Brown v. Wallace

Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED August 14, 2026 No. 25-30135 ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Ternell L. Brown, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Matthew Wallace, in his individual capacity; Katherinne F.

Alvarado-Cruz; Troy Lawrence, Jr., in his individual capacity, Defendants—Appellants. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana USDC No. 3:23-CV-1313 ______________________________ Before Richman, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:* Three members of the Baton Rouge Police Department, Matthew Wallace, Troy Lawrence, Jr., and Katherinne Alvarado-Cruz, were involved in the arrest and subsequent strip and body cavity search of Ternell Brown.

The officers have appealed the district court’s denial of their 12(b)(6) Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

No. 25-30135 motions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. We affirm in light of the limited record before us and remand to permit discovery and further proceedings as appropriate limited to the qualified immunity issues.

I The following factual allegations are taken from Ternell Brown’s Second Amended Complaint (Complaint).1 Detective Matthew Wallace and Officer Troy Lawrence, Jr., two members of the Baton Rouge Police Department’s Street Crimes Unit, were patrolling the 2500 block of Plank Road, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, when Detective Wallace “elected to conduct a traffic stop” of Brown’s vehicle. After Brown and her husband “complied by stopping” the vehicle in response to the activation of police lights, Detective Wallace “ordered Mrs. Brown and her husband to exit the vehicle.” Officer Lawrence arrived on the scene within fifteen seconds to assist Detective Wallace. Officer Lawrence, who was “immediately next to the passenger side door when” Brown exited, instructed “Brown to place her hands behind her back[,] . . . placed [her] in handcuffs,” and ordered her “to come stand beside his vehicle.” Officer Lawrence “guard[ed] Mrs. Brown to allow Wallace” to search “the vehicle without Mrs. Brown or her husband’s consent” and without a warrant.

Detective Wallace’s search of Brown’s vehicle uncovered “several bottles of prescription medication belonging to Mrs. Brown,” including one that contained “multiple prescriptions in the same bottle.” Brown “informed Lawrence and Wallace at least four times that she was in lawful possession of the pills . . . and offered to show proof.” Officer Lawrence and Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

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Detective Wallace responded by informing Brown that “she was not allowed to carry multiple prescriptions in the same bottle,” and they refused to “view[] her prescriptions while still on-scene.” Detective Wallace told Brown that they were unable to determine if the prescription drugs were “something [she] bought off the streets,” and he and Officer Lawrence told her that “a judge would sort it out.” Officer Lawrence then “falsely” told Brown that she would be taken to jail for possession of a firearm with a controlled dangerous substance.

Officer Lawrence and Detective Wallace ordered Brown into a Baton Rouge Police Department (BRPD) vehicle driven by Officer Doe. Officer Doe “forcibly” transported Brown to the Brave Cave, an “unmarked BRPD facility,” because they “suspected she might be involved in illegal drug activity.” Officer Lawrence and Detective Wallace drove separately, meeting Brown and Officer Doe there.

The Brave Cave was “a warehouse that the Street Crimes Unit [had] adopted as their home base over the past several years . . . where BRPD [took] suspects to interrogate them, gather intelligence, and attempt to ‘flip’ them to begin cooperating with BRPD.” The Brave Cave was “not a jail or detention facility,” and “no correctional staff work[ed]” there. It “was closed” a few months after the events at issue here when “reports of torture committed by members of the Street Crimes Unit became public.” Brown was held at the Brave Cave “for over two hours” so the officers could investigate whether there was probable cause to arrest her for a drug offense.

She was not brought to the Brave Cave to be processed “for eventual transfer to the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison . . . [but] to be further searched and questioned.”

Detective Wallace and Officer Lawrence instructed Officer Katherinne Alvarado-Cruz to conduct “Strip and Body Cavity searches [of Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

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Brown].” Heeding their “request,” Officer Alvarado-Cruz then “examined Mrs. Brown, forc[ing] her to spread her vagina and buttocks for inspection, and examined her vagina using a flashlight.” None of the officers had “a warrant . . . or consent to conduct” the strip or body cavity search of Brown.

The officers released Brown from the Brave Cave without charge after concluding that she “was not hiding a weapon or contraband in her rectum or vagina.” There is no footage of the events at the Brave Cave because the officers “intentionally turned off their body-worn cameras.”

Detective Wallace, Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz subjected Brown to the strip and body cavity search pursuant to BRPD policy, which states in pertinent part: III. Strip Search A. Arrestees will not be subjected to strip searches unless the officer has articulate [sic], reasonable suspicion that this particular arrestee may have weapons or contraband on his person. Reasonable suspicion will be based on the following factors: 1. The nature of the offense charged.

2. The arrestee’s appearance and conduct.

3. The circumstances of the arrest.

4. The arrestee’s prior record . . . .

C. Strip searches may be conducted on non-arrestees based on individualized articu[l]able reasonable suspicion to frisk, probable cause to search, consent, or a court order.

1. Reasonable suspicion and probable cause will be based upon the same factors listed in III A.

Brown attempted to file a complaint about the strip and body cavity search at BRPD headquarters but was “told that the officers had done Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

No. 25-30135 nothing wrong.” She then filed the instant lawsuit asserting, among other things,2 a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for both an unreasonable search and an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment against Detective Wallace, Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz. Specifically, she alleges that Detective Wallace, Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz violated her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches by subjecting her to a strip and visual body cavity search inside the Brave Cave, and violated her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure by forcibly transporting her to the Brave Cave and holding her there for hours.

Brown also sought to enjoin all defendants from implementing the BRPD policy outlined above. Brown’s claim for injunctive relief and another case involving the same BRPD policy were consolidated before a different judge in the Middle District of Louisiana “for the limited purpose of reaching a determination” of “whether the BRPD’s strip search policy regarding non- arrestees is constitutional.”3 That judge held Section III.C of the BRPD policy, which applies to non-arrestees, unconstitutional on its face.4 That ruling is not involved in this appeal, nor is it at issue here. Brown was an “arrestee” at the time of the strip and body cavity search. “An arrest occurs when, ‘in view of all [of] the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’”5 After Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

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Wallace stopped Brown’s vehicle and ordered Brown and her husband out of the vehicle, Lawrence placed her in handcuffs. He “guard[ed] Mrs. Brown to allow Wallace to conduct his search [of the vehicle] more efficiently.”

Lawrence then informed Brown she was being taken to jail, which was actually the Brave Cave, for possession of a firearm with a controlled dangerous substance. Brown remained in handcuffs while BRPD Officer Doe transported her to the Brave Cave in a BRPD vehicle. Brown was then held at the Brave Cave for over two hours as a “detainee.” Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not have believed she was free to leave. Nor did Brown, the person involved here. Brown was therefore an “arrestee” under the circumstances at issue.6 Detective Wallace, Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz each filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, raising the defense of qualified immunity. The district court considered each motion separately and denied each officer qualified immunity. Detective Wallace, Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz have each timely appealed.

II “[A] district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”7 But this court is “restricted to Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

No. 25-30135 determinations ‘of question[s] of law’ and ‘legal issues,’ and [does] not consider ‘the correctness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts.’”8 We “review[] de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds or for failing to state a claim, accepting all well- pleaded facts as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”9 “In doing so, we . . . do not accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.”10 This “court also has jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of a complaint on interlocutory appeal when that issue is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the denial of qualified immunity.”11 III “The defense of qualified immunity protects state officials from civil suit and liability when they could have reasonably believed that their actions were legal.”12 “Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.”13 “[P]roperly applied, it protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”14 “When a defendant invokes Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

No. 25-30135 qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.”15 “[A] plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.”16 A plaintiff “must show that (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct.”17 This court “may address either prong first,”18 and if either condition is lacking, the defendants are protected by qualified immunity.19 We address the claims of qualified immunity for Detective Wallace, Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz in that order.

A Detective Wallace argues he is entitled to qualified immunity for arresting Brown and for instructing Officer Alvarado-Cruz to conduct a strip and body cavity search of Brown while she was held at the Brave Cave.

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Detective Wallace contends he had probable cause for the arrest and that a post-arrest strip and body cavity search did not violate clearly established law.

“The Fourth Amendment protects against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’”20 “The stopping of a vehicle and detention of its occupants constitutes a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment.”21 “The legality of a traffic stop is analyzed under the framework articulated in Terry v. Ohio,” a “two-part . . . reasonable suspicion inquiry.”22 Under that “inquiry, we ask whether the officer’s action was: (1) ‘justified at its inception’; and (2) ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’”23 “For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must have an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle.”24 In other words, “[r]easonable suspicion must exist before the initiation of an investigatory detention.”25 “[I]n making a reasonable suspicion inquiry, a court ‘must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

No. 25-30135 has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.’”26 “We have stated previously that reasonable suspicion exists when the officer can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the search and seizure.”27 “Warrantless searches and seizures are ‘per se unreasonable unless they fall within a few narrowly defined exceptions.’”28 Among those exceptions is the automobile exception. Under that exception, “warrantless searches of automobiles are permitted by the Fourth Amendment if the officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of a crime.”30 Still, “whether the initial stop was permissible under the Fourth Amendment” is a “threshold matter.”31 Additionally, “[i]t is well established that under the Fourth Amendment a warrantless arrest must be based on probable cause.”32 “Probable cause justifying an arrest ‘means facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

No. 25-30135 one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.’”33 When “qualified immunity is asserted at the pleading stage, the precise factual basis for the plaintiff’s claim or claims may be hard to identify.”34 “[F]acts crucial to the resolution of the qualified immunity issue remain unknown at this juncture.”35 “A seizure must be ‘justified at its inception’”—“[r]easonable suspicion must exist before the initiation of an investigatory detention”36—and an officer must have “probable cause” before an officer may search a vehicle without a warrant.37 Brown’s allegations “fail to state”38 why Detective Wallace elected to pull over the vehicle and order Brown and her husband out of the vehicle,39 why Detective Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

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Wallace searched the vehicle, and why Detective Wallace searched her purse containing the drugs and gun that led to her arrest and subsequent strip and body cavity search.40 We accordingly find ourselves “in the difficult position of having to determine whether [Detective Wallace’s] conduct was objectively reasonable without the facts typically relied upon to do so.”41 Facts may exist regarding the knowledge of Detective Wallace that support his claim of qualified immunity.42 However, given that only Brown’s Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

No. 25-30135 complaint is before us, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation. On remand, discovery should be limited to the issue of qualified immunity, and further proceedings should resolve that issue before general discovery or trial occur.

B Officer Lawrence argues he is entitled to qualified immunity because he was not personally involved in any alleged violation of Brown’s constitutional rights. He states that at “best . . . [he] handcuffed [Brown], ordered [Brown] to stand beside his vehicle, and instructed [Brown] to get into the vehicle being driven by Officer Doe.” But as we recognized above, “[t]he stopping of a vehicle and detention of its occupants constitutes a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment,”43 warrantless searches of automobiles are allowed under the Fourth Amendment when “the officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of a crime,”44 and “a warrantless arrest must be based on probable cause.”45 Officer Lawrence admits the Complaint alleges that he was personally involved in the handcuffing and detention of Brown while Detective Wallace searched the vehicle and that he “instructed [Brown] to get into the vehicle being driven [to the Brave Cave] by Officer Doe.” As with Detective Wallace’s claim of qualified immunity, we find ourselves “in Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

No. 25-30135 the difficult position of having to determine whether [Officer Lawrence’s] conduct was objectively reasonable without the facts typically relied upon to do so.”46 We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Officer Lawrence, but proceedings on remand should first resolve the qualified immunity issue.47 C Officer Alvarado-Cruz contends she is entitled to qualified immunity because the law governing strip and body cavity searches of arrestees was not clearly established as to the particular level of suspicion required at the time she conducted the strip and body cavity search of Brown. She also contends that conducting the strip and body cavity search was objectively reasonable because “she was following the directives [of] senior officers,” who had reasonable suspicion, and BRPD policy required Brown’s strip and body cavity search to “be conducted by an officer of the same sex as the arrestee.”

She argues that, under the collective knowledge doctrine, she was entitled to rely on Detective Wallace and Officer Lawrence’s “reasonable suspicion” in carrying out the “ordered search.”

“In determining what constitutes clearly established law, this [court] first looks to Supreme Court precedent and then to [its] own.”48 “When there is no direct controlling authority, ‘this [court] may rely on decisions from other circuits to the extent that they constitute a robust consensus of Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

No. 25-30135 cases of persuasive authority.’”49 “Ultimately, the touchstone is fair warning: The law can be clearly established despite notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the [c]ourt, so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights.”50 In other words, we do “not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”51 In addition, the Supreme Court has instructed us “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality,”52 but to undertake this inquiry “in light of the specific context of the case.”53 Furthermore, a “Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.’”54 At the motion to dismiss stage, “it is the defendant’s conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for objective legal reasonableness.”55 “[T]he question is whether the officer’s actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

No. 25-30135 circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”56 In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,57 the Supreme Court held constitutional routine intake searches (i.e., suspicionless searches) of detainees prior to being released into the “general population,” “regardless of the circumstances of the [detainee’s] arrest.”58 As relevant here, part of the intake searches at issue included an officer looking at the detainee’s “body openings,” and requiring the detainee to “lift his genitals, turn around, and cough in a squatting position.”59 The Court expressly reserved, however, what types of searches “would be reasonable” when “a detainee [is] held without assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other detainees.”60 The Court explained that the “circumstances before the Court . . . [did] not present the opportunity to consider . . . whether an arrestee whose detention has not yet been reviewed by a magistrate or other judicial officer, and who can be held in available facilities removed from the general population, may be subjected to the types Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

No. 25-30135 of searches at issue” in that case.61 Here, Brown was not released into the general population.

To be sure, “Florence abrogated some . . . decisions to the extent they required that persons arrested on minor offenses be excepted from blanket strip searches even when they were entering a general prison population.” 62 However, “Florence did not . . . disturb recognized Fourth Amendment restrictions against such searches of persons held apart from the general prison population.”63 In Kelly v. Foti,64 this court held that jail officials may “strip and cavity search” “a person arrested for a minor offense and detained pending the posting of bond only if they possess a reasonable suspicion that [the arrestee] is hiding weapons or contraband.”65 In Stewart v. Lubbock County,66 this court held unconstitutional a department policy permitting strip searches of any arrestee, including minor offenders awaiting bond, when “no reasonable suspicion existed that they . . . might possess weapons or contraband,” and explained that officers must have reasonable suspicion that an individual might possess weapons or contraband to conduct a strip search.67 In Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

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Williams v. Kaufman County,68 this court described its previous holdings that officers must have reasonable suspicion to strip search individuals who have committed minor offenses “in custodial situations” and that “outside the prison context” officers need at least individualized reasonable suspicion to conduct a strip search.69 In Jimenez v. Wood County,70 our en banc court acknowledged that “longstanding precedent” requires reasonable suspicion to conduct strip searches of individuals who were arrested for minor offenses for weapons or contraband.71 At least four other circuits have required a more particularized suspicion that contraband is concealed for an officer to lawfully conduct a body cavity search. The First Circuit in United States v. Barnes72 concluded that there must be “a more particularized suspicion that contraband is concealed” prior to conducting a visual body cavity search of the defendant, even though the “initial strip search” of the defendant “was clearly justified given [his] arrest for a drug trafficking crime.”73 The Second Circuit in Sloley v. VanBramer74 held that “a visual body cavity search conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest for any offense must be supported by ‘a specific, articulable factual basis supporting a reasonable suspicion to believe the arrestee secreted evidence inside a body cavity.’”75 The Seventh Circuit in Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 19 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

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Campbell v. Miller76 held “that the police needed to have a reasonable suspicion that [the arrestee] was concealing contraband in order to justify the [strip and body cavity] search under . . . [the Supreme Court’s decision in] Robinson.”77 The Ninth Circuit stated in United States v. Mendez- Jimenez78 that “[a] clear indication or plain suggestion that the suspect is concealing contraband within his body is required before a search beyond the body’s surface may be authorized.”79 In other words, both our precedent and “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority”80 require an officer to have at least a reasonable suspicion that an arrestee not being released into the general population is hiding or concealing weapons or contraband before subjecting the arrestee to a strip and body cavity search.81 We therefore conclude that it is clearly established that, at a minimum, Officer Alvarado-Cruz needed reasonable suspicion that Brown was hiding or concealing weapons or contraband in a body cavity to justify her search of Brown’s vagina and buttocks.

Brown alleged in her complaint that Detective Wallace found “several bottles of prescription medication,” including one that contained “multiple prescriptions in the same bottle,” along with a “firearm.” Brown also alleged that Detective Wallace informed Brown that he suspected she could have Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 20 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

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“bought [the pills] off the streets,” and that she was transported to the Brave Cave due to the officers’ suspicions that she was “involved in illegal drug activity.” Brown stated that Officer Alvarado-Cruz conducted the strip and body cavity search “[a]t the request of Wallace and Lawrence,” and that after the officers were “satisfied that [she] was not hiding a weapon or contraband in her [body cavities], she was released from [the Brave Cave] without charge.”

“Under the collective knowledge doctrine, an officer initiating the stop or conducting the [strip and body cavity] search need not have personal knowledge of the evidence that gave rise to the reasonable suspicion or probable cause, so long as he is acting at the request of those who have the necessary information.”82 “In other words, the collective knowledge theory applies so long as there is ‘some degree of communication’ between the acting officer and the officer who has knowledge of the necessary facts.”83 Officer Alvarado-Cruz was “acting at the request of” Detective Wallace and Officer Lawrence, “those who [had] the necessary information.”84 Therefore, under the collective knowledge doctrine, Detective Wallace and Officer Lawrence’s knowledge and observations may be imputed to Officer Alvarado-Cruz.85 However, the collective knowledge doctrine does not apply to Officer Alvarado-Cruz until a “reasonable Case: 25-30135 Document: 117-1 Page: 21 Date Filed: 08/14/2026

No. 25-30135 suspicion that could have been transferred between” she, Detective Lawrence, and Officer Wallace existed.86 The complaint is devoid of factual allegations suggesting Detective Wallace and Officer Lawrence had reason to believe Brown was hiding contraband or a weapon in her body cavities. In Officer Alvarado-Cruz’s motion to dismiss before the district court, she argued that “combining pills in the same container was . . . ‘suspicious,’ and, because of [that] suspicious behavior, BRPD officers required [Brown] to undergo a visual strip and body cavity search ‘to show that she was not hiding contraband.’” Although “narcotics violation[s]” are “the kinds of crimes . . . that might give rise to a reasonable belief that [an] arrestee was concealing an item in a body cavity,”87

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No. 25-30135 we are unable to determine on this record whether Detective Lawrence and Officer Wallace had a “particularized and objective basis” to support such a belief.88 As with Detective Lawrence and Officer Wallace, we find ourselves “in the difficult position of having to determine whether [Officer Alvarado- Cruz’s] conduct was objectively reasonable without the facts typically relied upon to do so.”89 We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Officer Alvarado-Cruz and remand for discovery and further proceedings regarding that issue.90 We do not reach whether the strip and body cavity search conducted by Alvarado-Cruz was objectively reasonable.91 * * *

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For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Detective Wallace, Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz’s 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds and REMAND for discovery and further proceedings limited to the issue of Detective Wallace, Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz’s qualified immunity before general discovery or trial proceed.92

_____________________ (“Strip searches of detainees are constitutionally constrained by due process requirements of reasonableness under the circumstances.”).