any nature involving: (a) the Receiver, in his capacity as Receiver; (b) any Receivership Property, wherever located; (c) any of the Receivership Entities, including subsidiaries and partnerships; or, (d) any of the Receivership Entities’ past or present officers, directors, managers, agents, parent or affiliated entities, or general or limited partners sued for, or in connection with, any action taken by them while acting in such capacity of any nature, whether as plaintiff, defendant, third- party plaintiff, third-party defendant, or otherwise (such proceedings are hereinafter referred to as “Ancillary Proceedings”).

As the case moved forward in the district court, the receiver appointed by the district court informed the court that “counsel for the [d]ebtors and the U.S. Trustee’s office agreed that the bankruptcy filings [involved in the Bankruptcy Proceeding] should be dismissed.” The receiver explained that the “bankruptcy filings [we]re unnecessary” and that no “monetary value Case: 25-11043 Document: 52-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/03/2026

No. 25-11043

[would] be gained by proceeding with those cases.” The receiver stated he would “likely concede to the lifting of the stay in the [Bankruptcy Proceeding] to permit [its] agreed dismissal.”

Several months later, and after we affirmed the district court’s imposition of the new receivership order, the receiver filed a motion asking the district court to lift the stay of the Bankruptcy Proceeding “for the limited purpose of allowing the Bankruptcy Court to consider the U.S. Trustee’s pending pre-receivership motion to dismiss those cases.” 7 Barton did not file an opposition to the receiver’s motion, and the district court granted the motion, lifting the stay of the Bankruptcy Proceeding for the “limited purpose” of allowing the bankruptcy court to consider the motion to dismiss.

The bankruptcy court then entered an “agreed order granting” the U.S. Trustee’s motion to dismiss, which dismissed the Bankruptcy Proceeding. 8 Barton filed a motion to reinstate the cases, which was dismissed without prejudice. 9 Barton made no further filings and did not appeal from the court’s dismissal order. 10 The bankruptcy court closed the case. 11 Barton appeals from the district court’s order lifting the stay of the Bankruptcy Proceeding. 12

Case: 25-11043 Document: 52-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/03/2026

No. 25-11043

II “We begin, as always, with jurisdiction.” 13 “As the appellant, Barton ‘bear[s] the burden of establishing our appellate jurisdiction.’” 14 Barton contends we have jurisdiction “under multiple independent bases.” He argues we have jurisdiction under (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) “because the order modifies an existing injunction,” (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) “because the order decides consequential steps toward winding up the receivership,” and (3) the collateral order doctrine “because the order conclusively determines the federal forum” and “the loss of the bankruptcy forum is effectively unreviewable after final judgment.” His arguments lack merit.

Section 1292(a) states in relevant part that we have jurisdiction over appeals from: (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court; (2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposals of property . . . . 15

Case: 25-11043 Document: 52-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/03/2026

No. 25-11043

We have no jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) because the order lifting the stay involved a receivership-related order. As the Eleventh Circuit aptly put it: [E]ven if the . . . order [appointing a receiver] incorporated injunctive qualities, it was entered in the context of a receivership. We can’t skip over the more specific § 1292(a)(2), which expressly addresses receivership-related orders, to find jurisdiction under the more general § 1292(a)(1), which involves injunction-related orders of all stripes. 16 As we stated in Warren v. Bergeron, 17 “Congress passed a statute specifically governing appeals from orders relevant to receivership[, § 1292(a)(2), which] indicates that such orders are distinct from the injunctions covered by the prior subsection[, § 1292(a)(1)].” 18 Further, the Supreme Court has recognized that orders involving injunctions and orders involving receivers are distinct. When discussing § 1292(a)’s predecessor, it stated: The question is not whether included in an order appointing a receiver there may not be, either expressed or implied, some directions of a mandatory character,—something in the nature of an injunction,—but whether congress in this legislation provided for appeals in cases other than those in which an injunction, technically speaking, is either the sole or a principal part of the order or decree. Orders granting injunctions and Case: 25-11043 Document: 52-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/03/2026

No. 25-11043 orders appointing receivers are, in the common understanding of the profession, entirely independent. 19 An order appointing a receiver that includes “something in the nature of an injunction,” such as the stay of litigation involved here, which stayed only proceedings related to the receivership, does not give this court jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1). 20 The Sixth Circuit held in a similar case that an “order vacating the receivership is not an order modifying an injunction for purposes of § 1291(a)(1).” 21 It explained that an “order appointing a receiver,” which “implemented a stay affecting the receivership assets . . . is not an appealable injunction,” because “[n]ot every coercive order constitutes an injunction that is appealable under § 1292[(a)(1)].” 22 “Instead, an order is considered to be an injunction that is appealable under § 1292(a)(1) when it grants or Case: 25-11043 Document: 52-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/03/2026

No. 25-11043 denies ‘in toto or in part injunctive relief demanded in the complaint. . . .’” 23 Because the plaintiff’s “complaint did not demand injunctive relief, the stay incorporated in the receivership order is not considered an injunction that is appealable under § 1292(a)(1).” 24 “It follows that the order vacating the receivership [was] not an order modifying an injunction for purposes of § 1292(a)(1).” 25 Likewise, SEC’s “complaint did not demand injunctive relief” for ancillary proceedings. In granting and then later lifting the stay as part of its receivership order, the district court was not granting or denying specific injunctive relief demanded in the complaint. Accordingly, “[t]he stay incorporated in the receivership order is not considered an injunction that is appealable under § 1292(a)(1),” 26 and “[i]t follows that the order [lifting the stay] is not an order modifying an injunction for purposes of § 1292(a)(1).” 27 We have no jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1).

We also have no jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(2). The district court’s order lifting the stay was administrative, and it did not involve appointing a receiver or refusing to take steps to accomplish the purposes of winding up the receivership. 28

Case: 25-11043 Document: 52-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/03/2026

No. 25-11043

Barton’s interpretation of § 1292(a)(2) is one we have already rejected. 29 Section 1292(a)(2) does not cover all actions that constitute major steps toward winding up a receivership. “Refusing orders” modifies “both the infinitive phrase ‘to wind up receiverships’ and the infinitive phrase ‘to take steps to accomplish.’” 30 Barton himself admits the order was not a “refusal” to take steps, but was “a major step” in doing so.

Nor do we have jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. We have already stated—in a case involving this very litigation—that “our jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of receivership orders is limited to those related to sales or distributions under the collateral doctrine.” 31 III We recently warned Barton that “[f]urther appeals from sale orders or non-sale administrative orders will be viewed with skepticism and incur sanctions if deemed frivolous.” 32 In an appeal that “was filed before that warning issued,” we directed Barton to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. 33 We proceed similarly here.

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 and our inherent authority, we DIRECT Barton to SHOW CAUSE by letter on or before Case: 25-11043 Document: 52-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/03/2026

No. 25-11043

June 16, 2026 why sanctions should not be imposed. 34 He must “show cause why this appeal should not be deemed frivolous and why sanctions should not issue.” 35 His response should address, among any other points he wishes to raise, whether this appeal is frivolous in light of the jurisdictional defects identified above, his repeated receivership-related appeals, and this court’s prior warning that such appeals “have impacted the management of the receivership estate, significantly reduced funds potentially available to ultimate beneficiaries of the receivership, and expended court resources.” 36 * * * For the above reasons, we DISMISS Barton’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and DIRECT Barton to SHOW CAUSE why sanctions should not be imposed.