Whiticar v. Parish Hosp Svc Dist
Opinion
Case: 26-30071 Document: 34-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/05/2026
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit
No. 26-30071 FILED August 5, 2026 Summary Calendar ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Lethornia J. Whiticar, Jr., Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Parish Hospital Service District for the Parish of Orleans, District A, doing business as New Orleans East Hospital; Louisiana Children’s Medical Center, doing business as LCMC Health, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:24-CV-1287 ______________________________ Before Davis, Stewart, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:* Plaintiff-Appellant Lethornia J. Whiticar, Jr. appeals the dismissal of his employment-retaliation claim on summary judgment. Because he did not carry his burden of proof as to causation or pretext, we AFFIRM.
Case: 26-30071 Document: 34-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/05/2026
No. 26-30071
Whiticar, who is African-American, began working for Defendant- Appellee Louisiana Children’s Medical Center d/b/a LCMC Health in 2018, when he was hired as an Engineer II at New Orleans East Hospital.1 In October 2022, he was rapidly promoted to Engineer I then to Chief Engineer.
At all times, his direct supervisor was Karl Warner (Facilities Director), who is white. Warner, in turn, was supervised by Danielle Willis (Chief Financial and Administrative Officer), who is African-American.
Whiticar claims that shortly after he became Chief Engineer, Warner began to undermine him and made it impossible for him to do his job.
Whiticar asserts he complained about Warner’s discrimination to Brion Stanford, the hospital’s Director of Human Resources, sometime in November 2022. Then on January 13, 2023, Warner conducted an introductory review of Whiticar’s performance as Chief Engineer and gave Whiticar his first negative review at LCMC. Finally, on February 12, 2023, Whiticar was demoted from Chief Engineer back to Engineer I.
Whiticar sued LCMC under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging Warner discriminated against him and the subsequent demotion was in retaliation for Whiticar’s complaint to Stanford. The district court dismissed the discrimination claim as time-barred, leaving Whiticar with a standalone retaliation claim.
To prove a circumstantial case of retaliation such as Whiticar’s, an employee must show (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the Case: 26-30071 Document: 34-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/05/2026
No. 26-30071 protected activity and adverse action.2 Upon proof of this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action at issue. The employee must then respond with proof that his “protected conduct was the reason for the adverse action.”3 To carry this burden, the employee may combine “suspicious timing with other significant evidence of pretext.”4 LCMC sought summary judgment on the retaliation claim for two reasons—causation and pretext—and presented sworn statements by Stanford and Willis in support. Stanford’s statement provides that Whiticar never complained to Stanford at all, so Stanford had no reason to tell anyone at LCMC that Whiticar had engaged in protected activity.5 Willis’s statement says she made the decision to demote Whiticar due to performance concerns and, at the time, was unaware that Whiticar had complained to Stanford or engaged in other protected activity.
Willis’s statement also describes the issues she observed in Whiticar’s performance, which arose very shortly after he assumed the role of Chief Engineer. For one, Whiticar did not know how to prepare the hospital for a potential freeze when Willis asked him to ready the hospital for cold weather, though his predecessor did. He also had trouble using the hospital’s automation system, which regulated temperatures in critical areas like the Case: 26-30071 Document: 34-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/05/2026
No. 26-30071 surgical theater. And Warner’s January 2023 evaluation of Whiticar’s performance confirmed Willis’s observations. Specifically, the review concludes Whiticar was not meeting three of five job functions: while he satisfactorily managed schedules and forecast operational expenses and capital outlays, he was not meeting expectations as to preventative maintenance, managerial skills, and project management. Willis thus decided to demote Whiticar to Engineer I, effective February 12, 2023—a move endorsed by the hospital’s CEO (also an African-American woman).
Whiticar responded with his own sworn statement and that of a coworker. Whiticar’s statement attests that Warner criticized him, denied him access to the hospital’s environmental systems, and altogether prevented him from performing the Chief Engineer job. The coworker’s statement broadly supports Whiticar’s testimony and further observes that Whiticar was excluded from departmental projects and administrative meetings. Crucially though, neither statement challenges LCMC’s evidence that Willis made the decision to demote Whiticar and was unaware of Whiticar’s supposed protected activity. Because of this, the district court granted LCMC’s motion on causation. It also found Whiticar had not shown that LCMC’s reason for demoting him was pretextual. Our review is de novo.6 We agree with the district court that Whiticar failed to carry his burden of proof on the causation element of the prima facie case. It’s elemental that “[i]f the decisionmakers were completely unaware of the plaintiff’s protected activity, then it could not be said (even as an initial matter) that the decisionmakers might have been retaliating against the Case: 26-30071 Document: 34-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/05/2026
No. 26-30071 plaintiff for having engaged in that activity.”7 Accordingly, an employee “must produce at least some evidence,” whether direct or circumstantial, “that the decisionmakers had knowledge of his protected activity.”8 This burden can be overcome with a mix of “prototypical circumstantial indicators of decisionmaker knowledge”—things like “temporal proximity, specific conversations with knowledgeable colleagues, changed decisionmaker behavior following complaints, pretext, and parallel” adverse actions taken against other employees who also engaged in protected activity.9 An employee, however, must present more “than mere curious timing coupled with speculative theories.”10 Whiticar does not offer “prototypical circumstantial indicators of decisionmaker knowledge,” such as changes in Willis’s behavior or comments indicating Willis knew of Whiticar’s supposed complaint. He instead relies on three other indicia of causation—his prior excellent performance reviews, LCMC’s policy permitting performance- improvement plans, and the timing between his protected activity and demotion. But neither past evaluations of Whiticar’s work in other positions nor LCMC’s policy permitting performance-improvement plans is probative of Willis’s knowledge.11
Case: 26-30071 Document: 34-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/05/2026
No. 26-30071
That leaves just Whiticar’s temporal evidence—his complaint in November 2022 and demotion in February 2023. Without more, this three- month gap raises at most a weak causal inference.12 And that weak inference does not carry Whiticar’s causal burden given LCMC’s unrebutted statements disclaiming Willis’s knowledge. The district court correctly dismissed on this ground.13 Assuming Whiticar could barely clear the causation bar, his claim fails on pretext. Willis states she demoted Whiticar because she personally observed his poor performance as Chief Engineer, which Warner’s evaluation confirmed. Although Whiticar argues the negative review was animated by Warner’s discriminatory intent, there is no discrimination claim before the court, and he otherwise presents no evidence disputing Willis’s performance-based reason for the demotion. Hence, there is no basis to find pretext in this record.
AFFIRMED.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.