Defendants-appellants, National Steel Corporation (National), its wholly owned subsidiary, American Steel Corporation (American), and Fred Ginsberg, American’s Chairman, appealed from a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant, Emery Authier, Jr. The defendants contend that the district court submitted improperly the case to the jury because Authier’s complaint failed to state a cause of action under Michigan law and because, in any event, the action was preempted by Section 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982). We hold that although Authier stated a cause of action under Michigan law, such an action is preempted by ERI-SA. Accordingly, we vacate the jury verdict.

Authier was employed as an accountant by American from November of 1968 until his discharge in November of 1980. In January 1978, Authier was appointed as an administrator of American’s profit sharing plan, along with George Angevine, National’s General Counsel, and Bill Rust, National’s Vice President-Finance. Since American’s profit sharing plan was subject to *798ERISA regulation, see 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1982), Authier and the other administrators become subject to ERISA’s fiduciary duties, see 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).

In the fall of 1979, a corporate decision was made to terminate American’s profit sharing plan and bring the participants within National’s pension plan. During the termination process, Authier spoke to a partner in the law firm in charge of the termination of the plan. The partner informed Authier that an associate believed that a few problems existed with the plan. The next day Authier contacted the associate who denied making the statements attributed to him and assured Authier that nothing was wrong with the plan. Authier then contacted the firm which originally drafted the profit sharing plan; a partner at the firm told Authier that the termination should occur without difficulty.

Believing he was obligated by ERISA to inform his co-fiduciaries and the plan’s participants of potential problems, Authier drafted a letter in which he related his concerns. The letter recommended, among other things, that the law firm which drafted the pension plan be placed in charge of its termination. This letter was sent to Rust, Angevine, and the plan’s participants. Subsequently, according to the defendants, since Authier had been instructed previously to clear all mail of a non-routine nature with Ginsberg and since he failed to obtain Ginsberg’s approval prior to sending the letter, Authier was discharged from his positions at American. Authier then brought suit, arguing that his discharge contravened Michigan public policy.

Generally, under Michigan law, an employee can be discharged for any reason. E.g., Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 687, 273 N.W. 315, 316 (1937). The Michigan courts, however, recognize an exception to this general rule; an employee may not be discharged in violation of a “clearly articulated, well-accepted public policy.” Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 419 Mich. 356, 367, 353 N.W.2d 469, 474 (1984). In order to invoke this public policy exception, a plaintiff must establish that he was engaged in a protected activity, that he was discharged, and that his discharge was due to performing the protected activity. Id. at 367, 353 N.W.2d at 474. In this case, the jury found specifically that Authier was discharged for fulfilling his duties under ERISA. Thus, as an initial matter, the issue before this court is whether a fiduciary’s compliance with his duties under ERISA is a protected activity.

The Michigan Supreme Court has noted that an employee’s compliance with a statutory directive may, under certain circumstances, be a protected activity. Clifford, 419 Mich, at 365, 353 N.W.2d at 473. For example, in Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Railroad Co., 81 Mich.App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that an employer could not, consistent with public policy, discharge an employee for refusing to falsify state required pollution control reports.1 The Trombetta court reasoned that “[i]t is without question that the public policy of this state does not condone attempts to violate its duly enacted laws.” Id. at 495, 265 N.W.2d at 388. Accord Goins v. Ford Motor Co., 131 Mich.App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1983) (Michigan public policy violated by firing an employee for filing a worker’s compensation report). In addition to an employee’s compliance with the statutory mandate, however, the statutory scheme must create a clearly-mandated public policy.2 E.g., Suchodolski v. Michigan Con*799solidated Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 696, 316 N.W.2d 710, 712 (1982) (per curiam).

In order to protect pension plan participants and beneficiaries, Congress set up a comprehensive statutory scheme which established “standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries.” 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982). An ERISA fiduciary is obligated to perform his duties with the “skill, prudence, and diligence” of a reasonable man and act “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1982). Moreover, fiduciaries are personally liable for breaches of their duties under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982), and, under some circumstances, for breaches by their co-fiduciaries, 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (1982). We believe that this explicit Congressional policy statement coupled with ERISA’s detailed statutory provisions rises to the level of an important and clearly-articulated public policy under Michigan law.3 Thus, the district court held correctly that Authier asserted a cause of action under Michigan law, and, consequently, appropriately considered whether the action was preempted by ERI-SA.

ERISA preempts expressly “any and all State laws4 insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”5 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has on two occasions considered the breadth of preemption under ERISA. In Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 101 S.Ct. 1895, 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981), the Court interpreted Section 1144(a) broadly to preempt state laws which relate both directly and indirectly to ERISA. Id. at 525, 101 S.Ct. at 1907. Thus, the Court held that even though the New Jersey law in question regulated apparently workers’ compensation awards and not pension plans, it still fell within the preemptive *800sphere of Section 1144(a). Id. at 524, 101 5. Ct. at 1906. Further, the Court noted that Congress intended to make the regulation of pension plans solely a federal concern. Id. at 523, 101 S.Ct. at 1906. More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded upon the Alessi holding. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983): The Court in Shaw reasoned that Congress used “relate to” in its broadest sense, id. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 2900, and, therefore, if a state law has “a connection with or reference to” an ERISA pension plan, it is preempted, id.6 In the present case, we must determine whether a state common-law cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy based on a fiduciary’s alleged compliance with ERISA has a connection with or reference to an employee benefit plan.7

Although Authier’s claim is predicated technically upon the Michigan common-law cause of action for discharge in contravention of public policy, we believe that, as applied in this case, the action relates to an ERISA pension plan. Authier’s action hinges upon his assertion that he was terminated for fulfilling his obligations under ERISA. More importantly, ERISA created the public policy element of the commonlaw action. In our view, even though the Michigan cause of action regulates ostensibly employment relationships and not pension plans, preemption is not precluded in this specific application. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 524, 101 S.Ct. 1895, 1906, 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1983). The Supreme Court has noted explicitly that the crucial inquiry is not the purpose of the action; rather, its relation to an ERISA pension plan is determinative. Id. Thus, we conclude that since ERISA created a substantive element of the Michigan action and since the action turns upon a fiduciary’s duties under ERI-SA, Authier’s cause of action is related to ERISA within the meaning of Section 1144(a) and, accordingly, is expressly preempted.8

*801This result is consistent with Congress’ intent in enacting ERISA to protect beneficiaries and participants “by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.” 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982) (emphasis added). Broad enforcement provisions effectuate this policy. Civil actions may be brought by any “participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary ... to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of [ERISA],” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1982) (emphasis added), and by a participant or beneficiary whose rights under ERISA are interfered with, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982);9 see Crouch v. Mo-Kan Iron Workers Welfare Fund, 740 F.2d 805, 810 (10th Cir. 1984) (Section 1140 creates a retaliatory action similar to the civil rights laws); Kross v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 701 F.2d 1238, 1241-43 (7th Cir. 1983) (Section 1140 to be liberally construed); West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1980) (Section 1140 “may be enforced by civil actions”). Similarly, criminal sanctions are available for coercive interference with a beneficiary’s or participant’s rights, 29 U.S.C. § 1141 (1982); see West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1980) (enforcement of Section 1141 exclusive province of the Attorney General), and for willful violations of the reporting and disclosure provisions, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1982). Moreover, the Secretary of Labor is given express investigative and enforcement powers. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2) & 1134 (1982). Such a comprehensive enforcement scheme is indicative of a Congressional intent to make enforcement of ERISA solely a federal concern. See Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U.S. 1,-, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2854, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983) (ER-ISA provides a “series of express causes of action in favor of participants, beneficiaries and fiduciaries”); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1215 (8th Cir.) (Congress intended to provide uniform remedies in the enforcement of ERISA), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, 102 S.Ct. 641, 70 L.Ed.2d 619 (1981); Ogden v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 571 F.Supp. 520, 523 (E.D.Mich. 1983) (following Dependahl)] Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 562 F.Supp. 1286, 1293-94 (N.D.Ill. 1983) (court accepts expansive view of ERISA).

The legislative history also supports this conclusion. Both the Senate and House Reports, in the sections considering the en*802forcement provisions of ERISA, indicate that Congress intended “to provide the full range of legal and equitable remedies.” H.R.Rep. No. 93-533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 4639, 4655; S.Rep. No. 93-127, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 4838, 4871. Further, both reports stress the broad preemption of state laws to provide a uniform source of law. H.R.Rep. No. 93-533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 4639, 4655; S.Rep. No. 93-127, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4838, 4871.

Allowing a fiduciary to bring a state law cause of action for retaliatory discharge, as in the present case, will create inconsistency in the enforcement of ERISA. Initially, since all states do not recognize such an action,10 the recourse for a terminated ERI-SA fiduciary will depend upon the fortuity of the location of his employment. Moreover, even in the states which do recognize an action in a fiduciary’s favor, the state courts will have to define both the scope of a fiduciary’s duties under ERISA and the available remedies. Clearly, allowing the remedies available to an ERISA fiduciary discharged for complying with ERISA to turn upon the state of his employment and a state court’s interpretation of ERISA’s provisions runs contrary to Congress’ desire to establish a uniform federal law regulating pension plans. E.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Dines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,-, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2904, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523, 101 S.Ct. 1895, 1906, 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981). Thus, we conclude that permitting a fiduciary to bring a state law cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy would thwart the purpose of Congress in enacting ERISA. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S.Ct. 477, 100 L.Ed. 640 (1956); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). Accordingly, Authier’s action is preempted.11

In summary, we conclude that, as applied in this case, the Michigan common-law cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy relates to ERISA and, therefore, is expressly preempted. Since permitting a fiduciary to bring this type of action would create a diversity in the enforcement of ERISA, we believe that it is contrary to Congress’ desire to create a uniform federal law governing the enforcement of ERI-SA. The jury verdict is, accordingly, vacated and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss appellee’s complaint.

Both sides shall bear their own costs of this appeal.

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

This appeal poses many problems but I am not persuaded that the jury award should be vacated. Plaintiff pled and presented evidence to support a claim that he was wrongfully discharged for seeking to uphold his fiduciary duties under ERI-SA. In my opinion, plaintiff stated a cause of action under Michigan law for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The following cases illustrate Michigan’s stated policy in this regard. I recognize that it has been more often stated in dicta than illustrated in judgments. Nonetheless, the facts in this case as viewed by this jury fit the Michigan theory and I see no reason to doubt that Michigan would protect the integrity of ERISA as part of its own public policy. See Suchodolski v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Railroad Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978) and Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich.App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).

*803I should add that I do not think ERISA preempted the Michigan cause of action spelled out above. ERISA does not expressly create a federal cause of action for wrongful discharge of a fiduciary.

While, if I were not writing in dissent, I would give serious thought to defendants’ remittitur motion, I do not join in vacation of the entire jury award.